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ABSTRACT 
  The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), enacted in 1789 as part of the first 
Judiciary Act, provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations . . . .” Although the statute lay 
dormant until the 1980s, the ATS has since become the font of 
transnational public-law litigation in American courts. This litigation, 
frequently involving largely foreign parties and events, is a form of 
civil-side universal jurisdiction. Like more traditional forms of 
universal jurisdiction, the ATS allows American courts to hear 
human-rights claims based on the enormity of the offense, even when 
the claims lack any significant ties to the United States. But unlike 
traditional universal jurisdiction, which is overwhelmingly a criminal 
phenomenon, ATS suits place control over initiation and conduct of 
this litigation in private hands and engage the exceptional machinery 
of American civil justice. 
  The Supreme Court sharply limited ATS suits in the 2013 case of 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. This Article defends the 
Court’s rejection of universal jurisdiction in Kiobel and assesses the 
future of human-rights litigation in American courts. I submit that the 
scope of human-rights litigation under the ATS is best viewed not as a 
sui generis problem of foreign-relations law, as most lawyers and 
scholars have treated it, but instead within the more traditional 
federal-courts framework of implied rights of action and federal 
common law. Kiobel’s concerns about extraterritorial application of 
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the ATS fit comfortably within this framework, and they suggest that 
the Court will be extremely cautious about expanding the scope of 
ATS litigation in future cases. I also situate the ATS within the context 
of broader debates about enforcement of international human rights. 
These debates raise two crucial questions of institutional design: 
reliance on supranational or national institutions, and public or 
private control of enforcement. This debate, too, can be usefully 
informed by domestic debates about regulatory enforcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Writing in 1991, Harold Koh articulated a broad vision of 
“transnational public law litigation” as a parallel to the domestic 
public-law litigation that had desegregated American schools, cleaned 
up prisons and mental hospitals, and reformed a broad range of other 
public institutions.1 “Like its domestic counterpart,” Dean Koh wrote, 
“transnational public law litigation seeks to vindicate public rights 
and values through judicial remedies. In both settings, parties bring 
‘public actions,’ asking courts to declare and explicate public norms, 
often with the goal of provoking institutional reform.”2 The 
centerpiece of Koh’s vision was claims by victims of torture and other 
human-rights violations against their abusers, brought in American 
federal courts under the long-dormant Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 1980 decision 
recognizing such a claim in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala3 was, in Koh’s view, 
the “Brown v. Board of Education” that “inaugurated the era of 
transnational public law litigation in which we now live.”4 
The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations . . . .”5 Although the statute lay 
 
 1. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991) 
[hereinafter Koh, Transnational Public Litigation]. For the domestic version, see generally 
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).  
 2. Koh, Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2347–48. 
 3. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 4. Koh, Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2366 (citing Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); see also Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The 
Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 601 (2013) (observing that 
since Filártiga, “the ATS has garnered worldwide attention and has become the main engine for 
transnational human rights litigation in the United States”). 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). This provision has been part of the judicial code since 1789. 
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77. Courts and commentators refer to § 1350 
as both the “ATS” and the “Alien Tort Claims Act,” or “ATCA.” 
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dormant for much of our history, for the past thirty-five years it has 
been a prominent vehicle for international human-rights litigation. 
Initial claims focused on individual perpetrators of abuses in foreign 
lands, but more recent plaintiffs have sued multinational corporations 
alleged to have participated in such abuses. By one count, “there have 
been about 173 judicial opinions regarding the ATS [since Filártiga]. 
One hundred fifty-five ATS cases have been filed against 
corporations in federal courts, with about six-to-ten ATS cases being 
filed annually.”6 
The Filártiga line of cases employed the ATS as a form of civil-
side universal jurisdiction, offering recourse against serious violators 
of international law despite the absence, in many if not most cases, of 
any significant connection between the parties or events in issue and 
the United States. Jurisdiction rested not on particular U.S. 
connections or interests, but on a “more general obligation to help 
redress certain violations of international law as such, regardless of 
where they may have occurred or the identity of the victim.”7 The 
American human-rights community has viewed the ATS as “a badge 
of honor” that “contribute[s] . . . to the moral and political standing of 
the United States as a champion of international law,”8 and vigorously 
defended the statute’s role as a form of universal civil jurisdiction.9 
Critics have worried about the potential of universal jurisdiction to 
undermine American foreign policy and criticized broad ATS 
litigation as a threat to international business.10 
The Supreme Court sharply limited the ATS’s role in Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,11 which held that the ATS generally has 
no extraterritorial reach—that is, foreign nationals cannot sue foreign 
defendants for actions unconnected to the United States. Significant 
uncertainty remains, however; the Kiobel majority’s analysis seemed 
to leave open the possibility for a significant range of human-rights 
 
 6. Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 713 (2012). 
 7. Anne-Marie Burley (now Slaughter), The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 464 (1989). 
 8. Id. at 464, 493. 
 9. E.g., Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of 
Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 146–48 (2006). 
 10. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 323, 325 (2001) [hereinafter Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction]; GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & 
NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 
37–43 (2003). 
 11. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
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litigation under the ATS, and various concurring opinions suggested 
that the universal-jurisdiction view of the statute is far from dead. 
This Article defends the result in Kiobel and explores the implications 
of its reasoning. I argue that the Court rightly situated the ATS within 
established federal-courts doctrines governing implied rights of 
action, and that these doctrines can also resolve many future 
questions concerning the scope of ATS claims. 
Contemporary debates over the proper scope of ATS litigation 
reflect continuing tensions in American law and politics.12 There is, 
first, the perennial tension between desire to vindicate universal 
principles of human rights abroad and aversion to foreign 
entanglements. George W. Bush’s proclamation that “[t]he best hope 
for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world,”13 
for example, contrasts with John Quincy Adams’s insistence that 
“America . . . goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is 
the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the 
champion and vindicator only of her own.”14 A related tension exists 
between an “ideological fervor and messianic streak” and “offsetting 
tendencies” toward “[p]ragmatism” and “a willingness to compromise 
to achieve vital goals.”15 Hence, Anne-Marie Slaughter highlights a 
clash between narrow interpretations of the ATS based on “cramped 
and circumspect” views of the national interest grounded in 
“prudence” and broader readings grounded in “honor,” “virtue,” and 
“a vision of the United States at the forefront of efforts to strengthen 
the rule of law in international as well as domestic affairs.”16 
As it has developed in recent years, however, the ATS 
jurisprudence also reflects some less familiar tensions. One is between 
 
 12. See David J. Bederman, International Law Advocacy and Its Discontents, 2 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 475, 477–84 (2001) (framing the ATS debate within competing ideological traditions in 
U.S. foreign-relations law); Wuerth, supra note 4, at 601 (“[T]o the extent the ‘culture wars’ 
have played out in U.S. foreign relations law, the ATS has been their center of gravity.”). 
 13. President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/925/925-h/925-h.htm#link2H_4_0056; see also John B. Bellinger 
III, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Sec’y of State, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and 
Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, Address Delivered at Vanderbilt 
University Law School (Apr. 11, 2008), in 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 1 (2009) (“U.S. foreign 
policy—under every Administration—involves promoting respect for human rights around the 
world.”). 
 14. President John Quincy Adams, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on 
Foreign Policy (July 4, 1821), available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3484. 
 15. GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 
SINCE 1776, at 5 (2008). 
 16. See Burley, supra note 7, at 489, 493. 
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models of international law grounded in official state practice and 
international institutions, on the one hand, and a more decentralized 
model that emphasizes the role of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and national courts. This divide emerged in Kiobel itself, as 
national governments tended to oppose broad forms of ATS 
litigation, while NGOs vigorously promoted them.17 A comparable 
tension exists on the domestic level between public enforcement of 
regulatory standards by government agencies and enforcement by 
“private attorneys general,” often through common-law litigation that 
substitutes courts and juries for legislatures and expert 
agencies.18 Any effort to resolve continuing uncertainties under the 
ATS or to amend its provisions should take account of these broader 
tensions regarding the role of domestic courts in the development and 
enforcement of international law. 
Part I of this Article describes the background of the ATS and its 
development into a form of civil-side universal jurisdiction. Part II 
shows why universal jurisdiction meshes poorly with the ATS’s 
structure, which lacks any express private right to sue. An aggressive 
implied right of action in transnational human-rights cases cuts 
against the grain of federal-courts doctrine counseling restraint where 
Congress has not explicitly authorized private litigation. This tension 
has surfaced in recent decisions narrowing the ATS. Part III turns to 
ATS litigation after Kiobel; I then step back to consider ATS 
litigation in light of broader tensions in both domestic and 
international law enforcement. Any viable human-rights regime must 
rely significantly on national courts, and involvement by U.S. courts 
can further not only human rights but America’s pragmatic interests 
as well. Achieving such a regime, however, will require careful 
institutional design with support and leadership from the political 
branches. 
 
 17. Compare, e.g., Brief of the Gov’ts of U.K. of Great Britain and the Netherlands as 
Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 6–7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Great Britain & Netherlands Brief] (filed Feb. 3, 
2012) (urging the Court to reject corporate liability in ATS suits), with Brief of Amici Curiae 
International Human Rights Organizations and International Law Experts in Support of 
Petitioners at 2–4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) 
(filed Dec. 21, 2011) (urging the opposite); see also Bellinger, supra note 13, at 14 (urging that 
promotion of human rights abroad be left to the professionals in the Executive branch). 
 18. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558 (2009). 
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I.  THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AS CIVIL-SIDE 
 UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Judge Henry Friendly famously described the ATS as “a kind of 
legal Lohengrin . . . . [N]o one seems to know whence it came.”19 
Whatever its original purpose, the ATS has served in modern times 
primarily as a vehicle for human-rights claims brought by aliens 
against other aliens for human-rights violations committed outside 
the United States. Beth Stephens has called these “core Filártiga 
lawsuits,”20 after the Second Circuit’s seminal decision in Filártiga v. 
Peña-Irala,21 which initiated the modern era of human-rights litigation 
under the ATS. 
Used in this way, the ATS amounts to a uniquely American form 
of universal jurisdiction. The ATS, as understood in Filártiga and its 
progeny, opens American courts to victims of human-rights abuses 
whenever the perpetrators may be found within the jurisdiction of 
those courts, regardless of whether the relevant events have any tie to 
the United States. This Part traces that development. I begin with a 
brief overview of universal jurisdiction in international law, then turn 
to the story of the ATS. 
A. Universal Jurisdiction over Human-Rights Claims 
Debates about the ATS raise several distinct jurisdictional 
questions. It is helpful, at least to a point, to distinguish between a 
state’s jurisdiction to prescribe (to apply its own law), to adjudicate 
(to subject a legal dispute to the state’s own tribunals), and to enforce 
(to compel compliance with the applicable law, generally through 
executive action).22 An American court might assert jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a dispute, for instance, but apply international law as the 
rule of decision on the ground that the United States lacks 
jurisdiction to prescribe in the relevant circumstances. But these 
categories blur, overlap, and connect in myriad ways. For example, 
international law typically does not prescribe remedies for 
 
 19. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). For non–opera buffs, Lohengrin 
was the mysterious knight in the eponymous opera by Richard Wagner. 
 20. Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of 
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2002) 
[hereinafter Stephens, Translating Filártiga]. 
 21. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 22. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 401 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (distinguishing these three 
forms of jurisdiction). 
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violations,23 yet adjudication often involves fashioning a remedy, 
which in turn involves elements of both prescription and 
enforcement. Moreover, the Legal Realists taught that the law is 
often at least somewhat indeterminate, so adjudicating a claim under 
a particular legal principle will involve a degree of lawmaking as the 
court applies that principle to particular cases.24 That is one reason 
parties care not only about what law will govern their case but also 
about what court will apply that law. Adjudication almost always 
involves some degree of prescription. 
Jurisdictional questions in this area also arise under two distinct 
bodies of law (international and domestic), and the domestic 
questions concern both the federal Constitution and the relevant 
jurisdictional statutes. This Section deals primarily with the 
permissible exercise of jurisdiction under international law; I discuss 
some constitutional questions in passing in Part II.B. But it is worth 
remembering that these questions are interconnected. The statutory 
and constitutional provisions empowering the U.S. federal courts 
constrain those bodies far more than do the capacious principles 
found in international law, but it remains likely that international 
principles governing the appropriate exercise of prescriptive and 
adjudicatory authority shaped the vision of the judicial power 
reflected in Article III and the first Judiciary Act. And to add one 
more layer of complexity, the international law that influenced the 
Framers is quite different from the international law that exists today. 
This Section traces the outlines of universal jurisdiction in 
international law and practice as a backdrop to the development of 
the American ATS. Three points are crucial: universal jurisdiction is 
unsettled and controversial in principle; its exercise is extremely rare 
 
 23. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: 
Optimal Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 244 
(2011) (“The topic of remedies is one of the most undeveloped areas of international law.”). 
Efforts by international treaties and institutions to develop principles of individual remedies 
remain fairly embryonic. See, e.g., Liesbeth Zegveld, Remedies for Victims of Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 497, 497–98 (2003). In particular, 
“the concept of a private civil action in which one person sues another for violation of 
international law is virtually unknown to international law.” William R. Casto, The New Federal 
Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 643 
(2006) [hereinafter Casto, New Federal Common Law]. For example, the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission’s “Principles on the Right to a Remedy” “are first and foremost 
concerned with domestic remedies.” Zegveld, supra, at 513 (emphasis added).  
 24. See generally Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 
10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 32, 102–05 (2013) [hereinafter Young, Erie] (explaining how courts 
make law by interpreting it). 
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in practice; and when other countries do employ it, it is nearly always 
a tool of criminal (not civil) enforcement. 
1. The Bases of Jurisdiction in International Law.  “The starting-
point in this part of the law,” according to Sir Ian Brownlie’s leading 
treatise, is “that, at least as a presumption, jurisdiction is territorial.”25 
Jurisdiction is generally a function of sovereignty, and sovereignty—
even in this day and age—remains grounded in territory.26 As Cherif 
Bassiouni has explained, “[s]overeignty, jurisdiction, and territory 
have traditionally been closely linked . . . due to the recognized 
importance of avoiding jurisdictional conflicts between states and 
providing legal consistency and predictability.”27 Traditionally, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction was largely limited to offenses committed 
by a state’s own nationals abroad.28 Other forms of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction developed in the last century: states base jurisdiction over 
non-nationals in cases involving actions outside their borders on a 
“protective principle” (preventing conduct that may cause harm 
within their borders) or “passive-personality principle” (redressing 
extraterritorial crimes committed against a state’s own nationals).29 
Although extraterritorial in reach, both protective and passive-
personality jurisdiction retain a link to territoriality and nationality 
through their emphasis on the impact of the action in question.30  
 
 25. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (7th ed. 2008); see 
also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International 
Law [hereinafter Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction], in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: 
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 39, 40 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION] (“Throughout 
the course of legal history, jurisdictional powers have primarily been exercised in accordance 
with the principle of territorial jurisdiction.”). 
 26. See BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 301; Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: 
Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 188 (2004) 
[hereinafter Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy] (“[C]ontrol over territory is the hallmark of 
sovereignty.”).  
 27. Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 40; see also Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 168, 171–72 [hereinafter Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction].  
 28. See BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 303–04; Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, 
supra note 25, at 41. 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 402; BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 304–05; 
LOUIS HENKIN, GERALD L. NEUMAN, DIANE F. ORENTLICHER & DAVID W. LEEBRON, 
HUMAN RIGHTS 657 (1999); Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 41. 
 30. See Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 42. Moreover, each of 
these bases for jurisdiction remains subject to a general requirement of reasonableness. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 403(1). 
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Universal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over “acts committed 
outside [states’] territory by non-nationals whose victims also were 
not their nationals”31—arises instead from the nature of the offense.32 
Section 404 of the Restatement (Third) of American Foreign Relations 
Law states the common understanding in the international-law 
community: 
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for 
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of 
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking 
of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of 
terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in 
§ 402 is present.33 
As used here, universal jurisdiction is primarily jurisdiction to 
adjudicate crimes defined by international law.34 It is thus important 
to distinguish between universal jurisdiction to adjudicate, on the one 
hand, and universal condemnation of certain crimes, the 
extraterritorial reach of national legislation, and the universal reach 
of international adjudicative bodies (which may or may not rely on 
universal jurisdiction for their authority).35 
 
 31. HENKIN, NEUMAN, ORENTLICHER & LEEBRON, supra note 29, at 657. 
 32. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 305 (stating that universal jurisdiction is typically 
recognized where “the nature of the crime . . . justif[ies] . . . repression . . . as a matter of 
international public policy”); Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The 
Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 1 (2011) (“The jurisdictional claim is predicated on the atrocious nature of the crime and 
legally based on treaties or customary international law.”). 
 33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404; see also THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, Principle 1.1, at 21 (2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES], 
available at https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf (“[U]niversal jurisdiction is 
criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime 
was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the 
victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.”). 
 34. It remains jurisdiction “to prescribe” in the sense that the state exercising universal 
jurisdiction must liquidate the meaning of often-amorphous concepts in treaties and CIL. This 
sort of lawmaking is not the same as the normative discretion enjoyed by common-law courts 
authorized to shape, say, rules of tort. See Young, Erie, supra note 24, at 32, 102–05.  
 35. See Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 62; see also Stephan 
A. Oxman, Comment: The Quest for Clarity, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 64. 
Universal jurisdiction ordinarily does require the presence of the accused, although Mr. Oxman 
notes a “super pure” case of universal jurisdiction “in which jurisdiction would exist even 
without the presence of the accused.” Id.; see also A. Hays Butler, The Growing Support for 
Universal Jurisdiction in National Legislation, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 
67, 69 (describing the Belgian statute). 
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Universal jurisdiction is typically justified on the ground that the 
“exceptional gravity” of the offense “affect[s] the fundamental 
interests of the international community as a whole.”36 Universalist 
prosecutions thus rest on a consensus of nations, reflected in 
customary law, as to a particular crime’s extraordinary depravity.37 
This is not the only account of universal jurisdiction, nor does it best 
fit universality’s historical antecedents. But it is the account that 
dominates contemporary discussions of universal jurisdiction over 
war crimes, torture, genocide, and the like—the human-rights 
violations typically giving rise to ATS litigation.38 
Both proponents and critics of international human-rights 
litigation agree that the turn to universal jurisdiction reflects the 
weakness of criminal-enforcement institutions at the international 
level. A report by Human Rights Watch argues that 
despite the creation of ad hoc international criminal tribunals . . . 
vast gaps persist in the ability to bring to justice persons accused of 
the gravest international crimes . . . . Even with the advent of a 
permanent International Criminal Court, it is expected that there 
will remain an “impunity gap unless national authorities, the 
international community and the [ICC] work together” . . . . [A] 
critical role thus remains for national courts and tribunals through 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction.39 
Universal jurisdiction thus counts on domestic courts to enforce 
principles of international law.40 Serious resource and personnel 
 
 36. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 33, Introduction, at 23; see also Slaughter, 
Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 169, 173 (observing that the “standard account” of 
universal jurisdiction aims at “crimes under international law” that are “so heinous that they 
strike at the ‘whole of mankind’ and shock ‘the conscience of nations’”) (quoting Attorney Gen. 
v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 280 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962)).  
 37. See Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 175 (“The inherent limits built 
into this account flow from the combination of the degree of depravity or fundamental 
inhumanity necessary to classify certain acts as international crimes and the necessity of 
agreement on that classification by a considerable majority of sovereign states.”). 
 38. See, e.g., NEHAL BHUTA & JÜRGEN SCHURR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: THE STATE OF THE ART 1, 34 (2006), available at http://www.hrw
.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0606web.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH] (advocating 
the assertion of universal jurisdiction over “the gravest crimes recognized by the international 
community”); Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 204–07 (documenting the 
centrality of the “heinousness principle” to contemporary thinking about universal jurisdiction). 
 39. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 1. 
 40. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 168. Critics of international criminal 
institutions have similarly argued that international courts have had mixed results, at best, 
especially in the area of human rights. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL 
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constraints limit international criminal courts’ ability to deal with 
more than a fraction of the potential cases within their jurisdictions.41 
Only domestic courts will generally enjoy the extensive remedial 
powers necessary to grant effective redress in human-rights cases. In 
many cases, domestic courts exercising universal jurisdiction afford an 
attractive avenue for those seeking to vindicate claims under 
international law. 
2. Universal Jurisdiction in Practice.  Three aspects of the 
contemporary practice of universal jurisdiction are critical for present 
purposes. First, universal jurisdiction as practiced by other countries 
is always criminal in character.42 The Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction, for example, explicitly state that “universal 
jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction.”43 Domestic legislation 
implementing the “prosecute or extradite” provisions of the postwar 
human-rights conventions was framed in criminal terms.44 Likewise, 
the later wave of domestic statutes implementing the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC)—which imposes a duty on 
“every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes”45—also involved criminal, not 
civil, sanctions.46 The aspiration of these treaties and domestic statutes 
 
LEGALISM 150–74 (2009); Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism 
Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 639–41 (2010).  
 41. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 40, at 676–77 (describing how limited funding 
constrains international courts); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 1 (“With finite 
resources, international courts and mixed ‘internationalized’ tribunals can try only a relatively 
small number of perpetrators, and the courts’ mandates are generally limited to crimes 
committed in specific territories and conflicts.”).  
 42. William Dodge has suggested that the distinction between civil and criminal jurisdiction 
is irrelevant to the legality of universal jurisdiction under international law. E-mail from William 
Dodge to Ernest Young (Apr. 23, 2014) (on file with author). My point in this article, however, 
is that domestic law frequently does make this distinction important, and that the distinction has 
important functional consequences that both foreign-relations law and international law must 
take into account. 
 43. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 33, Principle 1.1, at 28. The Restatement (Third) 
does state—presumably with the ATS in mind—that “jurisdiction on the basis of universal 
interests has been exercised in the form of criminal law, but international law does not preclude 
the application of non-criminal law on this basis, for example, by providing a remedy in tort or 
restitution for victims of piracy.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404 cmt. b. 
 44. See Butler, supra note 35, at 68. 
 45. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999, pmbl. (1998). 
 46. See Butler, supra note 35, at 68–72. See generally Loi relative à la répression des 
violations graves du droit international humanitaire [Act Concerning the Punishment of Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law] of Feb. 10, 1999, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] 
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Mar. 23, 1999, reprinted at 38 I.L.M. 918 (Belgium); R.S.C. 2000, 
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has been to establish “a system of international criminal justice . . . in 
which both international criminal tribunals and national courts have 
an important and mutually reinforcing role to play in the enforcement 
of international criminal norms.”47 
Several of the European universal-jurisdiction statutes did 
incorporate elements that Americans associate with civil justice, such 
as an initiating role for victims and some compensatory remedies. 
Victims of persecution initiated the case against former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet in Spain, for example, and Iraqi families 
initiated Belgium’s abortive case against various U.S. officials arising 
out of the Iraq War.48 Some European civil-law countries recognize 
the action civile, which allows a civil claim for compensation to be 
attached to a criminal proceeding.49 Nonetheless, the criminal nature 
of the suit, with public control of the proceedings, remains primary; 
under the civil law’s inquisitorial model, for instance, the judge will 
control the investigation and exercise prosecutorial discretion even 
when private victims initiate the lawsuit.50 Moreover, these civil-side 
features have been among the most controversial aspects of universal 
jurisdiction in other countries, with statutory reforms frequently 
curtailing or eliminating them.51 
The second general point is that “the exercise of pure universal 
jurisdiction is actually very rare.”52 International treaties do not 
authorize universal jurisdiction as broadly as one might infer from the 
proposition that universality is appropriate to punish the gravest 
international crimes.53 A number of the broad human-rights 
conventions proposed and ratified after World War II, such as the 
 
c. 24, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en (Canada); International Criminal Court Act 2001, c. 
17, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010017.htm (United Kingdom). For an 
account of the British and Belgian experiences, see Langer, supra note 32, at 15–19 (Britain), 
26–32 (Belgium). 
 47. Butler, supra note 35, at 76. 
 48. See Langer, supra note 32, at 29 (discussing the Belgian case); Richard J. Wilson, 
Prosecuting Pinochet in Spain, 6 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 3, 3 (1999). 
 49. See generally Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 154 (collecting provisions). 
 50. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 32, at 36 (describing the Pinochet proceedings). 
 51. See infra text accompanying note 71.  
 52. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 168–69. 
 53. See, e.g., Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., 
July/Aug. 2001, at 87 (“[N]one of these steps”—including “the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948, the genocide convention of 1948 . . . the antitorture convention of 1988” or the 
human-rights provisions of the “Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe”—“was conceived at the time as instituting a ‘universal jurisdiction.’”). 
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1984 Torture Convention,54 required states to criminalize the relevant 
conduct in their domestic law and to prosecute or extradite persons 
accused of such conduct. Absent extradition, prosecution by state 
parties would often rely on universal jurisdiction,55 and many 
countries adopted laws providing for universal jurisdiction over such 
crimes.56 Some of these domestic laws were tied to particular human-
rights conventions;57 others provided for domestic jurisdiction not 
only over specific international crimes but also over “any other 
offense which under international treaties or conventions, should be 
prosecuted” in the forum country.58 However, universal jurisdiction is 
conspicuously absent from some of the more important human-rights 
conventions; neither the Geneva Conventions on war crimes nor the 
Genocide Conventions, for example, explicitly provide for it despite 
the widespread contention that war crimes and genocide are universal 
offenses.59 Although universal jurisdiction over these crimes is now 
 
 54. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Art. 7(1), G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987, draft reprinted in 23 I.L.J. 1027 (1985) (“The 
State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any 
offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not 
extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”). 
 55. See Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 55 (distinguishing 
between “extradite or prosecute” provisions and pure universal jurisdiction, but conceding that 
absent extradition, any prosecution of persons without national or territorial links to the forum 
state must rely on universal jurisdiction); see also Lori F. Damrosch, Comment: Connecting the 
Threads in the Fabric of International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 94 
(“[A]t a minimum all the prosecute-or-extradite crimes are ones as to which there is an option 
to exercise jurisdiction without any link to the crime other than custody of the offender.”). 
 56. See Butler, supra note 35, at 68; Mark Chadwick, Modern Developments in Universal 
Jurisdiction: Addressing Impunity in Tibet and Beyond, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 359, 362–64 
(2009). 
 57. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52 (United Kingdom). 
 58. See, e.g., Amendments to the Law on Judicial Power art. 23.4 (B.O.E. 1/2009) (Spain) 
(amending Organic Law on the Judiciary art. 23.4 (B.O.E. 6/1985)). On the Spanish experience, 
see Langer, supra note 32, at 32–41. 
 59. Compare, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404 (asserting that universal 
jurisdiction extends to genocide and war crimes), with Bassiouni, History of Universal 
Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 51 (noting that “[n]o convention dealing with the law of armed 
conflict contains a specific provision on universal jurisdiction,” and “customary international 
law as reflected by the practice of states does not, in the judgment of this writer, mean that 
universal jurisdiction has been applied in national prosecutions”); id. at 53 (noting that the 
Genocide Convention makes no provision for universal jurisdiction); see also Madeline H. 
Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
337, 347 (2001) (noting that “[u]niversal jurisdiction over genocide was proposed but rejected 
during the negotiation of the Genocide Convention, in view of strong opposition by France, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States”). 
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widely thought to be part of CIL, “[t]he origin and basis of this 
development . . . are actually questionable.”60 
More important, nations simply do not exercise universal 
jurisdiction when they have it.61 For example, David Scheffer, the U.S. 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, reported in 2000 that 
“governments [are] almost universally determined not to use the 
universal jurisdiction tools they have to prosecute.”62 This is true both 
at present and historically. Allied prosecutions of Nazi war criminals 
after World War II, although sometimes viewed as instances of 
universal jurisdiction, were grounded firmly in national jurisdiction 
and the rights of the victor states as participants in the conflict.63 
Spain’s famous effort to prosecute Augusto Pinochet, which Human 
Rights Watch described as a “wake up call” demonstrating the 
potential of universal jurisdiction,64 relied partially on universal 
jurisdiction but also on injuries to Spanish nationals.65 More generally, 
 
 60. Morris, supra note 59, at 347; see also infra notes 68–82 and accompanying text. 
 61. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 2 (“On paper, a great many countries 
around the world appear to recognize that they can and should exercise universal jurisdiction 
over international crimes such as torture and war crimes, by passing laws that permit the 
prosecution of such crimes. But practice has generally lagged far behind laws on the books.”); 
Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 170 (“[A]t least at this stage in the evolution 
of universal jurisdiction, . . . although the basis for jurisdiction over war criminals and 
perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity has been established in many countries, 
the actual prosecutions have been blocked in many cases.”). 
 62. David Scheffer, Opening Address, Universal Jurisdiction Conference, Dec. 2000, in 35 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 233, 234 (2001); see also Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra 
note 25, at 62 (“The tendency of state practice has been not to apply [universal jurisdiction].”). 
 63. Gary J. Bass, The Adolf Eichmann Case: Universal and National Jurisdiction, in 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 77, 81–83; Bassiouni, History of Universal 
Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 51–52; Morris, supra note 59, at 341–45; see also Bass, supra, at 83 
(noting that “the focus of the Nuremberg prosecution of top Nazi leaders was aggressive war,” 
not violations of human rights). Israel’s famous prosecution of Adolf Eichmann, following his 
abduction from Argentina, was in large part for crimes against the Jewish people—not simply 
for crimes against humanity generally. See Bass, supra, at 85; Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, 
supra note 27, at 172 (noting that “the Eichmann prosecution relied on both passive personality 
and the protective principle in addition to universality”). 
 64. See The Pinochet Precedent: How Victims Can Pursue Human Rights Criminals 
Abroad, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 1, 1998), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/chile98/
precedent.htm; see also Amnesty International USA, Universal Jurisdiction: Questions and 
Answers, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/counter-terror-with-justice/reports-statements-
and-issue-briefs/universal-jurisdiction/page.do?id=1108003 (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (“The 
Pinochet case, is the most well known case where states have exercised universal jurisdiction.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 314–15 (2001) (noting that prosecutions of Pinochet in Spain and 
Belgium emphasized crimes against citizens and residents of the respective forum states); 
Wilson, supra note 48, at 3. 
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a 2003 study by one of the the ICC’s architects found that “increasing 
numbers of states are enacting laws that provide for universal 
jurisdiction,” but “it has not yet been supported by the practice of 
states. In fact, there are only a few cases known to scholars in which 
pure universal jurisdiction . . . has been applied.”66 A more recent 
survey found that, out of “1051 complaints or cases considered by 
public authorities” in European nations with universal-jurisdiction 
statutes, “only 32 have actually been brought to trial.”67 
It is worth emphasizing, moreover, that universalist prosecutions 
have been confined to a handful of states in Western Europe;68 hence, 
it is difficult to say that universal jurisdiction is part of CIL.69 
Certainly, American law lacks any examples of classical universalist 
criminal prosecutions.70 Countries like Belgium and Spain that had led 
the way with broad assertions of universal jurisdiction appear to have 
 
 66. Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 62; see also Stephen 
Macedo, Introduction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 25, at 8 (“[U]niversal 
jurisdiction is not as well established in international law as some human rights organizations 
and others have claimed.”); Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 172 (noting that 
“many national courts have purported to exercise universal jurisdiction while actually requiring 
some kind of more traditional nexus to nationality or territory”).  
 67. Langer, supra note 32, at 7. 
 68. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 4 (“[A] handful of EU member states 
have been at the center of developments in the exercise of universal jurisdiction.”). 
 69. See also John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross Study, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 465–71 (2007) (refuting, on behalf of the U.S. State 
Department, assertions that universal jurisdiction is supported by the practice of nations or by 
adequate opinio juris); Sienho Yee, Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality, 10 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 503, 529–30 (2011) (denying that universal jurisdiction has become part of 
international custom outside the context of piracy). Some states have argued that CIL 
“authorizes, or at least does not prohibit, the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the core 
international crimes.” Langer, supra note 32, at 4. There is, of course, quite a difference 
between “authorizes” and “does not prohibit.” And, as Langer ably demonstrates, there is no 
consistent or uniform practice of states exercising universal jurisdiction, even among those 
Western European states that have experimented with it. See id. An argument for universal 
jurisdiction under CIL would thus have to emphasize evidence of opinio juris over the actual 
practice of nations. See generally J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 470 (2000) (criticizing this tendency in contemporary invocations of CIL); 
Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and 
General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1992) (same). 
 70. The federal piracy statute is the best example of American adoption of universal 
jurisdiction. But as Professor Bassiouni points out, virtually all the Marshall Court’s cases under 
the piracy statute involved American nationals. Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, 
supra note 25, at 279 n.55. Recent opinions applying the piracy statute have invoked universal 
jurisdiction, but the cases involved attacks on U.S. nationals. See, e.g., United States v. Shibin, 
722 F.3d 233, 236, 239–40 (4th Cir. 2013) (attack on German and American vessels); United 
States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 449, 469 (4th Cir. 2012) (attack on a U.S. navy vessel). 
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beaten significant retreats. Belgium, for example, famously 
entertained an effort by Iraqi families to prosecute former high-
ranking U.S. officials involved in the Gulf War, including President 
George H.W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell, and General Norman Schwarzkopf. But when 
American officials suggested that NATO’s headquarters could be 
withdrawn from Brussels, amendments that drastically narrowed the 
Belgian statute followed in short order.71 
The third striking feature of universal jurisdiction in actual 
practice is that it tends to diverge from the standard account resting 
on the “heinousness” of the underlying offense. Historically, universal 
jurisdiction was limited largely to piracy, which continues to provide 
the paradigm case of legitimate universal jurisdiction.72 Eugene 
Kontorovich has persuasively argued, however, that piracy is not a 
particularly outrageous offense in comparison to other crimes.73 After 
all, virtually every state once employed its own privateers (basically, 
licensed pirates) without any sense that their actions were morally 
outrageous, and the law treated piracy as simply robbery occurring on 
the high seas.74 The best rationale for universal jurisdiction over 
piracy, while not always articulated, seems to have rested on the 
statelessness of the perpetrators or perhaps on the difficulty of laying 
hold of them.75 There was, on the other hand, generally no recognition 
of universal jurisdiction over genocide or war crimes even though 
 
 71. See Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 890–
91 (2003). For Spain’s amendment of its universal-jurisdiction statute to cut back on aggressive 
prosecutions, see Langer, supra note 32, at 32–41. 
 72. See, e.g., Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 47–49; see also 
United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820) (stating that pirates “are proper 
objects for the penal code of all nations”). 
 73. Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 186; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 
70 (1996) (acknowledging that piracy “neither threatens peace and security nor shocks the 
conscience of humanity, though it may have at one time”). 
 74. See Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 210–29. 
 75. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 
(1769) (emphasizing that the pirate had placed himself back in the state of nature vis-à-vis 
victims and prosecuting states); Samuel Shnider, Universal Jurisdiction over “Operation of a 
Pirate Ship”: The Legality of the Evolving Piracy Definition in Regional Prosecutions, 38 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 473, 491 (2013) (suggesting that piracy is “a crime that could only be 
addressed by interstate cooperation, and that by its nature, location, and effects defines a shared 
interest that can be applied with minimal disruption of the world order”); Expert Declaration of 
Madeline Morris at 14–15, Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d. 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 
00-11695) (noting that pirates “preyed upon the nationals, vessels, and commerce of all states, 
but came within the jurisdiction of none”). 
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those crimes were recognized offenses centuries before Nuremberg.76 
The idea that universal jurisdiction follows whenever a crime is 
universally thought to be awful is thus a very new development.77 
A similar disconnect exists with respect to current practice 
concerning other crimes. Universal condemnation is neither a 
sufficient nor a necessary condition for universal jurisdiction. The 
international conventions dealing with war crimes and genocide lack 
any specific provision for universal jurisdiction, and whether that 
jurisdiction may be inferred is controversial;78 on the other hand, 
international conventions tend to call for signatories to exercise 
universal jurisdiction most frequently in cases of less serious crimes, 
such as narcotics offenses or destruction of cultural property.79 
Equally important, Máximo Langer has demonstrated that states do 
not decide to exercise universal jurisdiction simply as a function of the 
enormity of the offense; rather, prosecutions reflect a weighing of 
costs and benefits by political-branch officials in the prosecuting 
state.80 These incentives “tend to favor [assertion of universal 
jurisdiction] over low-cost defendants—those who can impose little or 
no international relations, political, economic, or other costs on 
potential prosecuting states—and especially over those low-cost 
defendants about whom the international community has reached 
 
 76. See Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 227–28. 
 77. Piracy is also a poor precedent for modern universal jurisdiction because it was defined 
to exclude official actions on behalf of governments. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 59, at 339–40 
(“By excluding state acts from the definition of piracy, the law of piracy was designed to prevent 
universal jurisdiction over piracy from becoming a source of interstate conflict.”).  
 78. See Langer, supra note 32, at 4. For diverging views, compare Universal Jurisdiction 
over War Crimes, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.icrc.org/en/
document/universal-jurisdiction-over-war-crimes-factsheet (“While the Conventions do not 
expressly state that jurisdiction is to be asserted regardless of the place of the offence, they have 
generally been interpreted as providing for mandatory universal jurisdiction.”), with Yee, supra 
note 69, at 511–19 (arguing that the major human-rights conventions do not authorize universal 
jurisdiction). 
 79. See Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 56–61.  
 80. Langer, supra note 32, at 3–10. This gap between availability of universal jurisdiction 
and actual prosecutions is equally pronounced for piracy. See generally Eugene Kontorovich & 
Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 
436, 452 (2010) (concluding that “under normal circumstances, nations use universal jurisdiction 
against a tiny fraction of high seas piracies”). The overwhelming majority of U.S. prosecutions 
for piracy have involved attacks on American citizens. See Bassiouni, History of Universal 
Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 279 n.55. Jurisdiction would thus have rested on the passive-
personality principle rather than the universal condemnation of piracy.  
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broad agreement.”81 As Eugene Kontorovich has concluded, “The 
endorsement by nations of universal jurisdiction as an international 
legal norm seems almost entirely unrelated to their willingness to put 
it into practice.”82 
3. Continuing Controversy over Universal Jurisdiction.  
Traditional theories of jurisdiction were means of allocating 
sovereignty and minimizing conflict among states. Universal 
jurisdiction, by contrast, reflects the more general shift in 
international law from regulating relations among states to regulating 
states’ treatment of their own citizens and other individuals within 
their control. It is avowedly reformist. As the authors of the Princeton 
Principles on Universal Jurisdiction affirm, “impunity for the 
commission of serious crimes must yield to accountability”; hence, 
universal jurisdiction “holds out the promise of greater justice.”83 
Universal jurisdiction is thus a “potent weapon” that “would cast all 
the world’s courts as a net to catch alleged perpetrators of serious 
crimes under international law. It holds the promise of a system of 
global accountability—justice without borders—administered by the 
competent courts of all nations on behalf of humankind.”84 
But notwithstanding frequent assertions that universal 
jurisdiction is now well accepted,85 scholars lament that “[t]he 
doctrine . . . has evolved . . . through a process that has been less 
circumspect and deliberate than we might have hoped.”86 Often the 
academic literature has leaped ahead of realities on the ground; as 
 
 81. Langer, supra note 32, at 5. By “agreement,” Professor Langer means agreement on the 
culpability of the defendants and the desirability of prosecution, not the seriousness of the 
alleged crime. See id. at 9 (stressing the lack of protest by the accused’s state of nationality). 
 82. Eugene Kontorovich, Measuring International Law Through Piracy, INST. LETTER, 8 
(Fall 2012), https://www.ias.edu/files/pdfs/publications/letter-2012-fall.pdf. 
 83. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, Introduction, supra note 33, at 23–24. 
 84. Macedo, supra note 66, at 4. 
 85. See, e.g., 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 604 
(2005) (asserting that “[s]tate practice establishes . . . as a norm of customary international law” 
that “[s]tates have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts over war 
crimes”); Supplemental Brief of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013) (No. 10-1491), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/06/10-1491-tsacsb-Yale-Law-School-Center-for-Global-Legal-Challenges.pdf (arguing 
unequivocally that, aside from substantive principles like sovereign immunity, international law 
imposes no restrictions on universal jurisdiction to adjudicate international-law offenses). 
 86. Morris, supra note 59, at 351–52. 
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Professor Bassiouni recognizes, “The writings of scholars have driven 
the recognition of the theory of universal jurisdiction for serious 
international crimes and have offered new interpretations of CIL, 
albeit without much support in the law and practice of states.”87 Even 
advocates admit that “the jurisprudence of universal jurisdiction is 
disparate, disjointed, and poorly understood.”88 
I have already discussed the disconnect between the historical 
precedent of universal jurisdiction over piracy and the contemporary 
grounding of universalist prosecutions in the heinousness of the 
offense.89 Other controversies concern whether universalist 
prosecutions rest on international or national law90 and whether the 
accused must be present within the prosecuting jurisdiction.91 And the 
broader notion of national-court intervention in the affairs of other 
nations has engendered significant controversy. As George Fletcher 
has observed, “many are outraged by Belgian, Canadian, German, 
and other claims to have the right to judge crimes no matter where 
they are committed.”92 
Criticism comes from three main quarters. The first includes 
American scholars and public officials, often—but not always—of a 
nationalist bent, who are concerned about the impact of universal 
jurisdiction on international relations. Henry Kissinger argued that 
universal jurisdiction is potentially unfair to defendants, may 
undermine emerging democracies’ efforts at national reconciliation, 
and risks arbitrary use by national authorities to pursue their own 
political or ideological agendas.93 Similarly, Curtis Bradley has 
worried that “prosecution of foreign citizens under this concept—
 
 87. Bassiouni, History of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 25, at 62; see also Macedo, 
supra note 66, at 8 (“[U]niversal jurisdiction is not as well established in international law as 
some human rights organizations and others have claimed.”). 
 88. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, Introduction, supra note 33, at 24; see also Arrest Warrant of 
11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 44 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of 
Judge Van Den Wyngaert) (“There is no generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction 
in conventional or customary international law.”). 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 72–77. 
 90. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 179–81. 
 91. See, e.g., Matthias Goldmann, Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Belgium), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Jan. 2009, 
available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1249?rskey=klJi44&result=6&q=&prd=EPIL (discussing the International Court of Justice’s 
(ICJ’s) conflicting opinions on this issue in the Arrest Warrant case). 
 92. George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 580, 580 
(2003). 
 93. See Kissinger, supra note 53, at 90–92. 
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especially foreign leaders—will undermine peaceful international 
relations.”94 These concerns have echoed in numerous briefs filed by 
Republican administrations in ATS cases.95 
More opposition comes from foreign states, many of them in the 
developing world, that find themselves frequent targets of universalist 
prosecutions. States of the African Union have been especially 
outspoken against the exercise of universal jurisdiction, particularly 
by former colonial powers in Western Europe. Following a Belgian 
court’s issuance of an arrest warrant for the incumbent minister for 
foreign affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the DRC sued Belgium in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging, inter alia, that Belgium’s 
assertion of universal jurisdiction violated the DRC’s sovereignty.96 
This incident and others ultimately led the African Union Assembly 
to adopt several decisions condemning the use of universal 
jurisdiction as “judicial overreach.”97  
A third criticism comes from criminal lawyers worried about the 
rights of the accused. Professor Fletcher, for example, has argued that 
universal jurisdiction’s rhetoric of “prevent[ing] gaps” in the criminal 
law and ending impunity reverses the traditional priorities of Western 
domestic criminal law, subordinating the rights of the accused to the 
interests of victims and the state.98 He also contends that universal 
jurisdiction creates the possibility of multiple prosecutions, thereby 
 
 94. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 10, at 325; see also Morris, supra note 59, at 
354 (anticipating that universal jurisdiction “will become a source and an instrument of 
interstate conflict”). 
 95. See Jide Nzelibe, Contesting Adjudication: The Partisan Divide over Alien Tort Statute 
Litigation, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 504–17 (2013); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 
305 (concluding that “Anglo-American opinion is hostile to the general principle involved [in 
universal jurisdiction]”). 
 96. See Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 44 
(Feb. 14); Goldmann, supra note 91, at ¶¶ 15–18 (noting that although the DRC prevailed on 
immunity grounds and the ICJ did not rule on the universal-jurisdiction point, dueling 
supplemental opinions revealed the depth of disagreement on the court as to the legitimacy of 
universal jurisdiction). 
 97. See, e.g., Assembly of the African Union (AU), Decision on the Report of the 
Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Decision No. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.199 (XI), AU Doc. Assembly/AU/14 (XI), 30 June–1 July 2008, x 5 and xx ii 
and iii; see also Harmen van der Wilt, Universal Jurisdiction Under Attack: An Assessment of 
African Misgivings Towards International Criminal Justice as Administered by Western States, 9 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1043, 1044 (2011); Karinne Coombes, Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to 
End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly International Relations?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
419, 441–43 (2011). 
 98. Fletcher, supra note 92, at 581–82. 
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raising double-jeopardy problems.99 And my colleague Madeline 
Morris has pointed out that because “[u]niversal jurisdiction 
empowers the courts of all states to exercise jurisdiction over the 
relevant crimes,” those “[j]udicial systems that are corrupt, abusive or 
lawless are empowered equally with others”; such jurisdiction thus 
raises due-process problems because it “extends extraterritorially the 
powers of non-independent or otherwise flawed judiciaries.”100 
I lack space here to comprehensively catalog, much less assess, 
these arguments about universal jurisdiction. My point is simply to 
demonstrate that there is no consensus about universal jurisdiction’s 
legitimacy—even among academics, much less in the real world. The 
more sober advocates of universal jurisdiction are hardly blind to 
these concerns. Cherif Bassiouni, for example, has recognized that 
“[e]ven with the best of intentions, universal jurisdiction can be used 
imprudently, creating unnecessary frictions between states, potential 
abuses of legal processes, and undue harassment of individuals 
prosecuted or pursued for prosecution under this theory.”101 Likewise, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter acknowledges “the common-sense intuition 
that universal jurisdiction is a potentially fearsome power that should 
only be exercised in extraordinary circumstances.”102 These advocates 
thus accept that “[s]urely universal jurisdiction cannot be exercised 
whenever the international community recognizes that the territorial 
state will be unlikely or unable to prosecute.”103 
The hard question, of course, is whether some of universal 
jurisdiction’s laudable goals may be achieved while minimizing its 
risks. As Kenneth Anderson put it, “universal jurisdiction for certain 
 
 99. Id. at 582–83. One might argue that multiple prosecutions should be permitted by 
analogy to the “dual sovereignty” exception to domestic double-jeopardy principles. See, e.g., 
Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 258 (1927) (Holmes, J.). It is far from clear, however, 
that this exception should apply to prosecutions by different nations for the same international 
crime. After all, the exception “turns on whether the two [prosecuting] entities draw their 
authority to punish the offender from distinct sources of power.” Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 
82, 88 (1985). Both nations would be prosecuting a breach of the same international norm. 
Nonetheless, the American cases do not generally differentiate between the source of law that 
makes the act illegal and the law that empowers the government to prosecute. See, e.g., United 
States v. Wheeler, 453 U.S. 313, 316–26 (1978). Those sources of law diverge when national 
authorities prosecute an international crime, complicating any answer to the double-jeopardy 
problem based on American analogies. 
 100. Morris, supra note 59, at 352, 354. 
 101. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 82 (2001).  
 102. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 175. 
 103. Id. at 183. 
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truly awful things is not truly in dispute, [but] there is no getting 
around the internal drive of schemes of universal jurisdiction to 
become a one-way ratchet of expansion.”104 The United States has not 
generally gone in for the sort of universal jurisdiction provided for—
and occasionally practiced—in Western Europe. We have, however, 
developed our own uniquely American practice of universal 
jurisdiction under the ATS,105 and the tendency toward expansion 
noted by Professor Anderson has had a powerful influence on that 
statute. The next two sections discuss how that came about, and how 
the Supreme Court more recently has sought to impose some limits. 
B. The ATS and the Rise of Filártiga Suits 
Congress enacted the ATS in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary 
Act, which established the federal judicial system. We know relatively 
little about the intent behind the Act’s provision for federal 
jurisdiction over a “civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations,”106 and there are very few cases 
prior to 1980. As Chief Justice Roberts observed in Kiobel, “the ATS 
was invoked twice in the late 18th century, but then only once more 
over the next 167 years.”107 Things have become considerably more 
interesting, however, in the last three and a half decades. 
1. Originalist Takes on the ATS.  The original understanding of 
the ATS has proven elusive. Curtis Bradley has argued, for example, 
that the ATS may well have been intended simply to implement 
Article III’s alienage jurisdiction.108 Although the 1789 Judiciary Act 
 
 104. Kenneth Anderson, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: The Alien Tort Statute’s 
Jurisdictional Universalism in Retreat, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 149, 154 (2013). But see 
Morris, supra note 59, at 361 (asking “whether in practice, a regime of universal jurisdiction will 
do more good or more harm overall”). 
 105. See Kontorovich, Piracy Analogy, supra note 26, at 201 (“[U]nlike other nations, the 
United States has confined [universal jurisdiction] to civil litigation.”). 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 107. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) (citing Moxon v. 
The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9895) (D. Pa. 1793); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Fas. 810 (No. 1607) 
(D.S.C. 1795); O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908); Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. 
Seafarers’ Int’l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam)).  
 108. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 591 
(2002) [hereinafter Bradley, ATS]; see also Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and 
International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1223–26 (1988). Article III’s alienage jurisdiction 
extends to “Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For a critique of the alienage interpretation, 
see generally, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some 
YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2015  8:46 PM 
1046 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1023 
contained a general provision for suits involving aliens, it covered 
only cases in which at least $500 was in controversy.109 The ATS, on 
Professor Bradley’s account, would have allowed the United States to 
honor its international-law obligation to provide redress for alien tort 
claimants—most of whom could not have met the $500 threshold 
under the Judiciary Act’s general alienage provisions110—without 
opening the federal courts generally to most British creditors’ claims 
for debt against American citizens.111 By contrast, the United States 
would have had no international-law obligation to provide a forum 
for suits between aliens, especially for controversies arising 
elsewhere.112 
Other lawyers and scholars have advanced interpretations that 
ground the ATS in Article III’s provision for jurisdiction over cases 
“arising under” federal law.113 The Reagan Justice Department, for 
example, took a “denial of justice” position that the ATS was 
designed to provide a remedy to foreigners in situations where failing 
to do so would breach the nation’s duty to another nation.114 On this 
 
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687 (2002) [hereinafter Dodge, Text and 
Context] (raising textual and historical objections to Bradley’s argument); Burley, supra note 7, 
at 469 (“[I]t is implausible that the primary purpose of the Alien Tort Statute was to avert the 
denial of justice to aliens. The broad sweep of this explanation simply does not fit with the 
precise and narrow wording of the Statute.”). 
 109. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
 110. See Bradley, ATS, supra note 108, at 625–26; William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ 
Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. 
REV. 467, 497 n.168 (1986) [hereinafter Casto, Protective Jurisdiction]. 
 111. Bradley, ATS, supra note 108, at 625–26. As Dean Slaughter notes, however, British 
creditors’ claims were the category of claims in which the state courts were most notoriously 
denying justice to foreigners; hence, their exclusion from the ATS would have vitiated any effort 
to use that statute to ensure compliance with the United States’ international-law obligations. 
Burley, supra note 7, at 467–68. 
 112. See Bradley, ATS, supra note 108, at 630 (citing Vattel and Blackstone). 
 113. But see id. at 597–619 (offering extensive historical evidence that the law of nations did 
not fall within the original understanding of the “Laws of the United States” as used in Article 
III). 
 114. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 15, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d. 493 (D. Haw. 
1986) (No. 86-0297) (arguing that the history of the ATS “indicates that the Statute’s scope is 
limited to torts (amounting to violations of either a treaty or the law of nations) committed by 
citizens of the United States or other persons subject to its jurisdiction, under circumstances in 
which the United States might be held accountable to the offended nation”); see also Kenneth 
C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort 
Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 20–21, 60–61 (1985) (agreeing that the ATS was enacted 
primarily to prevent denials of justice to aliens injured within the United States, but arguing that 
the language of the statute sweeps more broadly to cover extraterritorial human-rights suits by 
aliens against other aliens). 
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view, the ATS was meant to prevent international breaches that 
might plunge the young nation into war. More recently, A.J. Bellia 
and Bradford Clark advanced a variant of this position, arguing that 
“the ATS was originally enacted to enable the United States to 
remedy a specific, but important, law of nations violation—the 
intentional infliction of harm by a US citizen upon the person or 
personal property of an alien.”115 Such torts “violated the law of 
nations and, if not redressed by the perpetrator’s nation, gave the 
victim’s nation just cause for war.”116 In their view, then, “the ATS is 
best understood as a self-executing, fail-safe measure that enabled the 
United States to avoid responsibility for law of nations violations” by 
providing redress in its own courts.117 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, on the other hand, understands the ATS 
“as fulfilling a more general duty under the law of nations,” that is, 
“to uphold the law of nations as a moral imperative—a matter of 
national honor.”118 On this view, the framers of the Judiciary Act used 
the ATS as a step toward affirming the validity of international law 
and securing the young nation’s place in the international legal 
system. The framers’ notion was not entirely altruistic, Dean 
Slaughter notes, because “a system in which all states were virtuous 
would be a much better place for the United States.”119 William 
Dodge has similarly argued that “the original intent of the Alien Tort 
Clause was to provide [a] broad civil remedy for violations of the law 
of nations,” and that the ATS’s framers anticipated that the content 
 
 115. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of 
Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 452 (2011) [hereinafter Bellia & Clark, Law of Nations]; see 
also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute, 18 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1609, 1609 (2014) [hereinafter Bellia & Clark, Two Myths]. 
 116. Bellia & Clark, Law of Nations, supra note 115, at 454. 
 117. Id. Tom Lee’s argument that the ATS was meant to provide redress for violations of 
“safe conducts” has similar implications. See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the 
Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006) [hereinafter Lee, Safe Conduct]. Professor 
Lee recovers a broad historical understanding of safe conducts, including not only explicit 
documents such as passports but also the implicit obligation to protect all friendly and neutral 
aliens within a nation’s territory or territory it controls. See id. at 836–37. He thus concludes that 
the ATS provides “redress of torts against aliens that the United States had a commitment 
under international law to protect.” Id. at 907. 
 118. Burley, supra note 7, at 482, 488.  
 119. Id. at 486. 
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of the international-law norms to be vindicated would evolve over 
time.120 
In the end, Dean Slaughter may be right that “definitive proof of 
the intended purpose and scope of the Alien Tort Statute is 
impossible.”121 It is hard not to agree with Judge Pierre Leval, 
however, that contemporary use of the ATS as a vehicle for suits 
against multinational corporations over events occurring in foreign 
lands is a “historical accident.”122 In any event, lawyers must 
determine what the ATS means in a world much changed from 1789. 
The relevant changes include an international law that now governs 
not only relations between states but also a state’s treatment of its 
own citizens.123 That treatment—that is, a state’s violation of its 
citizens’ basic human rights—took center stage in the revival of ATS 
litigation beginning in 1980. 
2. The Filártiga Line.  Joelito Filártiga was the seventeen-year-
old son of Dr. Joel Filártiga, a Paraguayan physician and opponent of 
the military dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner. In 1976, a Paraguayan 
police officer named Américo Norberto Peña-Irala tortured Joelito to 
death in retaliation for his father’s political activities. Two years later, 
Joelito’s sister Dolly came to the United States on a visitor’s visa and 
sought political asylum. She soon discovered that Peña-Irala had also 
entered the United States and was living in Brooklyn. Dolly and her 
 
 120. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the 
“Originalists”, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 237, 241–43 (1996) [hereinafter Dodge, 
Historical Origins]; see also Dodge, Text and Context, supra note 108, at 701–11. 
 121. Burley, supra note 7, at 463. 
 122. Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law: Giving Victims of Human Rights 
Abuses Their Day in Court, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2013, at 16, 20; see also Anderson, supra 
note 104, at 151–52 (observing that “the ahistorical construction [exemplified by Filártiga] could 
not purport to explain . . . why Congress in 1789 would ever have enacted the ATS”). 
 123. Compare, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, Introductory Note (observing 
that “[t]he contemporary international law of human rights . . . reflects general acceptance . . . 
that how a state treats individual human beings, including its own citizens . . . is not the state’s 
own business alone . . . but is a matter of international concern and a proper subject for 
regulation by international law” and acknowledging that this principle “has developed largely 
since the Second World War”), and Burley, supra note 7, at 490 (describing this development as 
“[t]he cornerstone of 20th-century human rights law”), with MARK W. JANIS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (2d ed. 1993) (observing that before World War 
II, “it was thought to be antithetical for there to be international legal rights that individuals 
could assert against states, especially against their own governments”). 
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father sued Peña-Irala for Joelito’s torture and death, filing suit under 
the ATS in the Eastern District of New York.124 
The facts of the Filártiga litigation are paradigmatic of the first 
wave of modern human-rights litigation under the ATS. All relevant 
actors were foreign nationals: Joelito Filártiga, the torture victim; his 
father and sister, who brought the lawsuit as plaintiffs; and Peña-
Irala, the defendant.125 The events in question—Filártiga’s torture at 
the hands of Paraguayan security personnel in retaliation for his 
family’s political opposition to the government—occurred in 
Paraguay without any significant effect within the United States. The 
American courts’ jurisdiction over the case arose solely because the 
defendant happened to have moved, later in life, to New York City.126 
Doctrinally, Filártiga made two crucial moves. First, it held that 
ATS suits brought to vindicate principles of CIL fell within Article 
III’s “arising under” jurisdiction because “the law of nations . . . has 
always been part of the federal common law.”127 And second, Filártiga 
held that federal courts may apply CIL without awaiting statutory 
incorporation of customary norms by Congress, notwithstanding 
Article I’s express delegation to Congress of authority to “define and 
Punish Offences . . . against the Law of Nations.”128 The Filártigas 
were thus able to proceed with their claims under the ATS and, on 
remand, won a judgment of over $10 million.129 
The Second Circuit decided Filártiga against a backdrop of 
expanded human-rights advocacy in both the public and private 
sectors. The Carter administration had made promotion of human 
rights a centerpiece of its foreign policy in the 1970s.130 When human-
rights treaties and legislation stalled in Congress, the administration 
turned to the courts; hence, it filed an important amicus brief in the 
 
 124. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–79 (2d Cir. 1980); Stephens, Translating 
Filártiga, supra note 20, at 6. 
 125. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878–80. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 885; see Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A 
Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156–57. 
 128. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 886–87 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10); Ku & Yoo, supra 
note 127, at 157. 
 129. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 864–67 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). This judgment was 
never actually collected, however, as Peña-Irala was deported while Filártiga’s appeal was still 
pending. See Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: Judicial Internalization into Domestic 
Law of the Customary International Law Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STORIES 45, 60 (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson & Mark W. Janis eds., 2007).  
 130. See, e.g., HERRING, supra note 15, at 833–34. 
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Second Circuit supporting the Filártigas’ claim.131 This push from the 
Executive coincided with the development of a strong human-rights 
advocacy network of public-interest groups, legal academics, 
politicians, and journalists.132 These developments encouraged courts 
to take on a more aggressive role in human-rights enforcement. 
The American Law Institute (ALI) published a “Tentative 
Draft” of its Restatement (Third) of U.S. Foreign Relations Law in 
1980—the same year as Filártiga—and that draft endorsed both 
aspects of the Second Circuit’s decision.133 Although each aspect of 
Filártiga would prove controversial by the late 1990s, that decision 
reflected a broad consensus among international-law scholars about 
the domestic status of the law of nations. Louis Henkin summarized 
the prevailing view as follows: 
[T]here is now general agreement that international law, as 
incorporated into domestic law in the United States, is federal, not 
state law; that cases arising under international law are ‘cases arising 
under . . . the Laws of the United States’ and therefore are within 
the judicial power of the United States under article III of the 
Constitution; that principles of international law as incorporated in 
the law of the United States are “Laws of the United States” and 
supreme under article VI; that international law, therefore, is to be 
determined independently by the federal courts, and ultimately by 
the United States Supreme Court, with its determination binding on 
the state courts; and that a determination of international law by a 
state court is a federal question subject to review by the Supreme 
Court.134 
 
 131. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090); Nzelibe, supra note 95, at 495–99 (discussing the political 
background of the Carter administration’s decision to support ATS litigation). 
 132. See Nzelibe, supra note 95, at 499. 
 133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980), pt. I, ch. 2 introductory note at 41 (asserting that CIL 
“has come to be regarded as federal common law”). The final version, published in 1987, put the 
point even more strongly. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 111 n.3 (“[T]he modern 
view is that customary international law in the United States is federal law and its determination 
by the federal courts is binding on the State courts.”); id. § 111 n.4 (“Matters arising under 
customary international law also arise under ‘the laws of the United States,’ since international 
law is ‘part of our law’ . . . and is federal law.” (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 
(1900))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 703 n.7 (citing Filártiga with approval with respect to 
individual remedies for CIL violations).  
 134. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 
1559–60 (1984). 
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On the other hand, many scholars of foreign-relations law—that is, 
the domestic law governing the interaction of the U.S. legal system 
with international actors—rejected this consensus.135 They pointed out 
that the Restatement relied on cases that did not address the domestic 
status of CIL, and that the ALI’s pronouncement simply reflected the 
views of prominent international-law scholars.136 For a time, however, 
those scholars’ views would prove highly influential. 
Filártiga “gave . . . new life” to proposals by “leading 
international legal scholars [who] advocated the use of domestic 
courts to incorporate international law into domestic law.”137 And it 
caught on with international human-rights advocates in the courts. 
Over the next two decades, “[f]ederal courts . . . assumed jurisdiction 
over cases between aliens alleging abuses such as genocide, war 
crimes, summary execution, disappearance, and arbitrary detention, 
as well as torture.”138 Because the defendants were generally persons 
without substantial financial assets, like Peña-Irala, plaintiffs 
recovered little in the way of damages;139 however, human-rights 
advocates saw vindication of their legal claims as worth the expense 
 
 135. For a critique of the Restatement’s authority on these points, see Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the 
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 834–37 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Critique]; see also sources cited infra note 165. 
 136. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 135, at 834–36. The Restatement cited 
only two decisions in favor of its rule: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 
(1964), and Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra 
note 22, § 111, Reporters’ Note 3. Sabbatino was a case about the act-of-state doctrine and 
refused to apply CIL; as I have explained elsewhere, Sabbatino does not support the notion that 
CIL is federal common law. See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary 
International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 438–45 (2002) [hereinafter Young, CIL]. Chisholm 
concerned state sovereign immunity; it involved neither foreign parties nor international law, 
and it was promptly overruled by the Eleventh Amendment. It would be a considerable 
understatement to say that the Restatement had “weak” precedential support. See also sources 
cited infra note 165.  
 137. Ku & Yoo, supra note 127, at 157 (citing Richard Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic 
Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT’L L. 9 (1970); RICHARD FALK, THE ROLE 
OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964)); see also Paul B. 
Stephan, Courts, the Constitution, and Customary International Law: The Intellectual Origins of 
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 
33, 47 (2003) (recognizing that Filártiga triggered a “revolution in U.S. foreign relations law”). 
 138. Stephens, Translating Filártiga, supra note 20, at 7 (citing Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 
232 (2d Cir. 1995); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 
F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).  
 139. See, e.g., Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising Under the 
Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 460 n.16 (2007) (noting that “[m]ost individual ATS 
defendants are judgment proof—either as a matter of law or as a matter of fact”). 
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of litigation in many instances.140 These early cases were relatively 
uncontroversial, as they tended to involve “individual foreigners 
affiliated with governments no longer in power or viewed with 
disfavor by the U.S. government.”141 
Beginning in the late 1990s, however, the human-rights bar 
developed a more promising approach that focused on multinational 
corporations rather than present and former officials of foreign 
governments. The seminal case was Kadic v. Karadžić,142 which 
involved claims by Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
against the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, alleging rape, torture, and 
genocide. Mr. Karadžić argued that he was a private actor and 
therefore not bound by norms of international law.143 The Second 
Circuit rejected this argument on two grounds: first, some 
international-law norms—such as those prohibiting piracy and 
genocide—extend to nonstate actors;144 and second, private persons 
may be held liable for acting in concert with state actors to violate 
international law.145 These holdings—particularly the latter, which 
supported aiding-and-abetting liability for private actors—opened the 
door to ATS suits against multinational corporations that could be 
connected to human-rights violations abroad.146 
 
 140. See, e.g., Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64 n.11 (2008) (“ATS judgments against individual defendants provide 
invaluable symbolic vindication.”); Koh, Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2368 
(“Although no Filártiga-type plaintiff has apparently collected full compensation for his injuries, 
many have expressed satisfaction simply to have won default judgments announcing that the 
defendant had transgressed universally recognized norms of international law.”). Some plaintiffs 
were able to extract significant damages awards from former dictators like Ferdinand Marcos, 
who had fled to the United States, but collection has generally remained extremely difficult. See, 
e.g., Robert A. Swift, A Human Rights Class Action in the Philippines, THE PHILADELPHIA 
LAWYER, Winter 2012, at 37, 40, available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/
PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/TPL.winter12_philipines
.pdf (describing the difficulty of collecting and distributing to plaintiff class members $10 million 
of a nearly $2 billion judgment against Marcos’s estate). 
 141. Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to 
Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 177 (2004) [hereinafter Stephens, 
Checks and Balances]. 
 142. Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 143. See id. at 239. This argument cited the lack of a recognized Bosnian Serb state, 
although Karadžić also claimed to be President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Srpska. See 
id. 
 144. Id. at 241–43. 
 145. Id. at 245; see also Stephens, Checks and Balances, supra note 141, at 176–77. 
 146. See, e.g., HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 5. 
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Suits against multinational corporations offered far better 
prospects for meaningful financial recovery than the first wave of 
Filártiga suits,147 and they avoided many of the jurisdictional, 
immunity, and act-of-state doctrine hurdles associated with suing 
governments and their officials.148 A recent survey reports that, “[a]s 
of late 2006, approximately half of the post-Sosa reported ATS 
decisions involved corporate defendants.”149 Most of these 
corporations were alleged to have aided and abetted human-rights 
violations rather than to have committed those violations directly.150 
Doe v. Unocal Corp.151 is a good example of this “second wave” 
of ATS litigation. Unocal, an American company based in California, 
became involved in a project to build an oil pipeline across Burma. 
The plaintiffs, Burmese villagers from a rural area through which the 
pipeline was to run, alleged that they had been forced to work on the 
pipeline and subjected to murder, rape, and torture.152 Agents of the 
Burmese military government had allegedly committed the atrocities, 
but the plaintiffs claimed that Unocal had employed the military to 
provide security for the pipeline project and assisted the military 
while knowing that it was using forced labor and committing other 
abuses.153 A panel of the Ninth Circuit held that Unocal could be held 
liable for forced labor without any showing of state action and that it 
could also be sued for aiding and abetting if it provided “knowing 
practical assistance or encouragement that ha[d] a substantial effect 
on the perpetration of the crime.”154 
Unocal involved an American defendant, but many second-wave 
ATS suits featured foreign plaintiffs, foreign events, and foreign 
defendants. For example, in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
 
 147. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that, as of 2003, “more 
than 50 MNCs [were] in the dock; and the damages claimed exceed[ed] $200 billion”). 
 148. See id. at 5; Childress, supra note 6, at 723–24. 
 149. BETH STEPHENS, JUDITH CHOMSKY, JENNIFER GREEN, PAUL HOFFMAN & MICHAEL 
RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 23 (2d ed. 2008). 
 150. See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 140, at 62–63. 
 151. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 
395 F.3d 978 (2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (2005). 
 152. Id. at 939. 
 153. Id. at 937–42. 
 154. Id. at 946–47. The Ninth Circuit later vacated that decision when it agreed to rehear the 
case en banc, and Unocal ultimately agreed to a settlement. See Rachel Chambers, The Unocal 
Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights 
Abuses, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 13, 14, 15 (2005). 
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Talisman Energy, Inc.,155 Sudanese citizens alleging human-rights 
abuses by the Sudanese Government sued a Canadian oil company 
for aiding and abetting those abuses. Similarly, in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum,156 Nigerian citizens sued Dutch, British, and 
Nigerian oil companies for aiding and abetting Nigerian military 
forces who carried out torture, extrajudicial killing, and crimes 
against humanity. These suits, in which all parties are foreign and the 
events in question took place overseas, are called “foreign cubed” 
cases.157 
Filártiga and other “first wave” ATS suits had likewise been 
foreign-cubed cases, but objections to such suits were pursued more 
aggressively by second-wave corporate defendants.158 By implicating 
large multinational corporations with substantial litigation budgets, 
the second wave of ATS litigation pulled in sophisticated defense 
counsel.159 Second-wave suits also intensified political opposition by 
“mobiliz[ing] domestic business constituencies that had remained 
relatively agnostic when ATS litigation started in the early-1980s.”160 
Foreign states likewise intervened in defense of their own 
multinational corporations by filing amicus briefs opposing broad 
theories of ATS liability.161 Around the same time, the advent of the 
War on Terror shifted the foreign-policy spotlight to security 
concerns. ATS litigation threatened to complicate antiterror 
cooperation with foreign governments and also raised the specter of 
suits against U.S. officials.162 Not surprisingly, the George W. Bush 
administration filed a series of briefs urging federal courts to radically 
narrow the scope of ATS suits.163 
 
 155. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 156. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 157. See also Childress, supra note 6, at 720–21 n.84 (collecting other foreign-cubed ATS 
suits). Foreign-cubed suits were also an issue under the federal securities laws, but the Court 
seems to have largely eliminated them. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 
(2010). 
 158. See Childress, supra note 6, at 718–19 (suggesting that defendants in first-wave suits, 
who tended to be present or former government officials, focused on personal-jurisdiction and 
official-immunity defenses). 
 159. In Kiobel itself, for example, Royal Dutch Petroleum was represented in the Supreme 
Court by Kathleen Sullivan, former dean of the Stanford Law School and a partner at the 
leading litigation firm of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP. 
 160. Nzelibe, supra note 95, at 510. 
 161. See id. For a recent example, see Great Britain & Netherlands Brief, supra note 17.  
 162. See Nzelibe, supra note 95, at 508–09. 
 163. See id. at 511–12; e.g., Reply Brief for the U.S. as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 577654. 
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Each wave of Filártiga claims provoked controversy on both 
jurisprudential and functional grounds. The jurisprudential objection 
arose from most ATS claims’ reliance on CIL rather than on treaties 
ratified by the United States. Patrick Kelly and other international-
law scholars attacked the coherence of CIL itself, arguing that 
modern customary norms are largely indeterminate and not grounded 
in the actual practice of nations.164 More prominently, a group of 
scholars led by Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith challenged the 
conventional wisdom that CIL has the status of federal law within the 
domestic legal system.165 There was thus no “federal question” in 
Filártiga suits, and in the absence of some form of party-based 
jurisdiction,166 asserting federal subject-matter jurisdiction over them 
under the ATS would violate Article III.167 
The jurisprudential objection to CIL-based litigation ran beyond 
jurisdiction, moreover. Plaintiffs’ claims in ATS litigation generally 
relied on principles that appear in multilateral treaties, but that could 
 
 164. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
449 (2000); Simma & Alston, supra note 69, at 82; see also Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, 
How Customary is Customary International Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885 (2013) (arguing 
that the link between practice and customary law has always been problematic); Eugene 
Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of 
the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 155–61 (2004) (arguing that modern 
human-rights claims resting on CIL are not analogous to the sorts of CIL offenses recognized by 
the ATS’s framers). 
 165. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 111 Reporters’ Note 3 (“[T]he 
modern view is that customary international law in the United States is federal law and its 
determination by the federal courts is binding on the State courts.”), with Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Critique, supra note 135 (rejecting the Restatement view as unconstitutional). For earlier denials 
that CIL is federal law, see Philip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International 
Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 669–70 (1986); Weisburd, supra note 108, at 1239–40. Many 
international-law scholars, of course, have hotly disputed this view. See, e.g., Harold Hongju 
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, 
State Law]; Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A 
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997). For a general 
survey and assessment of the debate, see Young, CIL, supra note 136; Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513 
(2002).  
 166. Article III independently confers subject-matter jurisdiction for suits “affecting” 
ambassadors, as well as for suits between a U.S. citizen and a foreign citizen or state. U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2. But Filártiga suits generally involve foreigners suing foreigners. 
 167. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of 
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 320, 357 (1997) [hereinafter 
Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy]; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet 
and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2167 (1999) [hereinafter 
Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet]; see also Childress, supra note 6, at 719–20 (discussing the 
impact of Bradley and Goldsmith’s scholarship). 
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not be invoked directly because the United States had either failed to 
ratify those treaties or ratified them subject to reservations, 
understandings, and declarations forbidding their invocation in 
domestic litigation.168 Plaintiffs argued, however, that the treaties had 
somehow become part of international custom; hence, “this treaty-
derived CIL can be applied as domestic law in human rights cases 
even though the treaties themselves cannot be applied 
domestically.”169 ATS suits thus represented an end run around the 
political branches’ control of the domestic incorporation of 
international law.170 
Functional objections to Filártiga suits began with their potential 
to undermine U.S. foreign policy. John Bellinger, speaking as the 
legal adviser to the State Department during the George W. Bush 
administration, argued that “the ATS has given rise to friction, 
sometimes considerable, in our relations with foreign governments, 
who understandably object to their officials or their domestic 
corporations being subjected to U.S. jurisdiction for activities taking 
place in foreign countries and having nothing to do with the United 
States.”171 And Julian Ku and John Yoo insisted that, as a matter of 
comparative institutional competence, “[f]ederal courts suffer from 
many institutional shortcomings, especially when compared to the 
executive branch, in achieving national goals in foreign relations.”172 
Moreover, as ATS litigation shifted from foreign official 
defendants to multinational corporations, second-wave suits aroused 
traditional business objections to “strike suits” against “deep pocket” 
corporations.173 Nor are the potential costs limited to the corporate 
targets themselves. According to one study, widespread ATS 
 
 168. Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2167–68; see also Louis Henkin, U.S. 
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 
344 (1995). 
 169. Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2168; see also Richard B. Lillich, 
The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 851, 855–57 (1989) 
(applauding this circumvention of limits on treaties’ domestic effect). 
 170. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2168 (“[I]t seems illegitimate for 
federal courts to apply as domestic law a CIL of human rights based almost exclusively on 
human rights treaties that the political branches have taken pains to ensure do not apply as 
domestic law.”). 
 171. Bellinger, supra note 13, at 2; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, 
at 2181. 
 172. Ku & Yoo, supra note 127, at 220. 
 173. See, e.g., Bill Reinsch, The Alien Tort Statute’s Impact on the Business Community, 
WORLD COMMERCE REV., June 2012, at 28–30, available at http://www.worldcommerce
review.com/publications/article_pdf/612. 
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litigation may depress U.S. exports, cost tens of thousands of jobs, 
and discourage foreign investment both abroad and in this country.174 
In light of these concerns and their aggressive presentation by 
well-financed defense counsel, it is unsurprising that plaintiffs have 
obtained few judgments in second-wave cases.175 But the small 
number of plaintiffs’ judgments masks the significance of these suits. 
Defendants risk significant litigation expense and potentially 
embarrassing public disclosures about corporate activities abroad.176 
These realities have enabled plaintiffs to obtain settlements in some 
significant cases, including Unocal.177 And even unsuccessful claims 
may bolster a political strategy aimed at curbing human-rights 
abuses.178 Indeed, the mere threat of suit may alter corporate 
behavior. 
Both first- and second-wave ATS suits thus assumed an 
importance that transcends the still-relatively-meager results obtained 
by plaintiffs. And as ATS litigation expanded to draw in major 
multinational corporations and leading national counsel, the Supreme 
Court finally took an interest. 
C. The Supreme Court Limits ATS Litigation: Sosa and Kiobel 
The Supreme Court’s first straight-on encounter with the ATS 
arose out of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operation 
gone awry in Mexico.179 Enrique Camarena-Salazar was abducted, 
tortured, and killed in 1985 while working undercover in Mexico. The 
DEA subsequently identified a Mexican physician, Humberto 
 
 174. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 37–43 (attempting to quantify these 
impacts). 
 175. See Childress, supra note 6, at 713 n.25.  
 176. See, e.g., Reinsch, supra note 173, at 29–30. 
 177. See Chambers, supra note 154, at 15 (reporting that the Unocal settlement provided 
both “direct compensation and ‘substantial assistance’ via funds for programs to improve living 
conditions, health care, and education”). 
 178. Cf. Childress, supra note 6, at 725 (suggesting that some human-rights plaintiffs may 
sue under the ATS rather than more legally promising foreign or state law theories because of 
the political impact of branding the defendant as a violator of international law). 
 179.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The Court did consider an ATS claim in 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989), which was a suit by 
two Liberian corporations against Argentina for an attack on their oil tanker during the 
Falklands War. The Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1330 et seq., provides the exclusive jurisdictional vehicle for suits against foreign nations, 
preempting jurisdiction under the ATS. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434–39; see also Koh, 
Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2372 (noting that Amerada Hess “has chilled 
international tort suits against foreign sovereigns”). 
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Alvarez-Machain, as having assisted Camarena’s kidnappers by 
keeping Camarena alive for further torture. When Mexico refused to 
extradite Dr. Alvarez to the United States, the DEA hired two 
Mexican nationals, including Jose Francisco Sosa, to kidnap Alvarez 
and bring him to El Paso. A federal trial court acquitted Alvarez, 
however, and he then sued both the United States and Sosa.180 
Alvarez’s claims against Sosa rested on the ATS, alleging arbitrary 
arrest and detention in violation of CIL.181 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,182 the Court rejected Alvarez’s 
claim. Justice Souter’s majority opinion resolved some longstanding 
ATS debates but left considerable uncertainty in its wake. The Court 
found “implausible” Alvarez’s argument that the ATS itself created a 
cause of action for violations of international law.183 “As enacted in 
1789,” Souter said, “the ATS gave the district courts ‘cognizance’ of 
certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, 
not power to mold substantive law.”184 But the Court also rejected 
Sosa’s suggestion “that the ATS was stillborn because any claim for 
relief required a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of 
causes of action.”185 “[T]he First Congress did not pass the ATS as a 
jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future 
Congress,” the Court said, concluding that the statute was “meant to 
have a practical effect.”186 Although the ATS did not create a federal 
cause of action, it presupposed the existence of such a cause of action. 
The right to sue in ATS cases is thus best understood as an implied 
right of action created by federal common law.187 
 
 180. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–99. Alvarez brought his claim against the United States under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671–80, but it foundered under 
the FTCA’s statutory exception barring claims “arising in a foreign country,” § 2680(k). See 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699.  
 181. See id. at 734–36. 
 182. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 183. Id. at 713. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 714. 
 186. Id. at 719. 
 187. See id. at 724 (“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of 
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”); see also 
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 265 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., 
concurring) (“Sosa makes clear that all ATCA litigation is in fact based on federal common law, 
rather than a statutory cause of action.”); Casto, New Federal Common Law, supra note 23, at 
638 (“Sosa squarely holds that ATS litigation is based upon a federal common law cause of 
action and involves judicial lawmaking.”); Carlos M. Vázquez, Things We Do With 
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Sosa’s recognition of a federal-common-law cause of action 
obviated one longstanding debate about the ATS’s constitutionality. 
That debate had focused on whether ATS cases “arise under” federal 
law for purposes of Article III. But as Justice Holmes famously 
observed, “A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of 
action.”188 Sosa’s conclusion that the ATS presupposes an implied 
federal right of action under federal common law thus disposes of the 
Article III objection to Filártiga suits. And because Article III is 
satisfied so long as there is a “federal element” in the suit,189 it no 
longer matters whether the CIL principles that supply the rule of 
decision are also federal in nature. It is not uncommon, after all, for a 
plaintiff’s case to rely on one sort of law for the right to sue and 
another sort of law for the substantive rule of decision.190 Sosa thus 
moots the longstanding debate about whether CIL is “federal” within 
the meaning of Article III—at least for purposes of the ATS. 
Whether or not CIL is federal common law, the Sosa cause of action 
 
Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1719, 
1725 (2014) [hereinafter Vázquez, Presumptions]; Ernest A. Young, Response, Federal Suits and 
General Laws: A Comment on Judge Fletcher’s Reading of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 93 VA. L. 
REV. IN BRIEF 33 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview
.org/files/young.pdf [hereinafter Young, Comment on Fletcher]. The other logical possibility 
would be to ground the cause of action in international law, but even proponents of ATS 
litigation have not asserted that international law supports a right to sue in Filártiga cases. See, 
e.g., BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN 
U.S. COURTS 112–18 (1996) (urging federal courts to imply a right of action under domestic 
law); Casto, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 110, at 475 (“There is serious doubt . . . whether 
international law, unassisted by domestic law, creates a tort remedy that may be invoked in 
domestic courts by private individuals.”); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of 
Filártiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 65, 101 (1995) (acknowledging that “no other nation invites such cases into its courts”). 
 188. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916); see also 
Young, Comment on Fletcher, supra note 187, at 35–36 (elaborating on this reading of Sosa). 
American Well Works construed the statutory reach of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but its conclusion 
applies a fortiori to Article III itself. A federal right of action is not a necessary condition for 
arising under jurisdiction, even under § 1331, but it is certainly a sufficient one. See RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 864 (6th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
 189. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822–23 (1824). 
 190. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (involving a state 
tort claim in which plaintiffs invoked breach of a federal regulatory standard to establish the 
element of fault); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (providing a federal right of 
action against federal officers, but incorporating state law to provide the standard of liability). 
See generally Casto, New Federal Common Law, supra note 23, at 639–40 (discussing analogous 
“hybrid” causes of action in domestic law); Young, Comment on Fletcher, supra note 187, at 34–
35 (developing this point). 
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is, and that is enough for Filártiga suits to arise under federal law for 
purposes of Article III.191 
Justice Souter’s opinion in Sosa did, however, impose significant 
limits on the substance of ATS claims.192 The historical record 
indicated that “Congress intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for 
a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of 
nations”—primarily involving assaults on ambassadors, violations of 
safe conducts, and piracy.193 Although the majority rejected the notion 
that federal courts are “categorically precluded . . . from recognizing a 
claim under the law of nations as an element of common law,” it 
insisted that “any claim based on the present-day law of nations 
[must] rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”194 The 
 
 191. For general discussions of Sosa’s impact on the debate over CIL, compare Curtis A. 
Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the 
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007) (reading Sosa to validate the 
revisionist critique of CIL), with William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the 
Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007), available at http://www.harvard
lawreview.org/media/pdf/dodge.pdf (accusing Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore of misreading 
Sosa). My own view is that Sosa is incompatible with the “modern position” that CIL is federal 
common law, and that the best reading of Sosa largely supports the revisionist view. See Ernest 
A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 28 
(2007), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/120/feb07/young.pdf 
[hereinafter Young, Retail Incorporation]. Whether or not one agrees with that reading, 
internationalists like Ralph Steinhardt are simply wrong to assert that, under Sosa, “the courts 
may do the one thing that the ‘revisionists’ said was illegitimate, viz., infer a cause of action from 
customary international law.” Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Traffic Light Theory of Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 101 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 272, 273 (2007) [hereinafter 
Steinhardt, Traffic Light]. As Professor Steinhardt has acknowledged elsewhere, there is no 
customary international practice permitting Filártiga-type suits; the United States stands alone 
in that regard. See Steinhardt, Marcos, supra note 187, at 101. That is why Sosa said that federal 
courts may “recognize private claims under federal common law.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 
(emphasis added); see also supra note 187 (collecting internationalist sources rejecting the idea 
of resting a cause of action on international law). 
 192. See, e.g., Steinhardt, Traffic Light, supra note 191, at 273 (“Sosa’s ‘yellow light’ is its 
rule of evidence that an international norm can be actionable under the ATS only if it is 
‘specific, universal, and obligatory.’”). 
 193. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720; see also id. (“[T]he common law appears to have understood only 
those three . . . as definite and actionable, or at any rate, to have assumed only a very limited set 
of claims. As Blackstone had put it, ‘offences against this law [of nations] are principally 
incident to whole states or nations,’ and not individuals seeking relief in court.” (quoting 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769))). 
 194. Id. at 725; see id. at 732 (“[F]ederal courts should not recognize private claims under 
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and 
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was 
enacted.”). Importantly, this was a requirement that actionable CIL be as determinate as these 
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Court derived this constraint from concerns about both the legitimacy 
of judicial lawmaking grounded in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins195 
and the risk of interfering with foreign policy.196 
These cautions proved “fatal to Alvarez’s claim,”197 which relied 
upon a customary international norm barring arbitrary kidnapping or 
detention. As the Court construed his complaint, “Alvarez . . . 
invoke[d] a general prohibition of ‘arbitrary’ detention defined as 
officially sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to detain 
under the domestic law of some government.”198 But the Court found 
“little authority that a rule so broad has the status of a binding 
customary norm today,” and it noted with evident concern that such a 
sweeping prohibition would “support a cause of action in federal 
court for any arrest, anywhere in the world, unauthorized by the law 
of the jurisdiction in which it took place.”199 “[A]lthough it is easy to 
say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad 
that those who enforce them become enemies of the human race,” 
Justice Souter wrote, “it may be harder to say which policies cross 
that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone’s three common 
law offenses.”200 Under the circumstances, the Court was simply not 
prepared to exercise its “residual common law discretion” to 
vindicate an “aspiration” for stricter limits on arrest and detention.201 
Both the human-rights community and ATS skeptics claimed 
Sosa as a victory. EarthRights International called Sosa “a crucial 
victory for human rights,”202 and Martin Flaherty announced that 
Sosa’s “import is to confirm that international custom was part of 
 
common-law examples—not an effort to freeze the content of actionable CIL at the common-
law baseline. Compare, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 816 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that ATS claims should be limited to the offenses 
recognized in the Founding era), with Dodge, Historical Origins, supra note 120, at 241–43 
(criticizing this view).  
 195. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, 
supra note 191, at 902–10 (discussing Erie’s relevance to Sosa). 
 196. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–26 (citing Erie as counseling against judicial creation of 
private rights to sue); id. at 727 (citing foreign-policy concerns as a reason for limiting implied 
rights of action in the ATS context). 
 197. Id. at 725. 
 198. Id. at 736. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 737. 
 201. Id. at 738. 
 202. EarthRights International, In Our Court: ATCA, Sosa, and the Triumph of Human 
Rights 5 (2004), available at http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/in-our-
court.pdf. 
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judicially enforceable federal law even in the absence of a statute.”203 
Beth Stephens was more circumspect but nonetheless optimistic, 
claiming that the lower courts had acted “cautiously” under Filártiga, 
and that “[t]he Supreme Court validated their cautious approach in 
Sosa, preserving a measured mechanism for human rights 
accountability that affirms a narrow but very significant role for U.S. 
domestic courts in providing redress for victims of egregious human 
rights abuses.”204 Filártiga’s leading academic critics, on the other 
hand, saw Sosa as a clear rejection of the “modern position” that CIL 
is supreme federal law, readily enforceable by American courts.205 
And the business community “welcome[d] the Court’s ruling” as 
“clearly indicat[ing] that the ATS should not be used to institute 
foreign policy in American courts.”206 
The Court revisited the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co.,207 limiting the ATS even more sharply. The plaintiffs were 
residents of Ogoniland, a region of Nigeria in which the defendant 
corporations were engaged in oil exploration and production. 
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants enlisted Nigerian government 
forces to suppress environmental protests against the defendants’ 
operations, and that those government agents committed extrajudicial 
killings, torture, and other human-rights violations. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the complaint on the 
ground that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability, 
barring any ATS claim against the defendants.208 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to consider that question, but after oral argument 
the Court ordered supplemental briefing and argument to consider 
“[w]hether and under what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to 
 
 203. Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (2004); see also, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John 
Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 1, 12 (2004) (contending that “all of the . . . circuits have [embraced the modern 
position] (and now the U.S. Supreme Court has as well, in the Alvarez-Machain case)”). 
 204. Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar” For Human Rights 
Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 567 (2004) [hereinafter Stephens, Sosa]. 
 205. See Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 191, at 902; see also Young, Retail 
Incorporation, supra note 191 (taking a similar view). 
 206. Elizabeth Ann Chandler, NFTC and USA*Engage Cite U.S. Supreme Court Decision to 
More Narrowly Define Alien Tort Provision as Important Step in Curbing Erroneous Lawsuits, 
NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL (June 30, 2004) (quoting Bill Reinsch), available at 
http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?Mode=View&articleid=1691.  
 207. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 208. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States.”209 In June of 2013, the Court held that the ATS generally does 
not permit extraterritorial suits; hence, the Court unanimously 
concluded that “petitioners’ case seeking relief for violations of the 
law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred.”210 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court’s five conservatives, 
relied primarily on the presumption against extraterritoriality—a 
canon of statutory construction holding that “[w]hen a statute gives 
no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”211 
“This presumption,” the Chief Justice wrote, “‘serves to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other 
nations which could result in international discord.’”212 More 
generally, it “helps ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously 
adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy 
consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”213 Under 
this presumption, Kiobel was an easy case because “all the relevant 
conduct took place outside the United States.”214 All the parties were 
foreign as well. Although the Court acknowledged that other cases 
might present a more difficult question, it insisted that “even where 
the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they 
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.”215 Kiobel thus seemed to rule out foreign-
 
 209. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738, 1738 (2012). 
 210. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.  
 211. Id. at 1664 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)); see 
also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (recognizing a 
“longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States’” (quoting 
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))). 
 212. Id. (quoting ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 1669. 
 215. Id. Justice Alito, with Justice Thomas, joined the majority opinion but wrote separately 
to suggest a narrower view, under which “a putative ATS cause of action will fall within the 
scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the 
domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s 
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.” Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., 
concurring). Although Alito plainly meant to push the ATS in a narrower direction, he may 
have encouraged future courts to read the majority opinion more narrowly. After all, Alito 
opined that the majority’s discussion of claims that “touch and concern the territory of the 
United States” “obviously leaves much unanswered,” and he suggested that “perhaps there is 
wisdom in the Court’s preference for this narrower approach.” Id. at 1669–70. 
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cubed cases under the ATS, and it suggested a tough road for other 
ATS claims as well. 
Kiobel was unanimous as to its result, and that is worth pausing 
over for a moment: Although most observers predicted a closely 
divided court split along political lines,216 it turned out there was no 
support for entertaining a representative example of second-wave 
ATS litigation. Eugene Kontorovich has noted that “[w]hen the 
Second and Ninth Circuit[s] began questioning ‘foreign cubed’ suits a 
few years ago, the great majority of scholars dismissed [the courts’] 
claims as entirely spurious. The conventional wisdom was very much 
on the side of universal jurisdiction over corporate human rights 
abuses.”217 But after Kiobel, foreign-cubed claims are gone—and by a 
9-0 vote. Despite ATS advocates’ widespread belief that “the foreign 
cubed issue [was] a conservative invention to roll back human rights 
litigation,”218 concerns about overextension of implied rights of action 
and interference with the political branches’ conduct of foreign policy 
turned out to be widely shared. 
Notwithstanding Kiobel’s unanimous result, its concurring 
opinions are likely to extend debate about the ATS’s scope. Justice 
Breyer, writing for the Court’s four liberals, concurred only in the 
result and rejected the presumption against extraterritoriality as an 
appropriate framework for interpreting the ATS.219 Breyer suggested 
instead that jurisdiction should lie under the ATS whenever “(1) the 
alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an 
American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and 
adversely affects an important American national interest.”220 He 
made clear, however, that the national interest “includes a distinct 
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor 
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other 
 
 216. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel and Academic Fall[i]bility, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 17, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/04/17/kiobel-and-
academic-fallability (“Everyone, including myself, predicted a decision closely divided on 
ideological lines.”).  
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. For examples, see Stephens, Checks and Balances, supra note 141, at 7. 
 219. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer 
reasoned that although the presumption “‘rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily 
legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters,’” “[t]he ATS was enacted with ‘foreign 
matters’ in mind.” Id. at 1672 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 
(2010)). Moreover, “at least one of the three kinds of activities that we found [in Sosa] to fall 
within the statute’s scope, namely piracy . . . normally takes place abroad.” Id. 
 220. Id. at 1674. 
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common enemy of mankind.”221 By citing Filártiga (as well as the 
Marcos litigation) with approval, Breyer made clear that he would 
not read the ATS to exclude all foreign-cubed cases.222 But by 
agreeing with the majority that the Kiobel defendants’ minimal 
presence in the U.S. was insufficient, he suggested a minimum 
condition that alleged violators of international law be found seeking 
“safe harbor” within the United States.223 
The broader view of ATS litigation taken by four Justices itself 
suggests that the universal-jurisdiction vision of the ATS is hardly 
dead. Justice Kennedy’s one-paragraph concurrence strengthened 
that impression. He noted that “the Court is careful to leave open a 
number of significant questions regarding the reach and 
interpretation” of the ATS, and he agreed that “that is a proper 
disposition.”224 Kennedy warned, moreover, that “[o]ther cases may 
arise” involving serious human-rights violations “covered neither by 
the [Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)] nor by the reasoning 
and holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper 
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial 
application may require some further elaboration and explanation.”225 
Without specifying how he might part company with Kiobel’s 
majority in a future case, Kennedy undermined any sense of certainty 
that the majority opinion might otherwise have imparted. 
At least in the near term, post-Kiobel debate about the ATS is 
likely to focus on two sets of questions: First, was Kiobel right to 
reject a universal-jurisdiction reading of the ATS? Second, how much 
scope for human-rights litigation remains after the Court’s ruling? 
II.  THE TROUBLE WITH PRIVATIZED UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
A universal-jurisdiction model of ATS litigation has its 
attractions. The plaintiffs in Filártiga-style cases generally present 
compelling injuries, and the perpetrators of the charged abuses 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1675 (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)); Hilao v. Marcos 
(In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Estate of Marcos Human 
Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 495–96, 500 (9th Cir. 1992)). Justice Breyer also cited with approval 
the practice of those countries that “find ‘universal’ criminal ‘jurisdiction’ to try perpetrators of 
particularly heinous crimes such as piracy and genocide” and that permit related forms of civil 
suits. Id. at 1676. 
 223. Id. at 1678. 
 224. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 225. Id.  
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include some of the most notorious figures of the modern era. In this 
respect, ATS suits illustrate one of the “clear triumphs of the 
American legal system”: “its remarkable ability to hold the powerful 
to account while treating the weak with some respect.”226  
To the extent that deep-pocket corporate defendants can 
convincingly be implicated as aiders and abettors, moreover, the 
second wave of Filártiga litigation offers victims a hope of meaningful 
compensation that was generally lacking in the first. By imposing 
liability on powerful economic actors, courts might encourage those 
actors in turn to pressure foreign governments to clean up their acts.227 
And in many instances, the domestic situation in the relevant foreign 
nation is such that an extraterritorial suit in U.S. courts offers the only 
realistic hope of subjecting the atrocities involved to the rule of law.228 
As Judge Leval recently observed, ATS suits “give substance to a 
body of law that is crucial to a civilized world yet so underenforced 
that it amounts to little more than a pious sham.”229 
Universalist ATS litigation also promises to boost American 
courts’ involvement in the development of international law. Dean 
Koh’s vision of “transnational public law litigation” envisioned the 
U.S. federal courts as vital instruments not only for compensating 
victims and deterring perpetrators of human-rights violations, but 
also for “norm-enunciation” as participants in the development of 
 
 226. David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: 
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 737 
(2006). 
 227. See, e.g., David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The 
Resiliency of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack 
Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 336 (2011) (urging that “[t]he end 
objective” of ATS litigation against corporations “is that the corporate sector can ‘right the 
system,’ namely by challenging and attempting to correct the governmental or societal 
challenges to international law principles, . . . thus enhancing the social environment for future 
business growth”).  
 228. See, e.g., Katie Shay, The Wrong Decision for Human Rights, HUFFINGTON  
POST, Apr. 18, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katie-shay/kiobel-vs-shell_b_3113133.html 
(complaining that “[t]oday’s decision leaves Esther Kiobel and plaintiffs like her with little 
recourse against some of the largest corporations in the world” and suggesting that corruption 
and dependency on multinational corporations would prevent any remedy in the Nigerian 
courts); Brenda Bowser Soder, Kiobel Ruling Undermines U.S. Leadership on Human Rights, 
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
2013/04/17/kiobel-ruling-undermines-u-s-leadership-on-human-rights (“In many countries, 
especially those with weak and non-independent justice systems and where the government is 
either the violator or is complicit in human rights violations committed by corporations, the only 
remedy and the only deterrent is the risk of being held accountable in another country.”).  
 229. Leval, supra note 122, at 16. 
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international human-rights law.230 “[O]ur constitutional and historical 
traditions,” he insisted, “not only charge the courts with chief 
responsibility for preventing abuse of state power against individuals, 
but also with giving domestic meaning to the shared public values 
expressed by treaties and customary international law.”231 ATS cases 
thus facilitate the U.S. judiciary’s involvement in shaping the content 
of international human-rights law,232 and Kiobel is likely to renew 
longstanding complaints that American courts are too unwilling to 
construe and enforce international law.233  
The deterioration of the federal courts’ role obviously worries 
human-rights advocates, who warn that decisions like Kiobel “will 
undermine the United States’ status as a leader on human rights.”234 
But it should also concern those who worry that international law 
threatens American interests. After all, international law is hardly 
likely to become more congenial to American perspectives and 
interests if American courts get out of the business of construing it.235 
I will return to these concerns in Part III. 
We must also count the costs of transnational public-law 
litigation in the Filártiga mold, however. Those costs are considerable. 
They plainly moved the Court in Kiobel, and they are certain to 
 
 230. Koh, Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2368. 
 231. Id. at 2396. This conception of the courts’ role is in considerable tension with Dean 
Koh’s assertion that domestic courts “find” CIL rather than make it. See id. at 2385; see also 
Henkin, supra note 134, at 1561–62 (“In a real sense federal courts find international law rather 
than make it . . . as is clearly not the case when federal judges make federal common law 
pursuant to constitutional or legislative delegation.”). To my mind, the view that federal courts 
will help shape CIL to the extent that they consider CIL claims under the ATS is considerably 
more plausible. See Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1122 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Institutional Settlement] (arguing that this is 
a reason to support involvement by domestic courts in international cases). 
 232. See, e.g., Wuerth, supra note 4, at 24 (“ATS litigation has the potential to play an 
important role in the development and enforcement of customary international law” because 
“[d]ecisions of national courts can constitute state practice and evidence of opinio juris.”). 
 233. See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk 
for a Short Drink, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841, 845 (2013) [hereinafter Steinhardt, Long Walk] 
(“[W]hat is clear in Kiobel is . . . a continuing, seemingly visceral resistance to treating modern 
international law in both treaty and customary form as law of the United States.”); see also Koh, 
Transnational Public Litigation, supra note 1, at 2377 (“Since Sabbatino, American courts have 
given undue credence to separation of powers and judicial incompetence in international law 
cases. That decision has unfortunately contracted American courts’ once-vibrant, historically 
important role in the development of international law.”); Lea Brilmayer, International Law in 
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2278–79 (1991) (lamenting 
reluctance of American judges to apply international law). 
 234. Soder, supra note 228. 
 235. See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 231, at 1122. 
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profoundly influence the future course of ATS litigation. This Part 
addresses those costs from two different perspectives. Section A 
situates both Kiobel and Sosa as part of the Supreme Court’s evolving 
case law concerning implied private rights of action. Implied rights of 
action are a familiar feature of domestic securities-fraud and 
employment-discrimination litigation; they also provide a vehicle for 
constitutional claims against federal officials. In all these fields, the 
Court has been increasingly reluctant to recognize private rights to 
sue under federal statutes or the Constitution in the absence of an 
express statutory provision. Sosa was a rare instance in which the 
contemporary Court recognized a new implied private right of action 
(or, more precisely, endorsed an old one), and Kiobel’s limitation of 
that right’s extraterritorial effect reflected the Court’s more general 
discomfort with federal-common-law remedies. Just as the Court’s 
implied-rights jurisprudence has become increasingly restrictive in 
recent years, those same concerns are likely to generate additional 
constraints on ATS litigation going forward. 
We cannot understand Kiobel simply as a foreign-affairs case 
apart from this more general background of domestic federal-courts 
doctrine.236 Just as domestic principles governing the relations 
between the state and federal judiciaries provide valuable guidance 
concerning the relations of domestic and supranational courts, 
established domestic principles governing remedies and judicial 
lawmaking should (and do) govern the implied-rights issues posed by 
Sosa and Kiobel. Kiobel’s analysis is thus best understood not as a 
simple weighing of functional concerns237 or even as an application of 
the extraterritoriality canon in foreign-relations law.238 As I explain in 
Section B, both Kiobel’s application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and its analysis of functional concerns about ATS 
litigation make most sense within the broader framework of concerns 
about judicially created rights to sue. 
Section C shifts to the perspective of international law and 
foreign experience with universal jurisdiction. The debate over the 
scope of ATS litigation is often portrayed as a clash between 
domestic and international-law concerns. Here, however, the high bar 
 
 236. See id. at 1151–63 (arguing that foreign-relations law should not be treated as a distinct 
field, isolated from domestic public law). 
 237. See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, supra note 127, at 181–99 (comparing the institutional competence 
of courts and political actors in foreign-relations cases).  
 238. David L. Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without Rationale, 28 MD. J. 
INT’L L. 241, 245–50 (2013). 
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for universal jurisdiction in international law and the general 
reluctance of foreign nations to exercise the universal jurisdiction 
they do have cut in the same direction as domestic concerns about 
judicial lawmaking. Even more significant, the criminal nature of 
universalist prosecutions abroad highlights the unique and 
unprecedented quality of Filártiga’s vision. Simply put, foreign 
experience suggests that prosecution of universal-jurisdiction cases 
should remain primarily in public hands, and that the unique qualities 
of the American civil-justice system are likely to exacerbate the 
disruptive impact of universal-jurisdiction suits under the ATS. 
These points support the Court’s decision in Kiobel, 
notwithstanding early criticism of that decision by internationalist 
scholars. They also suggest that the Court is likely to decide questions 
that remain open under the ATS in a similarly restrictive manner—a 
matter I take up in Part III. 
A. Filártiga Claims as Implied Rights of Action 
Proponents of transnational public-law litigation tend to 
downplay the domestic-law limits on public-law litigation generally. 
But those limits are well developed and significant in American law. 
They include a strong presumption against implying private rights to 
enforce substantive legal norms when Congress has not expressly 
authorized such suits. Where implied rights have been recognized, 
similar presumptions limit their scope. And even where Congress has 
enacted broad private rights of action in public-law cases, such as in 
42 U.S.C. § 1983’s general right of action against state and local 
government officials for violations of federal law, the federal courts 
have narrowed those remedies. If Filártiga claims are to be justified as 
analogous to domestic public-law litigation, then the substantial 
limitations on such litigation must be understood and respected. 
1. The General Decline of Implied Private Rights Under Federal 
Statutes and the Constitution.  The Court appears to have first 
recognized an implied right of action in 1916,239 but it created only one 
more over the next fifty years.240 The Court became considerably 
 
 239. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).  
 240. See Tex. & N.O.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (recognizing 
an implied right to sue under the Railway Labor Act of 1926); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 
441 U.S. 677, 732–42 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (surveying the development of the 
implication doctrine). 
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more generous in the 1960s. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak241—the “high water 
mark of judicial implication of remedies”242—recognized an implied 
right of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
which prohibits fraud in the solicitation of proxy material, and the 
Court recognized a similar implied right under the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s general antifraud rule seven years later.243 
During the same period, the Court implied additional rights under 
various civil-rights laws.244 
Implied rights of action soon ran afoul of longstanding concerns 
about judicial lawmaking, however. As early as 1963, the Court noted 
that “we are not in the free-wheeling days ante-dating Erie R.R. Co. 
v. Tompkins. The instances where we have created federal common 
law are few and restricted.”245 The Court began to cut back on implied 
rights in its 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash,246 rejecting an implied right 
of action under a criminal provision of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act. Although the Court recognized an implied right under 
the nondiscrimination provisions of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 in Cannon v. University of Chicago,247 Justice 
Powell filed a powerful dissent arguing that “a federal court should 
not infer a private cause of action” under a federal statute “[a]bsent 
the most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent.”248 
Subsequent cases made clear that “Justice Powell lost the battle in 
Cannon, but he won the war.”249 
Since Cannon, the Court has generally narrowed its inquiry from 
a broad purposive analysis to a narrower focus on “proof that 
Congress intended to create a private right of action.”250 The leading 
contemporary case is Alexander v. Sandoval,251 a 2001 decision 
 
 241. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
 242. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 705.  
 243. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). 
 244. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 728 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 245. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938)). 
 246. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).  
 247. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 248. Id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 249. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 706; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights 
and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113, 
126–33 (2010) (tracing the post-Cannon development of the doctrine). 
 250. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 706; see, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (rejecting an implied right under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1934). 
 251. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
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rejecting an implied right of action to enforce disparate-impact 
regulations issued under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Sandoval made clear that “[l]ike substantive federal law itself, private 
rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by 
Congress.”252 Hence, courts must determine whether the relevant 
statute “displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a 
private remedy.”253 Without such evidence of Congress’s intent, “a 
cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no 
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how 
compatible with the statute.”254 The Court thus endorsed Justice 
Scalia’s earlier statement that “‘[r]aising up causes of action where a 
statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-
law courts, but not for federal tribunals.’”255 
The Court’s decisions on implied rights of action for 
constitutional violations have taken a similar path. Although federal 
law provides a statutory cause of action against state and local 
officials for violation of federal constitutional (and some statutory) 
rights,256 no such statutory remedy exists for similar violations by 
federal officials. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,257 the Court recognized an implied 
private right of action for damages under the Constitution itself for 
individuals injured by a federal official’s violation of their 
constitutional rights.258 Emphasizing that “[t]he present case involves 
no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative 
action by Congress,” the Court held that an individual has an implied 
right to sue under the Fourth Amendment for damages arising from 
an unconstitutional search and seizure.259 
 
 252. Id. at 286 (citing Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578).  
 253. Id. (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979)). 
 254. Id. at 286–87. 
 255. Id. at 287 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 
350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 256. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 257. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  
 258. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 726–42 (discussing the Bivens 
remedy); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens 
Question, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 509 (2013) (surveying the Court’s cases in this area). Before 
Bivens, plaintiffs seeking damages for a constitutional violation by federal officers had to rely on 
state common-law tort actions. In this scenario, the alleged unconstitutionality of the officer’s 
action would enter the case as a response to the officer’s likely defense of official authority. See 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390–91. 
 259. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. 
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The Court initially expanded Bivens to other constitutional 
claims and other types of federal officials.260 But just as with the cases 
dealing with implied rights under federal statutes, the Court switched 
course in the 1980s. The first set of cases held that Congress’s 
provision of an alternative remedy forecloses Bivens relief, even if 
that remedy is not as generous to the plaintiff as a Bivens claim might 
be.261 A second set of cases rejected Bivens claims even absent a 
statutory alternative remedy, based on the existence of “special 
factors counselling hesitation” about an implied remedy.262 Although 
these cases arose in the military context, the Bivens Court itself 
included “question[s] of federal fiscal policy” as another such factor,263 
and lower courts have recognized other “special factors” in a broad 
set of national-security cases.264 One of the Supreme Court’s most 
recent decisions suggests that the mere prospect of opening the door 
to “an onslaught of Bivens actions” is itself a reason to restrict the 
right.265 Finally, a third set of cases has refused to expand the class of 
potential defendants in Bivens actions.266 
 
 260. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (permitting an Eighth 
Amendment claim for inadequate medical care by federal prison officials); Davis v. Passman, 
442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979) (permitting an administrative assistant to a congressman to sue under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for alleged gender discrimination that resulted 
in her termination). 
 261. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (rejecting a due-process claim by 
plaintiffs alleging wrongful denial of Social Security disability benefits, based on availability of a 
statutory remedy); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (denying a Bivens remedy for a 
federal “whistleblower” employee who claimed to have been fired in retaliation for exercising 
his First Amendment rights, based on the availability of a civil-service remedy). 
 262. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987) (denying a Bivens remedy to a 
former serviceman claiming to have been subjected to LSD experiments by military officers 
without his consent); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304–05 (1983) (rejecting a Bivens suit 
by Navy-enlisted men against their superior officers alleging racial discrimination). 
 263. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 
(1947), in which the Court declined to recognize an implied right of action on behalf of the 
United States against a tortfeasor who negligently injured a soldier). 
 264. See, e.g., Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 
390, 394–96 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 548–55 (4th Cir. 2012); Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563, 574 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 563 F.3d 527, 532 
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see generally Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010) (surveying the cases). 
 265. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007). 
 266. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012) (rejecting a Bivens claim under the Eighth 
Amendment against individual employees of a privately operated federal prison for providing 
inadequate medical care); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (rejecting a Bivens 
claim under the Eighth Amendment against a private corporation operating a prison on behalf 
of the federal government); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (rejecting a due-process claim 
against a federal agency). 
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The upshot is that “three decades after its inception, Bivens 
appeared intact at least on its own facts, but its successful extension 
into any new contexts seem[s] decidedly unlikely.”267 The Court has 
been virtually unanimous in refusing to extend the Bivens right of 
action in every circumstance presented over the last three decades.268 
This bleak outlook, moreover, is of a piece with the more general 
decline of implied rights of action in the statutory context. As Justice 
Scalia has explained, “Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this 
Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.”269 
Across the board, the Court has been hostile to judicial recognition of 
private rights to sue for over three decades.270 
Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, the Court has likewise 
narrowed the scope of statutory rights to sue under the general 
federal civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides an 
express right of action against persons acting “under color of” state 
law—generally state and local officials—when they violate “the 
Constitution and laws” of the United States.271 Although § 1983 
remains a broad and powerful statute, the Court has recognized 
several important limits over the past several decades. In particular, 
the Court has said that narrower remedies specific to particular 
federal statutes may supersede § 1983’s broad right to sue,272 and it has 
frequently held that particular federal statutes simply do not create 
 
 267. Vladeck, supra note 264, at 265. 
 268. See generally Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68 (noting that since 1980, the Court has 
“consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of 
defendants”); Elliot J. Weingarten, Minneci v. Pollard and the Uphill Climb to Bivens Relief, 7 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 95, 95 (2012) (“Over the past thirty years, the Court 
has consistently denied Bivens expansion to new categories of plaintiffs.”); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 
2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 26 (2007) (concluding that Bivens is “on life support with little 
prospect of recovery”). 
 269. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 270. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3.3 (5th ed. 2007) (“In 
general, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to create new causes of action, even in areas 
where it has been willing to develop common law rules.”); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 343, 357–62 (characterizing the 
Court’s implied-right-of-action cases as part of a broader trend in which “the Court sounds the 
theme that its power (or, more generally, that of the federal courts) is sharply limited and that 
Congress has primary, if not exclusive, responsibility for fleshing out the operation of schemes 
of federal regulation”).  
 271. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 272. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005); Middlesex Cty. 
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 188, at 970–72. 
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individually enforceable rights.273 These cases, which cite the Court’s 
implied-right-of-action jurisprudence, are somewhat surprising given 
§ 1983’s express provision for a private remedy.274 In any event, even 
under § 1983—where textual and historical support for federal private 
rights of action is strongest—we see a strong narrowing trend. That 
trend may indicate a general skepticism of private enforcement; it 
may also reflect the modern proliferation of express rights to sue 
under specific statutory schemes. But the direction of doctrinal 
movement is unmistakable. 
This, then, is the doctrinal landscape that any assertion of an 
implied private right of action must confront. The remainder of this 
Section fits Sosa’s implied right of action for violations of the law of 
nations into this framework. Justice Scalia noted in Sosa that Bivens 
“provides perhaps the closest analogy” to ATS claims,275 and the Sosa 
majority cited recent cases rejecting implied rights in both 
constitutional and statutory cases as reasons for caution about claims 
like Sosa’s under the ATS.276 This landscape will seriously constrain 
the scope of ATS litigation going forward. 
2. Sosa’s Translation Problem and the Domestic-Law Limits on 
Private Rights Under the ATS.  In Sosa, the Supreme Court 
recognized that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new 
causes of action,” but nonetheless found that “[t]he jurisdictional 
grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that 
the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest 
number of international law violations with a potential for personal 
liability at the time” of its enactment.277 This cause of action is best 
understood as an implied right of action under federal common law. 
Some of the limits on that cause of action come from international 
law, in the sense that the Court has understood ATS claims as limited 
to a subset of rights that international law recognizes with requisite 
 
 273. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2002) (construing the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 968–70. 
 274. These decisions may reflect skepticism about the Court’s decision in Maine v. 
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), which extended § 1983 to cover all federal statutory violations 
despite significant historical evidence indicating a narrower intent. See HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 188, at 967–68. 
 275. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 743 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the 
judgment). 
 276. See id. at 727 (majority opinion) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 
(2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)). 
 277. Id. at 724. 
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clarity. Hence, the Sosa right enforces “norm[s] of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to . . . the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized.”278 But the Court also made clear that ATS claims are 
limited not only by the substantive content of international law, but 
also by a broader set of concerns about federal judicial lawmaking279 
and its potential to interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by the 
political branches of the U.S. government.280 These latter concerns 
arise from domestic law, resting on the likely purposes of the ATS 
itself and the demands of the Constitution’s separation of powers. 
It is thus a necessary, but not sufficient, condition that ATS 
plaintiffs ground their claims in well-established principles of 
international law. Domestic law also constrains ATS claims. Sosa 
emphasized three legal changes since the ATS’s drafting that 
provided “good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a 
federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action.”281 
First, post-Erie principles of separation of powers limit the lawmaking 
role of courts, especially with respect to recognizing implied private 
rights of action.282 Second, separation-of-powers principles also limit 
judicial intrusion into the conduct of foreign affairs by the President 
and Congress.283 Third, Congress has taken the lead in defining and 
enforcing international human-rights law, suggesting that courts 
should confine any implied rights under the ATS to a very narrow 
scope.284 Each of these “good reasons” is a question of domestic law, 
and each thus supplements the constraints on ATS suits imposed by 
the substantive reach of international norms. I discuss the first 
point—limits on implied rights of action—in this Section, then turn to 
the second and third points in the next Section. 
The Founding generation did not think of “causes of action” in 
the same way that contemporary lawyers do; plaintiffs’ rights to sue in 
 
 278. Id. at 725. 
 279. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (noting 
that instances of federal common law “are ‘few and restricted’” (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 
373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963))). 
 280. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (recognizing 
the act-of-state doctrine to avoid judicial actions that undermine the conduct of foreign affairs 
by the political branches). 
 281. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 282. Id. at 725–27. 
 283. Id. at 727–28.  
 284. Id. at 728. 
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the early Republic derived from the common-law “forms of action.”285 
Hence, it was enough for Congress to create jurisdiction in the ATS 
and then rely on the common law for the plaintiff’s right to sue. But 
as the Sosa Court noted, we do not think of the common law in the 
same way today, nor do we view federal courts as having broad 
authority to fashion common-law remedies.286 Sosa thus posed a 
difficult problem of translation, requiring the Court to take into 
account “the interaction between the ATS at the time of its 
enactment and the ambient law of the era,”287 as well as the changes in 
that ambient law since Erie.288 
Undertaking to transpose the Founders’ understanding of a tort 
in violation of the law of nations into the modern context of implied 
remedies, Justice Souter noted that “the absence of congressional 
action addressing private rights of action under an international norm 
is more equivocal than its failure to provide such a right when it 
creates a statute.”289 The First Congress, after all, would have 
considered such norms presumptively enforceable under the common 
law without need for a statutory remedy.290 Crucially, the Court found 
that the ATS would have been “stillborn” without such a right.291 
The Court thus concluded that “[t]he jurisdictional grant is best 
read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common 
law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of 
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at 
the time.”292 This meant that “the First Congress understood that the 
 
 285. See generally Anthony J. Bellia, Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 
777 (2004) (describing the common-law understanding of rights to sue); see also Dodge, 
Historical Origins, supra note 120, at 239 (arguing that requiring an express cause of action for 
ATS suits “would have mystified the First Congress”). 
 286. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–26. Erie itself has been under siege in recent years, and at least 
some of the attack seems motivated by dissatisfaction with the limits Erie places on the domestic 
reception and vindication of CIL. See Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 
595, 623–24 (2008). For a response, see Young, Erie, supra note 24. 
 287. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.  
 288. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–27 (discussing the impact of Erie). On translation as a 
problem of interpretation, see generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 1165 (1993). 
 289. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. 
 290. See id. (concluding that “history and practice give the edge” to the view that “torts in 
violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the common law of the 
time”). The Court noted, however, that only “few . . . torts in violation of the law of nations 
were understood to be within the common law.” Id. at 720. 
 291. Id. at 714. 
 292. Id. at 724. 
YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2015  8:46 PM 
2015] ALIEN TORT LITIGATION 1077 
district courts would recognize private causes of action for certain 
torts in violation of the law of nations.”293 The only way to replicate 
this authority under contemporary jurisprudence—assuming that the 
ATS is itself purely jurisdictional294—would be to recognize an 
implied right of action as a matter of federal common law. To impose 
onto the venerable Judiciary Act the current doctrine’s insistence on 
strong evidence of Congress’s intent to create a federal remedy would 
prevent the federal courts from hearing a significant set of cases that 
the ATS was clearly intended to cover. 
My own view is that although Justice Souter’s effort at 
translation made Sosa more complex, it is the only way to be faithful 
both to contemporary jurisprudential categories and to what the 
framers of the first Judiciary Act tried to achieve. The difficulty is 
whether Souter’s approach gave adequate effect to legal 
developments since the Founding. As he acknowledged, “the 
prevailing conception of the common law has changed since 1789,” 
and along with “that conceptual development in understanding 
common law has come an equally significant rethinking of the role of 
the federal courts in making it.”295 In the “ambient law” of our era, “a 
decision to create a private right of action is one better left to 
legislative judgment.”296 And although the majority opinion 
emphasized over and over that its implied ATS cause of action should 
be narrow, its statement that “the door is still ajar . . . and thus open 
to a narrow class of international norms today” left a wide scope for 
creativity in the lower federal courts.297 
Justice Scalia’s partial concurrence focused on this potential for 
lower-court adventurism. He noted that the standard the majority 
intended to constrain lower courts—that the CIL norms in question 
must be “specific, universal, and obligatory”298—was precisely the test 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. See id. at 713 (holding the ATS to be purely jurisdictional, and citing with approval 
William Casto’s declaration that any contrary reading is “simply frivolous”) (citing Casto, 
Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 110, at 480).  
 295. Id. at 725–26. 
 296. Id. at 727 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001); Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)). 
 297. Id. at 729. Justice Souter said that “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping,” 
id. (emphasis added), and he suggested that some prior lower-court findings of actionable norms 
“reflect[ed] a more assertive view of federal judicial discretion over claims based on customary 
international law than the position we take today,” id. at 736 n.27. 
 298. See id. at 732 (majority opinion) (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 
25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)) (explaining that the Court’s standard “is generally consistent 
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that the lower courts had previously employed in finding a broad 
range of actionable violations.299 Indeed, it was the standard that the 
Ninth Circuit had applied in upholding the claim for “arbitrary 
arrest” that the Supreme Court rejected in Sosa itself.300 Justice Scalia 
worried that the lower courts would abuse this discretion, “usurping 
[Congress’s] lawmaking power by converting what they regard as 
norms of international law into American law.”301 And indeed, Sosa 
did not seem to put much of a damper on ATS claims.302 
Justice Scalia’s focus on the standard for an actionable CIL 
violation, however, seems misdirected in hindsight. It is true that, 
post-Sosa, some lower courts have permitted ATS claims for 
violations that Justice Souter likely did not intend to reach.303 And 
human-rights advocates have urged plaintiffs to use the ATS for an 
even broader set of substantive claims.304 But most ATS claims 
advance the same core human-rights concerns of Filártiga, and these 
claims surely satisfy the “specific, universal, and obligatory 
standard.”305 Because Sosa’s substantive filter has little bite in this 
context, transsubstantive limits such as a bar to corporate liability or 
the presumption against extraterritoriality took on a more prominent 
role in Kiobel. 
 
with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this 
Court,” and citing with approval the “specific, universal, and obligatory” formula from Marcos, 
25 F.3d at 1475). 
 299. See id. at 748 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (citing Marcos, 25 F.3d 
at 1475; Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).  
 300. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 301. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).  
 302. See, e.g., Bellinger, supra note 13, at 5 (“Notwithstanding the [Sosa] Court’s directive 
for restraint, almost four years later, [ATS] litigation has showed no signs of slowing down.”); 
Richard O. Faulk, The Expanding Role of the Alien Torts Act in International Human Rights 
Enforcement, Class Action Litigation Report, 10 TXLR 294, at 4 (2009) (listing “creative and 
expansive post-Sosa attempts to invoke the ATS”). 
 303. See, e.g., Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315–16 (D. Mass. 
2013) (holding that a claim that an anti-gay preacher had aided and abetted the persecution of 
homosexuals in Uganda passed Sosa’s test). 
 304. See, e.g., Jaclyn Lopez, The New Normal: Climate Change Victims in Post-Kiobel 
United States Federal Courts, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 113, 115 (2013) (arguing “that there is an 
emerging international norm of limiting contributions to climate change, and that a plaintiff 
bringing an ATS claim regarding climate change may succeed on the merits of the case”). 
 305. See, e.g., Scarborough, supra note 139, at 459 (observing that “[p]ost-Sosa, no one 
would doubt that claims of extrajudicial killing, state-sponsored rape, and forced labor would 
qualify under Sosa’s analysis to create ATS liability”). But see Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 
877, 883–86 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that torture and extrajudicial killing are not actionable 
under the ATS). 
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B. Extraterritoriality as a Constraint on Sosa’s Right of Action  
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Kiobel rested entirely 
on the canon of statutory construction “provid[ing] that ‘[w]hen a 
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it 
has none.’”306 The canon is a venerable one, traceable at least as far 
back as the Court’s refusal in 1818 to construe a federal piracy statute 
to cover a robbery on the high seas by foreign citizens on board a 
foreign ship.307 Like many canons of construction, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality has both descriptive and normative 
dimensions.308 Descriptively, it “rests on the perception that Congress 
ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”309 
The canon also serves normative values (which Congress may or may 
not share): It promotes compliance with international law;310 it 
protects the foreign-policy primacy of the political branches;311 it 
avoids clashes between American law and the laws of other 
jurisdictions; and it limits foreigners’ exposure to the wild and woolly 
ways of the American civil-justice system.312 
 
 306. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Morrison 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). 
 307. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 643 (1818); see also William S. Dodge, 
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 n.2 
(1998) (collecting other early instances). 
 308. See id. at 112–23 (surveying reasons for the canon). On the distinction between 
descriptive and normative canons, see generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of 
Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 
749 (1992) (distinguishing between “descriptive” canons, which “implement what Congress 
really wanted, but expressed inartfully or incompletely,” and “normative” canons, which 
“implement an important ‘public value’ through the mechanism of statutory interpretation”); 
Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely 
Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (same); see also Ernest A. Young, 
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 1549, 1586–87 (2000) [hereinafter Young, Constitutional Avoidance]. 
 309. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255; see also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) 
(“[T]he presumption is rooted in a number of considerations, not the least of which is the 
commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”). 
 310. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687, 687 (2011) 
(“The presumption against extraterritoriality was born from the marriage of the Charming Betsy 
canon . . . and an international law rule that jurisdiction was generally territorial.”); Sloss, supra 
note 238, at 241–42. 
 311. See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“The presumption against extraterritoriality guards 
against our courts triggering . . . serious foreign policy consequences, and instead defers such 
decisions . . . to the political branches.”); Sloss, supra note 238, at 245–46 (calling this the 
“international relations” rationale). 
 312. See, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270 (worrying that the United States “has become the 
Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign 
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Although early commentary has argued that Kiobel is out of step 
with these justifications,313 I reach the opposite conclusion. Kiobel was 
a particularly appropriate case for judicial caution about the 
extraterritorial reach of American law. I begin, however, with 
objections that the canon simply does not apply either to the ATS or 
to Sosa’s right of action. 
1. Extraterritoriality, Jurisdiction, and Implied Rights of Action.  
The first difficulty with applying the extraterritoriality canon in 
Kiobel was that, as Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged, “[w]e 
typically apply the presumption to discern whether an Act of 
Congress regulating conduct applies abroad.”314 The ATS, however, 
“does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief”; it is, as the Court 
held in Sosa, “‘strictly jurisdictional.’”315 For many of Kiobel’s critics, 
this renders the presumption irrelevant. Carlos Vázquez, for example, 
has argued that the extraterritoriality canon is categorically 
inapplicable to jurisdictional statutes.316 He suggests that the 
presumption applies only to statutes that regulate conduct.317 This 
objection, however, gives the canon far too narrow a scope. 
The problem is that the substantive–jurisdictional distinction is 
insufficiently clear-cut to bear the weight that critics would place on 
it. International law has long regulated jurisdiction to prescribe (to 
regulate conduct) and jurisdiction to adjudicate, suggesting that each 
raises significant extraterritoriality concerns.318 Jurisdiction to decide 
is, in any event, always to some extent jurisdiction to prescribe a rule 
for that case. One need not be a hard-core Legal Realist to 
acknowledge that adjudication frequently involves some degree of 
lawmaking; applying a preexisting legal standard in a new factual 
 
securities markets”); Paul B. Stephan, Response Essay—Empagran: Empire Building or Judicial 
Modesty?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
553, 554 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011); Sloss, supra note 
238, at 251–54 (calling this the “domestic judicial policy” rationale). 
 313. See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 238, at 243, 246–47, 253–54. 
 314. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
 315. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)). 
 316. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1723; see also Steinhardt, Long Walk, 
supra note 233, at 841 (charging that “Kiobel is the first time that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been applied to a purely jurisdictional statute”). 
 317. Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1723. 
 318. Notably, Justice Breyer’s concurrence rejecting application of the extraterritoriality 
canon argued that ATS jurisdiction was consistent with international norms—not that 
jurisdictional statutes raise no extraterritoriality concerns. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673–77 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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context, for example, inevitably shapes the meaning of that standard. 
And extension of federal jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under 
international law increases the likelihood that American judges will 
come into conflict with foreign jurists over the meaning of 
international legal principles.319 The potential for judicial lawmaking 
and transnational disagreement, in turn, creates incentives that 
influence litigant conduct. The history of federal-courts doctrine is 
replete with examples of litigants altering their conduct in order to 
fall within one or another court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate.320 
The extraterritoriality canon’s underlying concerns, then, do not 
fall neatly on one side of a bright line between prescriptive and 
adjudicative jurisdiction. They suggest that Kiobel’s reasoning might 
apply to other “strictly jurisdictional” statutes, such as the general 
federal-question statute or the alien–citizen diversity provision, in a 
future case in which the ATS is not in play. But Kiobel itself is best 
read as applying the presumption not to the ATS itself, but rather to 
the implied right of action that Sosa recognized. As Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote, “the principles underlying the [extraterritoriality] 
canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes 
of action that may be brought under the ATS.”321 This application 
gives rise to two further objections: that Sosa does not involve the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, and that the canon in any 
event does not apply to federal-common-law causes of action. 
The first objection notes that “it is debatable whether the Kiobel 
plaintiffs were even asking U.S. courts to apply U.S. law 
extraterritorially. Arguably, it would be more accurate to say that the 
Kiobel plaintiffs were asking U.S. courts to apply international law 
extraterritorially.”322 The canon should not apply, in other words, 
because the substantive rules of conduct enforced by Sosa claims 
 
 319. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, 
and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59, 71–72 (2009) (acknowledging the 
risk that greater national-court involvement in deciding international-law questions may lead to 
more conflict among courts of different nations). 
 320. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (bank assigned a mortgage to an 
out-of-state party in order to facilitate access to federal court in a foreclosure suit). Much of the 
point of federal diversity jurisdiction was to encourage the development of interstate commerce 
by assuring out-of-state businesses that they would have access to a federal forum in the event 
of a dispute. See RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND 
FEDERALISM 67–68 (1977). 
 321. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
 322. Sloss, supra note 238, at 243. 
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derive from international law.323 But the Court’s implied-right-of-
action jurisprudence has always understood creating a right to sue as 
itself an important exercise of power.324 And that right is a creature of 
federal—not international—law.325 As both supporters and critics 
have noted,326 America’s recognition of a private civil remedy for 
human-rights violations is unique—neither foreign nor international 
law offers any ready analogues. It ignores reality to characterize Sosa 
claims as a passive procedural mechanism rather than as an important 
assertion of American sovereignty with far-reaching consequences.327 
As such, those claims should be governed by the same general rules 
of extraterritoriality as other assertions of national legal authority. 
The latter objection is that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality should not apply to determine the scope of federal-
common-law rules (like Sosa’s implied right of action), because there 
is no congressional intent to construe in such cases.328 This is an odd 
argument, because it suggests that courts may impose extraterritorial 
obligations less easily when there is legislative support for those 
obligations—that is, an enacted statute—than when the courts 
themselves have created the right to sue. Canons guide statutory 
construction by identifying either things Congress is unlikely to want 
to do (e.g., legislate extraterritorially) or values that are important 
enough to push back against Congress’s likely intent (e.g., avoiding 
conflict with other nations). It is hard to imagine why either sort of 
principle should not also constrain courts when they make law on 
their own. Federal common law is, after all, always subordinate to 
federal statutes.329 Moreover, as Chief Justice Roberts noted, “the 
danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign 
 
 323. Id.; see also Leval, supra note 122, at 21 (making a similar argument). 
 324. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(stating that implying private rights of action “allows the Judicial Branch to assume 
policymaking authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch”); accord Carlos M. 
Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and 
Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 
1504, 1547 (2011) (agreeing that Sosa claims involve an exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe, not 
just to adjudicate). 
 325. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 326. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 104, at 182; Leval, supra note 122, at 18. 
 327. See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, 
POLITICS, RIGHTS 156 (2014) (characterizing the rise of ATS claims after Filártiga as a critical 
development shaping the international legal landscape). 
 328. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1731. 
 329. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011); Illinois v. 
Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981). 
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policy”—a principal concern underlying the extraterritoriality 
canon—“is magnified in the context of the ATS, because the question 
is not what Congress has done but instead what courts may do.”330 
2. Did Congress Intend to Reach Foreign-Cubed Cases?  Justice 
Breyer’s primary argument in his Kiobel concurrence did not reject 
any of this reasoning. He instead suggested that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality should not apply because “[t]he ATS . . . 
was enacted with ‘foreign matters’ in mind.”331 David Sloss rightly 
notes that “[n]o one seriously disputes the proposition that Congress 
enacted the ATS to influence foreign affairs. Congress’s primary goal 
when it enacted the ATS was to reduce a source of friction with 
important U.S. allies.”332 In his view—and Breyer’s—that should be 
sufficient to overcome any presumption that Congress was “primarily 
concerned with domestic conditions.”333 
It does not follow, however, that Congress meant federal law to 
apply extraterritorially simply because it was concerned about 
“foreign matters.” Imagine that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
permissive construction of the Takings Clause in Kelo,334 Congress 
worries that local takings of foreign-owned property would offend 
other nations. It enacts a statute prohibiting (and providing a 
compensatory remedy to aliens for) “any expropriation in violation of 
customary international law.” This hypothetical statute would have 
been plainly “enacted with foreign matters in mind,” but does that 
make it more likely that Congress also intended the statute to allow 
foreign property owners to sue foreign governments for 
 
 330. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013). Cf. David H. 
Moore, An Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2006) 
(“[A]s a rule, congressional intent is the threshold for federal judicial authority to apply 
[customary international law] as federal law . . . .”). 
 331. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). This point makes 
more sense as a way of rebutting the presumption—we know that Congress meant to legislate 
extraterritorially because it was dealing explicitly with international matters—than of rendering 
the presumption inapplicable. For example, in Morrison the Court evaluated textual evidence 
that the federal securities laws touch on foreign activities and transactions as evidence to rebut 
the presumption of extraterritoriality. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 263 
(2010). It is not clear whether this distinction makes any practical difference, however.  
 332. Sloss, supra note 238, at 4. 
 333. Id. at 4 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating the usual 
presumption)); accord Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 334. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding a local government’s use 
of eminent domain to take private residential property and give it to a private corporation in 
order to promote economic development). 
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expropriations taking place in foreign countries? That conclusion 
would transform a statute meant to avoid international controversy 
into one guaranteed to engender it. 
Parallels to the actual history of the ATS should be obvious. As 
Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, Congress legislated in response to 
worries about the capacity of the state courts to provide reliable 
remedies for law-of-nations violations occurring within American 
territory, and the federal courts’ early applications of the statute 
likewise involved domestic occurrences.335 In this vein, my colleague 
Curtis Bradley has argued that the “the text and structure of the First 
Judiciary Act, and the correspondence surrounding it, suggest that 
Congress viewed at least the law of nations portion of the Alien Tort 
Statute as an implementation of Article III alienage jurisdiction”—
that is, as restricted “to suits involving a U.S. citizen defendant.”336 
Whether or not one finds Professor Bradley’s reading persuasive, its 
availability (and considerable textual and historical support) 
demonstrates that a statute may well be concerned with “foreign 
matters” and yet not meant to apply extraterritorially (especially in 
the foreign-cubed sense). No one, after all, argues that Congress had 
anything like contemporary Filártiga-style litigation in mind in 1789.337 
Nor does Sosa’s widely accepted assumption that the ATS was 
meant to cover piracy demonstrate that Congress intended to permit 
extraterritorial suits. First, the assumption itself may not be correct. 
After all, the early Congress passed a specific statute dealing with 
pirates, and the Marshall Court’s piracy cases all involved American 
parties.338 Second, the extraterritoriality presumption aims to prevent 
clashes with foreign governments and, in particular, foreign law that 
would potentially apply to conduct regulated by the relevant federal 
 
 335. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666–67; see Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 
1607); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895). 
 336. Bradley, ATS, supra note 108, at 636–37; see also M. Anderson Berry, Whether 
Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original Language of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 316, 320–21 (2009) (arguing that the drafting history of the ATS—
particularly, the change from “foreigner” to “alien”—indicates Congress’s desire to restrict the 
statute to suits involving foreigners resident in the United States).  
 337. The Court seemed to have something like Dean Slaughter’s broader view in its sights 
when it denied that “the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable 
forum for the enforcement of international norms.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668. 
 338. See supra note 70. Indeed, the Court’s earliest extraterritoriality case refused to apply 
the piracy statute extraterritorially. See supra note 307 and accompanying text. 
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statute.339 Those concerns are particularly attenuated when laws deal 
with generally stateless entities like pirates.340 When Justice Breyer 
asserted that human-rights violators are “today’s pirates,”341 he 
papered over a number of important distinctions, including the 
frequently close relationship between defendants and foreign 
governments in contemporary ATS suits, the possibility of 
interference with legal processes ongoing in the state where the 
events occurred, and the likelihood that the foreign state may have 
considerable economic interests at stake. The Chief Justice was right 
to suggest that “pirates may well be a category unto themselves.”342 
Finally, Professor Vázquez suggests that the Sosa cause of action 
should overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality because 
it is based on the Founders’ notion of “general” law, and in the 
eighteenth century such general law would have been understood to 
apply universally.343 This argument misunderstands the relationship 
between the “general” principles of CIL that provide the rule of 
decision in ATS suits and the source of the plaintiff’s right to sue. As 
A.J. Bellia has shown, eighteenth-century American plaintiffs derived 
their right to sue from the English common-law forms of action, not 
general principles of CIL.344 Vázquez acknowledges that international 
law generally does not confer rights to sue on civil plaintiffs345—and I 
do not understand him to argue that it did in the Founding era, either. 
The English common law, of course, did not apply universally and 
 
 339. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667 (“Applying U.S. law to pirates . . . does not typically 
impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial 
jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy 
consequences.”). 
 340. Justice Breyer correctly noted that “the robbery and murder that make up piracy do 
not normally take place in the water; they take place on a ship. And a ship is like land, in that it 
falls within the jurisdiction of the nation whose flag it flies.” Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
the judgment). But it is not as if applying American remedies in piracy cases is likely to offend 
those countries that consider piracy legal and object to their punishment. There aren’t any, at 
least as a general matter. And in any event, we generally punish pirates under the federal piracy 
statute—not the ATS—through a criminal process that can more readily take into account any 
such foreign-relations objections that do materialize. 
 341. Id. at 1672; see also id. at 1672–73. 
 342. Id. at 1667 (majority opinion); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 78 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (“Applying the ATS to conduct on the high seas 
does not pose the risk of conflicts with foreign nations that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and the ATS itself were primarily designed to avoid. The high seas are 
jurisdictionally unique.”). 
 343. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1739. 
 344. See Bellia, supra note 285, at 785. 
 345. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1725. 
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had to be received by positive act in each of the American states.346 
The common-law provenance of Sosa’s right of action thus cannot 
power an argument that the right applies universally without regard 
to geography. To the extent that history frames the appropriate 
bounds of Sosa’s right of action, that history indicates that Congress 
was concerned with a far narrower set of cases in which international 
law required the United States to provide a remedy—primarily in 
cases arising in U.S. territory or involving U.S. nationals.347 
3. Extraterritoriality as a “Special Factor Counselling Hesitation.”  
Alongside arguments about Congress’s intent, Chief Justice Roberts 
invoked concerns about ATS claims causing “‘unintended clashes 
between our laws and those of other nations’” and “‘impinging on the 
discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing 
foreign affairs.’”348 These concerns echoed the Court’s domestic 
implied-rights cases. Speaking of implied rights of action to vindicate 
constitutional principles, for example, the Court has frequently 
recognized that “‘the federal courts must make the kind of remedial 
determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying 
particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation 
before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.’”349 The same 
reasons supporting a presumption against extraterritoriality in 
statutory construction thus figured in Kiobel as “special factors 
counselling hesitation” in extending an implied right of action under 
federal common law. 
Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia made this connection explicit a year 
before his elevation to the Supreme Court, invoking the special-
factors analysis from the Bivens cases to reject an ATS claim against 
former Nicaraguan Contras: 
Just as the special needs of the armed forces require the courts to 
leave to Congress the creation of damage remedies against military 
 
 346. See, e.g., Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United 
States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951). States incorporated the common law, moreover, only to the 
extent that each jurisdiction did not decide to modify it by legislative act or later judicial 
decision. See id. at 798–99.  
 347. See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, Law of Nations, supra note 115; Lee, Safe Conduct, supra note 
117, at 902. 
 348. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 727; EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 349. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 621 (2012) (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 
550 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983))).  
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officers for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of soldiers, . . . so 
also the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the 
creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy 
officials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects 
causing injury abroad. The foreign affairs implications of suits such 
as this cannot be ignored . . . . [A]s a general matter the danger of 
foreign citizens’ using the courts in situations such as this to obstruct 
the foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute that we 
must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy 
should exist.350  
The Supreme Court has likewise invoked foreign-affairs and security 
concerns as reasons to cabin implied federal rights of action.351 
Those concerns have particular resonance in cases invoking 
universal jurisdiction. International legal principles governing 
universal jurisdiction and foreign experience with its exercise tend to 
underscore the Chief Justice’s concerns in Kiobel. Likewise, 
comparative analysis of foreign and American approaches to civil 
litigation bears out Kiobel’s worry about conflict with foreign legal 
regimes. The next Section thus fleshes out Kiobel’s “special factors” 
from the perspective of international law and experience. 
C. Universal Jurisdiction in International Perspective 
In international law, universal jurisdiction remains controversial 
in principle and extremely rare in practice. There are good reasons 
for that. Even advocates of universal jurisdiction acknowledge that it 
is “a potentially dramatic extension of judicial power and a 
corresponding threat to judicial legitimacy.”352 To the extent that 
consistency with international law is a goal of the extraterritoriality 
canon, Kiobel’s limits on ATS litigation further that goal. It is equally 
important to recognize, moreover, that the form of universal 
jurisdiction exercised in Filártiga suits is profoundly different from 
the universal jurisdiction exercised in human-rights cases by other 
countries around the world. Universal jurisdiction in foreign practice 
is a criminal phenomenon.  
 
 350. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208–09 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Casto, 
New Federal Common Law, supra note 23, at 645 (“Because ATS litigation in Sosa’s wake is so 
obviously analogous to Bivens litigation, the same caution is pertinent to crafting tort remedies 
for violations of international law.”). 
 351. See Vladeck, supra note 264, at 268–75. 
 352. Slaughter, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 168. 
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Reading Sosa to recognize a civil form of universal jurisdiction 
departs from foreign practice in two crucial respects: It wrests control 
over the initiation and conduct of litigation from public hands, and in 
particular, away from the Executive branch, which is responsible for 
conducting foreign policy. And moving human-rights litigation onto 
the civil side tends to emphasize exceptional aspects of American 
procedure and remedies that may intensify conflict with foreign legal 
systems. Foreign experience with universal jurisdiction should make 
American courts hesitate to expand ATS litigation. 
1. Extraterritoriality, Universality, and International Law.  Justice 
Breyer’s Kiobel concurrence emphasized that “just as we have looked 
to established international substantive norms to help determine the 
[ATS’s] substantive reach, so we should look to international 
jurisdictional norms to help determine the statute’s jurisdictional 
scope.”353 Three distinct questions are worth asking: Does 
international law require the exercise of universal jurisdiction? Does 
it permit the exercise of such jurisdiction? And even if universal 
jurisdiction is permitted, is it nonetheless disfavored? 
Justice Breyer suggested that universal jurisdiction is not only 
permitted but required by international law.354 Significantly, he did not 
assert that international custom established this obligation, but rather 
noted that “the Senate has consented to treaties obliging the United 
States to find and punish foreign perpetrators of serious crimes 
committed against foreign persons abroad.”355 But even the 
Restatement (Third) acknowledges that each of the treaties that 
Breyer cited “include[s] an obligation on the parties to punish or 
extradite offenders.”356 That is rather different from a requirement to 
 
 353. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). It is not clear that 
this analogy works. After all, the very term “universal” jurisdiction fits uncomfortably with the 
traditional mission of the American federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and 
statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies 
outside this limited jurisdiction . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 354. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 355. Id. 
 356. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404 Reporters’ Note 1, at 257 (emphasis 
added) (discussing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 28, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 
T.I.A.S. No. 8532; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; and the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192). 
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“find and punish”; a state party to these treaties may satisfy its 
obligations without exercising any sort of universal jurisdiction, so 
long as it hands over perpetrators to other nations willing to 
prosecute.357 These treaties have each been ratified by many, many 
countries, and yet few of those countries provide for, much less 
exercise, universal jurisdiction. 
It is nonetheless impossible to say that international law 
prohibits universal jurisdiction. As discussed in Part I, international 
law has recognized universal jurisdiction in principle for some time. 
Some of Kiobel’s critics, however, suggest that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction has become so well accepted that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is no longer warranted. David Sloss, for example, 
claims that “the international law rationale for the presumption 
against extraterritoriality became untenable because international law 
changed.”358 Professor Sloss relies on a 1927 decision by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (a forerunner to today’s 
ICJ) in the Lotus case,359 which rejected any “general prohibition to 
the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and 
the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside 
their territory.”360 Instead, the Court said that international law 
 
Each of the post-Restatement treaties that Justice Breyer cited offers signatories a similar choice. 
See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
Art. 9(2) (2006) (requiring that each state party take measures to establish jurisdiction “when 
the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction, unless it extradites or 
surrenders him or her”), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Professional
Interest/disappearance-convention.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015); Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85, Arts. 5(2), 7(1) (similar); Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (requiring 
each signatory to “search for persons alleged to have committed . . . such grave breaches” and to 
“bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts” or “hand such 
persons over for trial”). Justice Breyer acknowledged this qualification in his string citation, but 
he should have qualified his initial statement that these treaties “oblig[e] the United States to 
find and punish foreign perpetrators of serious crimes committed against foreign persons 
abroad.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676. 
 357. See, e.g., International Bar Ass’n, Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction 154 (2008), available at http://tinyurl.com/taskforce-etj-pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) 
[hereinafter IBA Task Force] (emphasizing the importance of this distinction). 
 358. Sloss, supra note 238, at 2. 
 359. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
 360. Id. at 19. It is worth noting that neither the Permanent Court (which was, of course, far 
from permanent) nor the present-day ICJ has ever had authority to liquidate the meaning of 
international law. Article 59 of the ICJ’s statute provides that “[t]he decision of the Court has 
no binding force except as between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Statute of 
the Int’l Court of Justice, Art. 59, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&
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“leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is 
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.”361 Further, Sloss 
denies that there is “any rule of international law that prohibits 
domestic courts from exercising jurisdiction over foreign-cubed cases. 
To the contrary, the universality principle is a widely accepted 
principle of international law that authorizes States to apply their 
laws extraterritorially to address heinous conduct that violates 
universal human rights norms.”362 
This overstates the case considerably. First, Professor Sloss 
conflates the sort of extraterritoriality at issue in Kiobel with the 
broader meaning of that term in both international law and American 
statutory construction. In general discussions, extraterritoriality can 
entail any application of a state’s law to conduct occurring outside its 
borders. That includes jurisdiction asserted over actions by a state’s 
own citizens abroad (nationality), extraterritorial actions causing 
impacts within a state’s borders (protective principle), and actions 
harming the state’s citizens abroad (passive-personality principle).363 
Acceptance of these sorts of extraterritoriality in international law, 
such as it is, would hardly establish the legitimacy of foreign-cubed 
cases like Kiobel. Those cases rely on the distinct principle of 
universal jurisdiction. 
Likewise, Professor Sloss exaggerates by asserting that “the 
universality principle is a widely accepted principle of international 
law.” Accepted by whom? Sloss cites the Restatement (Third),364 which 
 
p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_III (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). According to Sir Ian Brownlie, this 
provision “reflects a feeling on the part of the founders that the Court was intended to settle 
disputes as they came to it rather than to shape the law.” BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 20; see 
also id. (noting that Article 51 was meant “to rule out a system of binding precedent”). 
Although such decisions undoubtedly do have “a role in the progressive development of the 
law,” id. at 21, Brownlie notes that the Lotus decision itself was decided on a narrow vote and 
“was rejected by the International Law Commission in its draft articles on the law of the sea,” 
id. Generally speaking, ICJ decisions are one source among many in settling the meaning of 
international law—to the extent that it can be settled at all. 
 361. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), supra note 359; see also Dan E. Stigall, International Law and 
Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 331 (2012) (noting that the ICJ has reaffirmed this view as recently 
as 2009).  
 362. Sloss, supra note 238, at 3. 
 363. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30. 
 364. See Sloss, supra note 238, at 3 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 404 cmt. 
a & b). Justice Breyer similarly invoked this Restatement section in Kiobel. See 133 S. Ct. at 1673 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Relying on the Restatement (Third) is problematic not 
just because it has been criticized as more normative than descriptive, see supra notes 135–36, 
but also because its function is not to restate international law or to survey other states’ practice. 
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establishes that universal jurisdiction is accepted by a certain segment 
of the American legal academy, and an article by two leading 
international advocates of universal jurisdiction.365 Maximo Langer 
has demonstrated, however, that universal jurisdiction is practiced 
only by a handful of Western European countries, each of which has 
taken steps to limit its exercise.366  
Moreover, as I elaborate in the next two subsections, the United 
States is the only nation to exercise the sort of freestanding civil-side 
universal jurisdiction at issue in Kiobel and other foreign-cubed 
cases.367 Given the extremely mixed track record of such suits, it is 
hard to say that civil universal jurisdiction was well established in 
American state practice even before Kiobel. Notwithstanding Justice 
Breyer’s assertion in his Sosa concurrence that a “procedural 
consensus exists” in favor of universal jurisdiction,368 much of the 
international academic commentary continues to treat universal 
jurisdiction as controversial.369 
 
Moreover, the Restatement (Third) was promulgated over a quarter century ago, before 
significant retreats from universal jurisdiction in the countries that had practiced it. See supra 
note 71 and accompanying text. 
 365. See Sloss, supra note 238, at 3 (citing Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9). Those 
advocates acknowledge that “state practice endorsing the exercise of universal jurisdiction” is 
“embryonic,” but they assert that it is “beginning to emerge.” Donovan & Roberts, supra note 
9, at 153. The Donovan and Roberts article stops far short of asserting, as Professor Sloss does, 
that universal civil jurisdiction is “well established.” Sloss, supra note 238, at 3. 
 366. See Langer, supra note 32, at 43 (observing that universal jurisdiction is “applied 
essentially by Western European and developed Commonwealth states”); see also Yee, supra 
note 69, at 529–30 (Chinese scholar contesting general acceptance of universal jurisdiction). 
 367. See Anderson, supra note 104, at 166 (“Foreign parties don’t regard the ATS as 
legitimate or as implementing genuine international law, and won’t ever—not our close friends 
and allies, let alone China or Russia. Even the Canadians resent it.”). 
 368. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the 
judgment). In support, Justice Breyer cited only the Restatement (Third), a report of the 
International Law Association, a decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the Supreme Court of Israel’s decision in the Eichmann case. 
 369. See supra text accompanying notes 86–104; see also IBA Task Force, supra note 357, at 
151 (“The proper scope and application in certain instances or with regard to certain crimes of 
universal jurisdiction is controversial among states and among commentators.”). One might also 
consider the international-law rationale as a descriptive canon: Courts should assume that 
Congress, as an empirical matter, generally wishes to comply with international law. To the 
extent that we deal with the intent of the enacting Congress—as seems appropriate with 
descriptive canons—then the relevant state of international law would be that law as it stood in 
1789. Although the eighteenth-century world does seem to have recognized universal 
jurisdiction over pirates, everyone agrees that extraterritorial jurisdiction was more tightly 
circumscribed during this period. 
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Even in its broader sense, extraterritoriality remains exceptional. 
According to a leading treatise, “The starting-point in this part of the 
law is the proposition that, at least as a presumption, jurisdiction is 
territorial.”370 The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction does appear 
to be on the rise, but a recent report by the International Bar 
Association concluded that “[t]he steady increase in states exercising 
extraterritorial jurisdiction has not . . . resulted in an abatement of the 
controversies surrounding such exercises.”371 An interpretive canon 
presuming that statutes do not apply extraterritorially thus fits rather 
well with the current state of international law, which occasionally 
permits the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction but finds that 
jurisdiction both unusual and controversial.372 
2. Political Control of Foreign Policy and the Leap from 
Criminal- to Civil-Side Universal Jurisdiction.  As discussed in Part I, 
the primary difference between American exercise of universal 
jurisdiction under the ATS and foreign practice is that the latter exists 
as part of the criminal law. Justice Breyer suggested in Sosa that 
“consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction itself suggests that 
universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening.”373 But as he 
acknowledged, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in other countries 
is nearly always public—that is, it is initiated and controlled by public 
officials rather than by private litigants. When private litigants do 
play a role, they are subject to significant public controls.374 Public 
domination of universalist litigation ensures that the same institutions 
responsible for the conduct of foreign policy have the ultimate say 
over the initiation and prosecution of international human-rights 
litigation. 
 
 370. BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 298, 301. 
 371. IBA Task Force, supra note 357, at 5. For a sampling of the controversy, see, e.g., 
Kathleen Hixson, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Third Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127 (1988) (arguing that the 
Restatement (Third)’s relaxation of limits on extraterritoriality was inconsistent with 
international law). 
 372. See supra Section I.A.3. See also Macedo, supra note 66, at 11 (worrying that “[t]he 
currently incoherent jurisprudence of universal jurisdiction is likely to result in confusion and, at 
best, uneven justice”). 
 373. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see 
also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676–77 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (analogizing ATS 
litigation to foreign countries’ exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction). 
 374. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
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Intuitively, the civil nature of universal jurisdiction under the 
ATS may seem to render such jurisdiction less troubling; the 
Restatement, for example, suggests that “the exercise of criminal (as 
distinguished from civil) jurisdiction in relation to acts committed in 
another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive.”375 That may 
well be true from the standpoint of the defendant and perhaps the 
defendant’s state, although I argue in Subsection 3 that the 
exceptional characteristics of the American civil-justice system may 
create unique frictions. Other commentators blur the distinction 
between civil and criminal remedies, noting that international 
criminal law has increasingly provided for reparations and urging that 
compensation for victims should be recognized as part of the 
“effective remedy” that state parties must provide when they violate 
international human-rights treaties.376 And still other commentators 
even go so far as to say that accepting universal criminal jurisdiction 
requires civil jurisdiction a fortiori.377 
But there are also good reasons to find the ATS’s civil regime 
more troubling than criminal instances of universal jurisdiction.378 As 
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith have observed, “[w]hether in the 
civil or criminal context, one nation’s examination of the validity of 
another nation’s human rights record directly implicates international 
relations. In the criminal extradition or prosecution context, however, 
the executive branch has the duty, expertise, and discretion to 
accommodate such foreign relations concerns.”379 In civil cases, 
however, “human rights litigation is under the control of private 
plaintiffs, many of whom are noncitizens, and unelected judges.”380 
 
 375. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 22, § 403 Reporters’ Note 8.  
 376. See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 153–54 (concluding that “the acceptance of 
universal criminal jurisdiction should carry over to the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction for 
at least the same range of conduct”). 
 377. See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (2003) (arguing that the “greater” power to prosecute criminally 
necessarily includes the “lesser” power to impose civil liability); but see Bradley, Universal 
Jurisdiction, supra note 10, at 343–46 (observing that “the theory of universal jurisdiction 
hypothesizes that each nation is delegated the authority to act on behalf of the world 
community, not on behalf of the particular victims. . . . To the extent that private civil causes of 
action are designed primarily to redress harm to particular victims, they may be conceptually 
outside of the universal jurisdiction authority”).  
 378. See Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 10, at 343–46. 
 379. Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2158–59. 
 380. Id. at 2159; see also Morris, supra note 59, at 356–57 (urging that because universalist 
prosecutions may precipitate international conflict, it is “imperative that high-level executive 
decision-makers, duly informed by intelligence and analysis from foreign ministries, have the 
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One would expect the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to bring 
decisions to initiate proceedings at least somewhat in line with the 
Executive branch’s foreign policy; executive officials could then be 
held politically accountable for their exercise of that discretion. 
Under the ATS, however, “private litigants make the decisions 
regarding when to bring these lawsuits, which countries to target, and 
what relief to seek.”381 
Other legal systems do allow somewhat more involvement by 
victims in the prosecutorial process,382 and in fact some of the most 
high-profile universalist prosecutions—including the Spanish case 
against Augusto Pinochet—have been initiated by private parties.383 
Generally speaking, however, private involvement in criminal 
prosecutions overseas pales in comparison to the autonomy of the 
American private civil plaintiff (or her lawyers). The Pinochet case, 
for example, involved a civil-law jurisdiction in which the presiding 
judge took the lead in conducting the investigation.384 Moreover, 
universalist criminal prosecutions initiated by nongovernmental 
actors have been controversial for precisely this reason.385 Notably, in 
Belgium, criticism of such prosecutions by other states led Belgium 
largely to repeal its universal-jurisdiction statute.386 
 
power to preclude prosecutions that could lead to international catastrophe”). As Professors 
Bradley and Goldsmith note, the British Law Lords “expressly encouraged Britain’s home 
secretary to reconsider his decision to allow extradition proceedings against Pinochet to go 
forward, even though the Law Lords had determined that there was a valid legal basis to 
proceed with extradition.” Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2159. Although 
the secretary demurred, “[h]is decision . . . was based on just the sort of balancing of legal and 
political considerations . . . that is not available in private civil litigation.” Id. 
 381. Bradley & Goldsmith, Pinochet, supra note 167, at 2181–82. 
 382. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also Stephens, Translating Filártiga, 
supra note 20, at 12. 
 383. See Wilson, supra note 48, at 3. The Spanish acción popular allows individuals with an 
interest in a case or acting on behalf of a victim to bring private prosecutions. See C.E. art. 125, 
B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain); Organic Law on the Judiciary art. 20.3 (B.O.E. 
6/1985); L.E. Crim. § 101, 270. 
 384. See Wilson, supra note 48, at 3; see also Langer, supra note 32, at 33–34 (discussing 
“people’s prosecutions” in Spain). 
 385. See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 155. 
 386. See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
888, 896–97 (2003). Likewise, Britain has sharply curtailed the ability of private parties to 
initiate universal-jurisdiction prosecutions. See John Bellinger, Britain Amends Universal 
Jurisdiction Law, LAWFARE (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2011/09/britain-amends-universal-jurisdiction-law (“Britain amended its universal jurisdiction 
law last week to require private individuals who seek arrest warrants for foreign government 
officials for human rights offenses to obtain the consent of Britain’s director of public 
prosecutions.”). 
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A second functional consideration is that the underlying law in 
criminal proceedings is generally statutory. Most analogous 
prosecutions invoking universal jurisdiction have occurred in civil-law 
countries where statutes play a more prominent role.387 Even in this 
country, which has a rich common-law tradition on the civil side, the 
criminal law has been a statutory preserve since the early Republic.388 
This tendency stems from separation-of-powers concerns about 
judicial power and due-process concerns about the vagueness of 
common-law crimes. Although judge-made law continues to play a 
role in federal criminal law,389 it remains the case that, by making 
human-rights violations a matter of civil tort rather than crime, the 
ATS commits this American version of universal jurisdiction to a 
judge-driven rather than a legislature-driven regime.390 
This separation-of-powers choice has several consequences. It 
divorces not just the decision to prosecute, but also the development 
of the law’s underlying content, from the political institutions also 
charged with formulating American foreign policy. A consequence 
for potential defendants concerns fair notice: it is far harder to 
anticipate how judges may develop the vast corpus of customary 
principles and open-ended human-rights treaties391 than to consult a 
statutory codification of prohibited conduct, even if the latter may 
inevitably retain some ambiguities around the edges. 
Decoupling private civil litigation from executive foreign policy 
is not without its virtues. As Gary Bass has noted, states are unlikely 
to incur the political and logistical costs of universalist prosecutions 
pursued out of a disinterested concern for the international rule of 
law; rather, the states bringing such prosecutions will tend to be 
 
 387. Likewise, the Canadian universal-jurisdiction statute refers specifically to the 
definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in the Rome Statute. See 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c.24, § 4 (Can.). 
 388. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 36 (1812) (holding that 
before federal authorities may impose criminal penalties, “[t]he legislative authority of the 
Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall 
have jurisdiction of the offense”); see also Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part 
One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1040 (1984); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part 
Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1280 (1985). 
 389. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 
345, 347–48; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 188, at 689–90. 
 390. More recent enactments like the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), by contrast, 
retain a civil model but define the content of the underlying law in the statute. See Torture 
Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, Mar. 12, 1992, 106 Stat. 73. 
 391. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 164, at 451 (emphasizing the indeterminacy of CIL). 
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states—like Israel in the Eichmann case—that have suffered 
somehow at the hands of the accused, or states that have a political 
agenda to advance against another state.392 Private plaintiffs initiate 
ATS litigation in American courts for strategic reasons of their own, 
of course, but at least the claims are adjudicated by the courts of a 
government that will often have little direct interest in the outcome. 
Advocates of universal civil jurisdiction have argued that keeping 
control of criminal sanctions in public hands while dispersing control 
of civil sanctions strikes the right balance.393 But the clear message of 
the Court’s implied-rights jurisprudence is that this balance in itself is 
a question best left to Congress.394 
Finally, it may be possible to modify the ATS regime in ways that 
would inject a degree of executive foreign-policy supervision. 
Although the implied-rights cases recognize judicial authority to 
make such modifications as a matter of federal common law, we are 
better off if courts need not guess at the political branches’ 
preferences. In the Court’s previous extraterritoriality cases, the 
presumption has often proved to be an effective “preference-
eliciting” rule; in both ARAMCO and Morrison, for example, 
Congress responded to the Court’s rejection of extraterritorial reach 
by restoring some of that reach but, at the same time, fine-tuning the 
statute’s extraterritorial application in various ways.395 The specifics of 
how that might be done are outside the scope of this Article, but it is 
a mistake to assume that courts must bear sole responsibility for 
reform in this area. 
3. America’s Exceptional Civil-Justice System.  The shift from a 
predominantly criminal form of universal jurisdiction in other 
countries to a civil form under the ATS also exacerbates the 
possibility of clashes between domestic and foreign law. In particular, 
 
 392. See Bass, supra note 63 at 78. 
 393. See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 9, at 156 (“If the recognition of universal 
jurisdiction necessarily entails a balancing of traditional sovereign prerogatives and fundamental 
human values, the balance should be struck by according those with the greatest incentive to 
pursue reparations—that is, the victims of the heinous conduct—the right to do so in civil 
actions, while reserving to public authorities the decision to seek penal sanctions.”). 
 394. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983) (“Congress is in a far better position than a 
court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation . . . .”). 
 395. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 104–05 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing Congress’s response to ARAMCO and 
Morrison); EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR 
LEGISLATION 205–06 (2008) (discussing preference-eliciting rules of statutory construction).  
YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2015  8:46 PM 
2015] ALIEN TORT LITIGATION 1097 
it brings into play the highly exceptional features of the American 
civil-justice system.396 Many features of that system are highly 
attractive to plaintiffs.397 But those features are also likely to strike 
foreign defendants as unusual and possibly unjust. Wholly apart from 
the substance of the particular claims advanced in ATS litigation, 
then, the process of American civil litigation may well amplify the 
discomfort that exercising universal jurisdiction in American courts 
inspires in foreign observers.398 
Even within our own legal system, “[c]ivil litigation and criminal 
litigation . . . occupy separate worlds. They employ different 
procedural rules, often before different judges in different 
courthouses, and with almost entirely unconnected bars . . . .”399 These 
separate worlds differ in the degree to which they diverge from the 
rest of the world.400 Although American criminal prosecutions differ 
in significant ways from foreign prosecutions, American 
“exceptionalism” seems markedly more pronounced on the civil side. 
And although comparisons often emphasize differences between 
America and the civil-law countries, “American procedure is very 
different from its common law kin” as well.401 
In Kiobel, the governments of Great Britain and the Netherlands 
filed two amicus briefs objecting “to the efforts of U.S. litigators and 
 
 396. See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 287 (2002); Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil Procedure 
Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (accepting the 
“holistic assessment that U.S. civil procedure is highly exceptionalist when compared to the civil 
law systems in the rest of the world,” but arguing that “‘American exceptionalism’ is 
diminishing in some, if not most, areas of civil procedure”); Richard L. Marcus, Putting 
American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 709–10 
(2005) [hereinafter Marcus, Procedural Exceptionalism].  
 397. See Stephens, Translating Filártiga, supra note 20, at 27–34; Roger Alford, Arbitrating 
Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508–09 (2008). 
 398. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 47; see also Marcus, Procedural 
Exceptionalism, supra note 396, at 710 (invoking “the nasty aroma American litigation seems to 
elicit in much of the rest of the world”). 
 399. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 226, at 684. 
 400. As David Sklansky and Stephen Yeazell have pointed out, the civil and criminal worlds 
also differ in the degree to which they have changed since the early Republic. See id. at 737 
(“Criminal procedure . . . is frozen roughly into the shape it had in 1800. . . . By contrast, civil 
procedure[’s] . . . shape and general features would scarcely be recognizable to a lawyer from 
the early Republic.”). This further undermines any attempt to derive a coherent civil-side 
regime for human-rights enforcement from the text and history of the first Judiciary Act. 
 401. Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
441, 442 (2010); see also Chase, supra note 396, at 284 (observing that “the American dispute 
process . . . is exceptional even when measured against its siblings in the common law family”). 
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judges to bypass the legal systems of other sovereigns by deciding 
civil cases involving foreign parties where there is no significant nexus 
to the U.S.”402 These briefs emphasized that conflict with foreign 
nations over ATS suits arises in part because the United States 
“provide[s] a unique plaintiff-favoring system.”403 “[T]he 
attractiveness of the United States as a forum for foreign plaintiffs is 
well known,” the foreign governments argued, “and [it] may, in part, 
be traced by decisions by the United States to accord private plaintiffs 
a set of advantages that most other countries have not accepted.”404 
Those governments cited six “special litigation advantages available 
in the U.S.”: the “American rule” that each side bears its own costs 
(including attorneys’ fees); the breadth and expense of American 
discovery in civil cases; the constitutional right to a civil jury trial; the 
availability of punitive damages; broad “opt out” class actions; and 
the use of results-based contingent fees.405 
Each of these features is a staple of the literature on comparative 
civil procedure.406  That literature also emphasizes American rules of 
notice pleading, which Scott Dodson has described as “unlike any 
other in the world.”407  Some scholars have identified modest trends 
 
 402. Brief of the Governments of the K. of the Netherlands and the U.K. of Great Britain 
and N. Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 24, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (filed June 13, 2012) [hereinafter 
Netherlands & Great Britain Brief]; see also Great Britain & Netherlands Brief, supra note 17, 
at 29–33. 
 403. Great Britain & Netherlands Brief, supra note 17, at 33; see also Netherlands & Great 
Britain Brief, supra note 402, at 26–30. 
 404. Great Britain & Netherlands Brief, supra note 17, at 33. 
 405. Id. at 27–28. 
 406. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the 
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 401 (2014) (observing that class actions are “a 
central feature of American procedural exceptionalism,” “resisted (if not rejected) by most 
foreign legal systems”); James R. Maxeiner, The American “Rule”: Assuring the Lion His Share, 
in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 287 (Mathias 
Reimann ed., 2013) (decrying American failure to adopt a “loser pays” rule for attorney fees or 
to regulate fee agreements); John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive 
Damages: Is the Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 510, 513–16 (2007) 
(observing that most civil-law countries “prohibit punitive damages in private actions because 
they consider punitive damages a form of punishment that is appropriate only in criminal 
proceedings”); Chase, supra note 396, at 288–96 (discussing civil juries and discovery as aspects 
of American exceptionalism). 
 407. Dodson, supra note 401, at 443; see also id. (explaining that “civil law countries . . . 
require detailed fact pleading and often evidentiary support at the outset, and . . . even most 
common law traditions . . . also require some fact pleading”; American pleading, by contrast, 
generally requires only “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’” and “has traditionally 
focused on notice rather than facts” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8)).  
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toward convergence, particularly in pleading and aggregate-litigation 
procedures, but important and contentious differences remain.408  
Foreign critics have argued, moreover, that these features compound 
one another in practice. Broad discovery increases litigation costs, 
which then cannot be recovered by prevailing defendants thanks to 
the American rule on attorneys’ fees.409 Likewise, aggregate litigation 
and punitive damages magnify defendants’ exposure to possibly 
capricious jury verdicts.410 And notice pleading, the lack of fee-
shifting, and contingent-fee arrangements all work together to 
enhance incentives to file claims.411 
The exceptional features of American civil litigation reflect a 
litigation culture starkly different from that found elsewhere. The 
point is not simply that, as Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco 
have observed, “[t]wenty-first-century America is one of the most 
litigious societies the world has ever known.”412 Rather, American 
litigation differs from that abroad both with respect to who drives it 
and to the purposes that it seeks to achieve. Many have observed that 
American litigation elevates the parties and their lawyers over the 
judge.413 The parties frame the issues and control fact-gathering in 
American courts, for example, while judges tend to guide both 
processes elsewhere.414 Lawyer-driven litigation also feeds an 
 
 408. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), brought American 
pleading closer to the rest of the world, but concluding that American practice remains 
“significantly different from foreign models”); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation 
Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) 
(“European receptiveness to new procedures for aggregate litigation . . . stops markedly short of 
full-fledged embrace for U.S.-style class actions, much less related features of litigation 
finance.”). 
 409. See Netherlands & Great Britain Brief, supra note 402, at 27. 
 410. Id. at 27–28; see also Richard Marcus, ‘American Exceptionalism’ in Goals for Civil 
Litigation, in GOALS OF CIVIL JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL 
SYSTEMS 123, 134 (Alan Uzelac ed., 2014) [hereinafter Marcus, Goals] (“One major feature of 
American litigation is that the stakes are higher.”). 
 411. See Netherlands & Great Britain Brief, supra note 402, at 27–28. 
 412. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs’ Diplomacy, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 102, 
102 (2000). 
 413. See, e.g., Marcus, Procedural Exceptionalism, supra note 396, at 723–24 (contrasting the 
adversary and inquisitorial systems); Maxeiner, supra note 406, at 290 (“That private lawyers 
are the driving force behind civil justice explains the existence of the American practices of no 
indemnity for attorneys’ fees and unregulated fee agreements.”). 
 414. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 226, at 694 (observing that the power of private 
lawyers in our system “to compel sworn testimony and to require the other party and 
unaffiliated witnesses to disclose information and documents . . . is broader and deeper than the 
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“entrepreneurial spirit that has developed within the civil litigation 
bar.”415 Second-wave Filártiga suits against corporate aiders and 
abettors are, of course, an example of that spirit. The independence 
of the bar from government, however, heightens the potential 
disconnect between ATS litigation and national foreign policy. 
The most distinctive element of American litigation culture is its 
vibrant tradition of public-policy reform through litigation.416 This 
tradition, which places international human-rights lawyers in the role 
of Thurgood Marshall in Brown v. Board of Education,417 makes civil 
litigation a more instinctive strategy for human-rights advocates in 
this country.418 And facilitating reformist litigation may explain our 
system’s plaintiff-friendly rules; as Richard Marcus has argued, “[t]he 
more one conceives of private litigation as furthering a public 
enforcement purpose, the more one may be tempted to provide 
incentives to pursue it, and the more one may be inclined to equip 
those who do pursue litigation with the tools they will need to 
succeed.”419 Conversely, “[t]he absence of a comparable private 
enforcement goal helps explain why the procedures of the rest of the 
world differ so markedly from America’s.”420 
Adoption of a civil-litigation model under the ATS thus 
promotes vindication of human rights through a mechanism that is 
out of step with practices in the rest of the world. This may or may 
 
powers exercised by private lawyers in any other legal system”; in civil-law countries, by 
contrast, “judges typically decide whether and how deeply to probe the disputed facts”); see also 
Marcus, Procedural Exceptionalism, supra note 396, at 723–24 (comparing the role of the judge 
in the American system with the German, Japanese, and English systems). Here, too, there are 
some signs of modest convergence. See Dodson & Klebba, supra note 396, at 14–18. 
 415. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 226, at 693. 
 416. Stephens, Translating Filártiga, supra note 20, at 24–26. Some attribute this aspect of 
American legal culture to American suspicion of intrusive government, see generally ROBERT 
A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001), while others 
emphasize the common-law tradition, see Marcus, Goals, supra note 410, at 130 (“The very 
heart of the common law system contemplates that the courts themselves will develop and 
enforce—via private litigation—the sorts of legal protections that are ordinarily adopted by 
legislative or administrative action in other legal systems.”). 
 417. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Koh, Transnational Public 
Litigation, supra note 1, at 2366 (explicitly invoking comparisons with Brown). 
 418. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 416, at 15–16 (suggesting that “in the United States 
lawyers, legal rights, judges and lawsuits are the functional equivalent of the large central 
bureaucracies that dominate governance in high tax, activist welfare states”).  
 419. Marcus, Goals, supra note 410, at 133; see also Paul Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 
49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997) (claiming that private civil “discovery is the American alternative 
to the administrative state”). 
 420. Marcus, Goals, supra note 410, at 140. 
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not be a good thing—I tend to be a fan of the American model of civil 
litigation, but my purpose here is neither to praise that model nor to 
bury it. Instead, I want to make two more modest points. The first is 
that by transforming the universal criminal jurisdiction practiced in 
the rest of the world into a civil phenomenon, the Filártiga model of 
ATS litigation significantly amplified the risk of conflict with other 
legal systems. Foreign governments and corporations are both 
uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the American civil-litigation 
system, and that exacerbates the political conflict inherent when 
American institutions intervene in their affairs.421  
The second point, however, is that the use of civil litigation to 
push social reforms—and to vindicate basic notions of justice—taps 
into a fundamental aspect of American legal culture. This gives ATS 
litigation an intuitive appeal to American lawyers. Who among us, 
after all, would not pay good money to watch Joe Jamail depose 
Bashar al-Assad? To the extent that Filártiga litigation is a natural 
American analog of criminal prosecutions in foreign lands, we are 
unlikely to abandon it entirely. 
Nonetheless, the exceptionalism of American civil procedure and 
remedies law, the incentives it creates for plaintiffs, and the 
international resentment it inspires all suggest the need for care with 
procedure and remedies in transnational public litigation. The 
contrast with Bivens is instructive. The Court created an implied right 
of action in response to two anomalies—the limitation of the general 
federal civil-rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to suits against state and 
local officers, and the existence of a longstanding common-law right 
of action for constitutional violations by federal officers in cases 
involving equitable relief but not damages.422 Bivens filled the 
resulting gap, and it made sense to apply the generally applicable civil 
rules to the new class of claims. In an important sense, then, Bivens 
normalized the law governing damages actions against federal officers 
by conforming it to well-established practice in closely related areas. 
Recognition of universal civil jurisdiction under Filártiga, however, 
introduced something entirely new and different into the 
international human-rights regime. And it exported, for the first time, 
the American tradition of reformist civil litigation beyond our own 
 
 421. It also makes civil-side litigation an odd choice if the point of having universal 
jurisdiction is to join in a common venture with other societies. Cf. Burley, supra note 7, at 493. 
 422. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 403 (1971); see also id. at 429 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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borders. Kiobel’s retrenchment is likely just the beginning of a 
broader effort to rein in that development. 
III.  TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC-LAW LITIGATION AFTER KIOBEL 
Kiobel imposed an important limit on ATS claims, but it is 
hardly the end of the story. The Court did not explain its holding that 
ATS claims must “touch and concern the territory of the United 
States,”423 and it left unresolved longstanding questions about whether 
ATS claims may be brought against aiders and abettors or corporate 
defendants. Section A of this Part considers what the Court’s 
approach so far can tell us about these questions. Section B then turns 
to a broader set of issues about the future and structure of 
transnational public-law litigation. Throughout, I argue that the 
Court’s experience with public-law litigation generally, and 
particularly the implication of private rights to sue, will (and should) 
inform its approach to international human-rights claims under the 
ATS. 
A. U.S. Defendants and the Unresolved Pre-Kiobel Questions 
In the wake of Kiobel, human-rights advocates sought a silver 
lining in the continuing possibility of litigation against American 
defendants.424 In addition to the Unocal case, a number of other 
prominent ATS actions have been brought against U.S. 
corporations.425 “A majority of these cases are against U.S. 
companies,” noted one advocate, “and [Kiobel] still means they can 
be held accountable.”426 As Oona Hathaway put it, after Kiobel 
“‘[f]oreign cubed’ cases . . . are off the table. But there may remain 
significant scope for ‘foreign squared’ cases—cases in which the 
 
 423. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 424. See, e.g., Steinhardt, Short Drink, supra note 233, at 841 (“On closer analysis, however, 
Kiobel, like Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain before it, adopts a rhetoric of caution without foreclosing 
litigation that fits the Filártiga model.”). Other possibilities exist. For instance, Kiobel may not 
bar suits against foreign defendants based on foreign conduct that causes effects within the 
United States. See Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1737. I am not aware of any 
examples of such a suit. 
 425. See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Bowoto v. 
Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 426. Quoted in Jonathan Stempel, Window Narrows in U.S. for Human Rights Abuse 
Lawsuits, REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/18/us-
usa-court-humanrights-idUSBRE93H15O20130418.  
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plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. national or where the harm occurred 
on U.S. soil.”427 
Foreign-squared suits are closer to the First Congress’s likely 
purpose in enacting the ATS. As already discussed, recent scholarship 
has insisted that Congress intended to provide a remedy only for 
wrongs for which the United States might be held accountable under 
international law. That would include not only wrongs to aliens 
occurring within U.S. territory but also, in at least some 
circumstances, wrongs committed by American nationals abroad.428 
ATS litigation against U.S. defendants will raise at least three 
sets of difficult questions. The first is the question raised by the 
Kiobel concurrences: Exactly how much contact with the United 
States is necessary to support a suit under the ATS? Such cases rely 
on nationality, not universality, as a basis for jurisdiction; they are 
thus less controversial than foreign-cubed cases as a matter of 
international law and practice. The presumption against 
extraterritoriality remains applicable, however. None of the Supreme 
Court’s extraterritoriality cases before Kiobel, after all, involved 
universal jurisdiction. In ARAMCO, for example, the Court held that 
Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination did not apply 
extraterritorially to a suit by an American national against a company 
incorporated in Delaware, because the events in question occurred in 
Saudi Arabia.429 Cases like ARAMCO suggest that the mere 
nationality of the defendant may not be enough to change Kiobel’s 
result. 
Early post-Kiobel decisions in the federal circuit courts bear out 
this prediction. In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.,430 the 
Fourth Circuit held that an ATS claim by former detainees at the 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq against an American defense contractor 
sufficiently “touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the United States “to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” The 
court of appeals did not think it sufficient that CACI was an 
American corporation; rather, it emphasized other connections to the 
United States, including allegations “that CACI’s managers in the 
 
 427. Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” 
Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/
kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases.  
 428. See Bellia & Clark, Two Myths, supra note 115, at 1638–40; Lee, Safe Conduct, supra 
note 117, at 891–92; Vázquez, Presumptions, supra note 187, at 1736. 
 429. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 249 (1991). 
 430.  Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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United States gave tacit approval to the acts of torture committed 
by CACI employees at the Abu Ghraib prison, attempted to ‘cover 
up’ the misconduct, and ‘implicitly . . . encouraged’ it.”431 Moreover, 
CACI acted pursuant to a contract to perform interrogations with the 
U.S. government, and the alleged torture occurred at a United States 
military facility.432  
Al Shimari seems like a fairly easy case under Kiobel.433 The 
Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, rejected an ATS claim in 
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc.434 Cardona was a class 
action by Colombians alleging that the defendant, a U.S. corporation, 
made payments to paramilitary groups that carried out torture and 
extrajudicial killings. The court of appeals’ terse opinion noted that 
“[t]here is no allegation that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or 
that any other act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS touched or 
concerned the territory of the United States with any force.”435 The 
majority implicitly rejected the dissent’s argument that the case 
satisfied Kiobel simply because the defendant was an American 
national, and because plaintiffs alleged “that Chiquita’s corporate 
officers reviewed, approved, and concealed payments and weapons 
transfers to Colombian terrorist organizations from their offices in the 
United States with the purpose that the terrorists would use them to 
commit extrajudicial killings and other war crimes.”436 
It seems premature to view Al Shimari and Cardona as a circuit 
split: the former presented a considerably more compelling case 
under Kiobel than the latter, and a court applying the same standard 
might well come out differently on these two sets of facts. At the 
same time, Cardona seems to have viewed allegations that the 
American corporate defendant’s home office knew about and 
participated in the planning of rights violations abroad with more 
skepticism than did Al Shimari. It will always be possible to allege 
 
 431. Id. at 530–31. 
 432. See id. at 528, 530–31. 
 433. See John Bellinger, Two New ATS Decisions: Fourth and Eleventh Circuits Split on 
Whether Claims Against CACI and Chiquita “Touch and Concern” the Territory of the United 
States, LAWFARE (July 27, 2014, 8:53 PM) http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/07/two-new-ats-
decisions-fourth-and-eleventh-circuits-split-on-whether-claims-against-caci-and-chiquita-touch-
and-concern-the-territory-of-the-united-states (“Of the pending ATS cases, the CACI suit may 
present the most compelling factual scenario for the extraterritorial application of the ATS to a 
US corporation.”). 
 434. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 435. Id. at 1191. 
 436. Id. at 1192, 1194 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
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that sort of involvement, and if such allegations are sufficient to get 
plaintiffs past a motion to dismiss then Kiobel may not prove so 
severe a limit. The Supreme Court seems likely to apply its decisions 
raising the pleading bar to these sorts of claims, so that plaintiffs will 
need to plead specific facts demonstrating a plausible connection to 
U.S. territory.437 
The second set of questions includes the laundry list of 
uncertainties about the ATS itself that predated Kiobel and were not 
resolved by that decision. These questions, like the extraterritoriality 
issue, are transsubstantive—they concern not the limits of actionable 
claims, but whether Sosa’s right of action covers aiding-and-abetting 
liability or permits suits against corporations. Nonetheless, one way to 
handle these questions would be to treat them as identical to 
questions about Sosa’s substantive scope—that is, corporate or 
aiding-and-abetting liability would be permitted only if international 
law provides for such liability with the same degree of clarity and 
universal acceptance required for the underlying substantive offense. 
Hence, defense counsel in ATS cases have tended to argue that 
international law governs all ancillary questions, probably because 
corporate liability is relatively scarce in international law.438 Plaintiffs 
(and sympathetic academics), on the other hand, have generally 
argued that federal common law governs these ancillary questions.439 
I submit that both groups are partially correct; any Sosa claim 
should have to clear both an international- and a domestic-law bar. 
Sosa’s cause of action is limited to claims that would fit within the 
ATS’s grant of jurisdiction, which requires “a tort . . . in violation of 
the law of nations.”440 If international law does not recognize 
corporate liability, for example, that standard is not satisfied. But 
 
 437. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.’” (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007))); see also Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 557 (rejecting “naked assertion[s]” without “further factual enhancement”). 
 438. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 17–26, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (arguing that whether corporations may be sued under the ATS is 
a question governed by international law). International law also arguably supports a relatively 
demanding standard for aiding-and-abetting liability. See id. at 50–51. 
 439. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 
(2013) (No. 10-1491), at 24–25 (arguing that “federal common law supplies the rules governing 
the scope of tort remedies in ATS litigation”); Casto, New Federal Common Law, supra note 23, 
at 641 (arguing that “[t]he norm that a defendant is alleged to have violated comes from 
international law, and domestic law supplies all other rules of decision”). 
 440. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
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because the plaintiff’s right to sue derives from federal common law, 
domestic-law limitations are relevant as well. That is evident from 
Kiobel itself, which looked to the domestic-law presumption against 
extraterritoriality to delimit Sosa’s right of action—another ancillary 
question that Sosa left open. 
The ancillary questions go away, of course, if one adopts Justice 
Scalia’s conclusion in Sosa that “creating a federal command (federal 
common law) out of ‘international norms,’ and then constructing a 
cause of action to enforce that command through the purely 
jurisdictional grant of the ATS, is nonsense upon stilts.”441 But no 
justice seemed interested in revisiting the existence of an implied 
right of action in Kiobel, even though it seems likely that at least four 
current Justices would embrace Scalia’s view.442 In any event, the 
Court’s unanimous rejection of both Sosa’s and Kiobel’s claims on the 
merits strongly suggests that all the Justices share a concern about the 
judicial lawmaking entailed by implied private rights of action. That 
consensus has been particularly evident in the Court’s recent Bivens 
cases, in which even the liberal Justices have generally refused to 
extend the scope of that implied remedy.443 
The Bivens cases make clear that the Court’s hesitance about 
implied private rights of action extends not simply to their existence, 
but also to their scope. This is a critical point, because it presages a 
likely resolution of the remaining ancillary questions under the ATS. 
Even accepting Sosa’s holding that an implied right exists under the 
ATS, the general presumption against implied rights will constrain 
the scope of that right. A similar pattern has occurred in the Court’s 
statutory implied-rights jurisprudence. In Central Bank of Denver, 
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,444 for example, the Court 
 
 441. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 743 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in 
the judgment).  
 442. For those keeping score at home, Justice Scalia wrote for himself, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas in Sosa. Id. at 739. It seems likely that Scalia’s position would 
garner at least four votes today, with Chief Justice Roberts voting the same as his predecessor 
and Justice Alito switching positions with Justice O’Connor, who joined Justice Souter’s opinion 
in Sosa. 
 443. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012) (rejecting, by an 8–1 vote, an 
effort to extend Bivens to cover an Eighth Amendment claim against employees of a privately 
operated federal prison); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 548–49 (2007) (rejecting, by a 7–2 
vote, a request to extend Bivens to cover harassment and intimidation by the Bureau of Land 
Management).  
 444. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180 
(1994). 
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rejected calls to extend the implied private right of action under SEC 
Rule 10b-5 to aiders and abettors. The Court signaled its reluctance 
to extend nonstatutory causes of action, emphasizing, inter alia, that 
although Congress has enacted a general criminal aiding-and-abetting 
statute, there is no such statute on the civil side.445 More recently, 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.446 
refused to extend the implied right under Rule 10b-5 to suits against 
entities who allegedly acted in concert with a company accused of 
issuing a misleading financial statement. The Court observed that 
“[c]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action 
caution against its expansion. The decision to extend the cause of 
action is for Congress, not for us.”447  
Cases like Central Bank of Denver and Stoneridge Partners 
suggest that further restrictions on the ATS right of action may be in 
the offing. Both cases refused to extend implied rights under the 
federal securities statutes to aiders and abettors. The Roberts Court 
may well make a similar call under the ATS, largely shutting down 
the second wave of Filártiga litigation and restricting ATS suits to 
actions against the actual perpetrators of human-rights violations. If 
Congress wished to curb private suits while preserving leverage to 
spur reform abroad, it might choose to replace private aiding-and-
abetting suits with a more public form of human-rights enforcement 
directed at multinational corporations, modeled on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).448 Left to its own federal-common-law 
devices, however, the Supreme Court is likely to view with 
considerable skepticism each effort to expand Sosa’s implied right of 
action to new situations or classes of defendants. 
By locating the ATS within its implied-right-of-action 
jurisprudence, the Court tilted the playing field strongly against any 
expansion of ATS liability. On the other hand, the “special factors” 
discussed in the previous Part will be more mixed in cases against 
U.S. defendants. The potential for U.S. responsibility for 
international-law violations by American nationals provides a reason 
 
 445. Id. at 181–82.  
 446. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008). 
 447. Id. at 165; see Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1085, 1102 (1991) 
(stating, as a “fundamental principle[] governing recognition of a right of action implied by a 
federal statute,” that “the breadth of the right once recognized should not, as a general matter, 
grow beyond the scope congressionally intended”). 
 448. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2012)). 
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why ATS jurisdiction may actually further foreign-policy goals, and 
the concern about offending foreign nations by holding their 
corporations liable will be less substantial in these situations. Still, 
other factors may counsel caution. For example, broad availability of 
ATS jurisdiction against American corporations, even for actions 
taking place entirely abroad, may place those corporations at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign corporations.449 And even 
litigation against U.S. companies may offend foreign governments to 
the extent that it brings embarrassing facts to light concerning their 
own human-rights abuses or threatens a business relationship upon 
which the foreign state depends.450 
Finally, it is not at all clear to what extent Filártiga-style lawsuits 
against U.S. defendants will need to rely on the ATS at all. The ATS 
remains a jurisdictional statute, but aliens suing U.S. defendants will 
be able to get into federal court under the diversity statute.451 To be 
sure, those plaintiffs will still need a cause of action, and to the extent 
that they rely on the federal-common-law right of action recognized 
in Sosa, plaintiffs will have to accept the limits on that right of action 
identified in the Court’s ATS case law. But Sosa is not the only 
possible right of action. For instance, the law of the place in which the 
injury occurred may provide a cause of action. Or plaintiffs may 
choose to sue under American state law—torture, extrajudicial killing, 
and rape are torts, after all.452 Indeed, human-rights plaintiffs may 
choose to avoid the federal jurisdictional questions altogether by 
suing in state courts.453  
Each of these options would require American courts to decide 
whether the various limits on the Sosa cause of action are tied to the 
ATS or serve as freestanding limitations on any suit in an American 
court based on human-rights violations abroad. I consider those issues 
 
 449. See Anupam Chander, Unshackling Foreign Corporations: Kiobel’s Unexpected Legacy, 
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 829, 829 (2014). 
 450. See, e.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper, 113 F.3d 540, 543–44 (5th Cir. 1997) (permitting 
removal of a case to federal court based on these sorts of concerns). 
 451. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights 
Cases Under State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 12 (2013).  
 452. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the district 
court had diversity jurisdiction over tort claims filed against Exxon by Indonesian citizens). 
 453. Childress, supra note 6, at 715; see also Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl Childress 
III & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreword: After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in 
State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013) (introducing a symposium on 
the topic). 
YOUNG IN PRINTER FINAL (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2015  8:46 PM 
2015] ALIEN TORT LITIGATION 1109 
in depth elsewhere.454 The remainder of the present discussion focuses 
instead on broader considerations about the enforcement of 
international law. 
B. The Broader Debate About Transnational Public-Law Litigation 
The ATS is not just any statute; it is, as Harold Koh and many 
others have suggested, the centerpiece for contemporary visions of 
transnational public-law litigation.455 At least some federal judges 
have read this mandate very broadly. Judge Jack Weinstein, for 
example, has written that “[i]n judging international human-rights 
claims against domestic corporations or others, courts in the United 
States with jurisdiction act as quasi international tribunals,” applying 
an “‘international law of human rights [that] parallels and 
supplements national law, superseding and supplying the deficiencies 
of national constitutions and laws.’”456 For that reason, it is worth 
thinking about Kiobel and the ATS in light of broader debates about 
the structure of international-law enforcement. 
One longstanding debate has concerned the choice between legal 
and political enforcement. Some critics of Filártiga-style litigation, for 
example, have argued that judicial resolution of human-rights claims 
gets in the way of efforts by the State Department and other public 
institutions to improve human-rights compliance around the world 
through diplomacy and action in supranational political 
organizations.457 This position harkens back to the long period when 
international human-rights law was largely aspirational. Legal 
enforcement mechanisms were minimal to nonexistent, and 
jurisprudes seriously debated whether international law was really 
“law” at all.458 Aspirational principles of human rights proved more 
efficacious than many observers expected during this period,459 but 
 
 454. See Ernest A. Young, After Kiobel: Legislative Reform of the Alien Tort Statute and the 
Migration of Human Rights Claims in American Courts (unpublished draft on file with author).  
 455. See text accompanying note 1, supra; see also Childress, supra note 6, at 712 (“[N]o 
other U.S. statute frames the issue of U.S. courts’ application of international law so starkly.”).  
 456. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting 
LORI FISLER DAMROSCH, LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER 
& HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 645 (4th ed. 2001)). 
 457. See Bellinger, supra note 13, at 8–10, 13–14; Ku & Yoo, supra note 127, at 195–98. 
 458. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213–16 (2d ed. 1997) (1964) (arguing 
that international law is not law because it lacks a system of “secondary rules” for the creation, 
interpretation, and enforcement of primary rules of conduct). 
 459. See, e.g., JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 190–91 (2005) 
(describing the role of the Helsinki Accords, in which the Soviet Union agreed to abide by basic 
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their effect remained largely political. International law provided an 
argument that could be employed in bilateral negotiations or in 
multilateral supranational organizations; sometimes it provided a 
rallying point for popular movements. But it was not ordinarily the 
sort of thing one could go to court and enforce. 
Those days are fading now, and international human-rights law 
increasingly operates as law today. We are moving into a period in 
which the most interesting questions involve not the substantive 
content of human rights but rather questions of institutional design 
for enforcement.460 International courts have proliferated, and they 
increasingly demonstrate an ability to shape nations’ behavior.461 And 
states face considerable informal pressures to comply even when not 
subject to sanctions or binding judgments.462 Legal enforcement does 
remain sporadic and often ad hoc in the absence of a centralized legal 
system at the international level. Experience with universal 
jurisdiction abroad suggests that courts must pick their spots carefully 
in order to be effective; prosecutions are most likely against former 
officials of defunct regimes who can no longer mobilize political 
blowback, and the need to make such pragmatic calculations poses its 
own difficulties for the international rule of law.463 But scholars 
continue to advance evidence that human-rights law does impose 
meaningful constraints on behavior.464 
In this environment, it is both unrealistic and unnecessary to 
exclude an independent role for courts. An international rule of law 
 
human-rights guarantees in what many perceived at the time as an empty gesture, in helping 
bring down Soviet communism). 
 460. See, e.g., Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 231, at 1145–50; Jenny S. Martinez, 
Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 431–33 (2003); Laurence R. 
Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 
YALE L.J. 273, 276–79 (1997). 
 461. See, e.g., ALTER, supra note 327, at 32–67. 
 462. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 635–55 (2004). 
 463. One may expect, for instance, an international version of the debate in American 
constitutional law over the legitimacy of the “passive virtues”—that is, doctrines by which courts 
avoid taking jurisdiction over disputes likely to damage their legitimacy. Compare ALEXANDER 
H. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH—THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 127 (1962) (arguing in favor of these “passive virtues”), with Gerald E. Gunther, The 
Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial 
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (criticizing Bickel’s view).  
 464. See, e.g., KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009). 
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has been a goal of American foreign policy since the Founding,465 and 
the increasing judicialization of international affairs may be seen as a 
sign of that policy’s success. In this vein, Tom Lee has argued that “an 
energetic role for the federal courts is fully consistent with the 
original meaning of the ATS.”466 Professor Lee points out that the 
federal judiciary historically served as a “safety valve” in foreign-
affairs controversies.467 This point mirrors a recurrent theme in the 
evolution of foreign sovereign immunity and the act-of-state doctrine: 
sometimes it is helpful to American foreign relations to separate the 
dispute-resolution role of the courts from the foreign-policy role of 
the national executive. The key question is how to preserve this 
complementary role while minimizing judicial interference with 
foreign policy formulated by the political branches. 
Once we concede some role to the courts, then human-rights 
enforcement raises at least two fundamental design questions. The 
first is the choice between public and private enforcement—that is, 
between enforcement initiated and controlled by government actors 
(or international organizations), on the one hand, and actions brought 
by private actors, principally victims but perhaps also other forms of 
“private attorneys general.” Within the class of public enforcement, 
more-specific questions arise concerning control over the decision to 
prosecute. In some European countries, for example, individual 
judges have been empowered to bring universal-jurisdiction 
prosecutions largely outside the control of national executive 
authorities.468 Some of the more extravagant episodes in this vein have 
led to legislation consolidating executive control over such 
prosecutions.469 Under the American FCPA, by contrast, 
prosecutorial authority is centralized not only within the federal 
Executive branch, but within a particular office at Main Justice.470 
 
 465. See, e.g., HERRING, supra note 15, at 69, 74 (noting the Washington administration’s 
insistence on neutral rights during the conflict between Britain and France); Burley, supra note 
7, at 481–88 (discussing the Founders’ general concern with upholding the international rule of 
law). 
 466. Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the 
Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1645, 1650 (2014). 
 467. Id. at 1657.  
 468. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 32, at 5. 
 469. See id. at 10–41; Ratner, supra note 386, at 889–92.  
 470. See Mike Koehler, The Impact of Kiobel on FCPA Enforcement, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 
18, 2013, 9:30 AM), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/18/kiobel-insta-symposium-the-
impact-of-kiobel-on-fcpa-enforcement.  
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When public enforcement occurs at the supranational level, issues of 
accountability and control become considerably more formidable.471 
The second choice is between enforcement by supranational or 
national institutions. Supranational enforcement may occur through 
permanent institutions, like the ICC; institutions created to deal with 
a particular situation, like the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); or one-shot 
decisionmakers assembled to hear a particular dispute, such as the 
investor-arbitration panels convened under Chapter 11 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).472 Permanent 
institutions may be either human-rights specific, like the ICC, or 
general-purpose, like the ICJ. National enforcement may also occur 
through preexisting general-purpose institutions, such as the U.S. 
federal courts, or through special-purpose institutions, such as South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. At each level, 
moreover, proceedings may be judicial or administrative in nature, 
and in either case institutions may or may not have authority to make 
new law in addition to interpreting and enforcing preexisting legal 
principles. This is true even for courts: international courts modeled 
on the civil-law tradition formally eschew any lawmaking function by 
denying the authority to create binding precedent,473 while American 
courts enjoy a robust tradition of common-law development of 
human-rights norms.474 
As the chart below demonstrates, one can find examples of all 
four combinations of choice along these two dimensions: 
 
 
 471. See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Accountability of International Prosecutors, in LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn ed., forthcoming 
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2473778 [hereinafter 
Turner, Accountability].  
 472. Although most consider NAFTA to be part of international economic law, the right 
against expropriation of private property—the concern of NAFTA Chapter 11—is also 
recognized as a human right. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 27, 43–44 (3d ed. 2013).  
 473. But see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 46–47 (2d ed. 1985) (observing that 
in practice, the civil-law tradition is not as hostile to precedent as it is in theory).  
 474. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizing an individual 
right to bear arms); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (invalidating the juvenile death 
penalty as “cruel and unusual punishment”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking 
down laws banning homosexual sodomy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(recognizing a due-process right to privacy); Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(holding that racially segregated schooling denies “equal protection of the laws”). 
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This is not the place for a comprehensive evaluation of these options, 
and I do not contend that one combination is optimal in all 
circumstances. At least for the foreseeable future, the best approach 
is probably a fairly eclectic mix of all four options. The remainder of 
this Part identifies some more general considerations involved in 
making the relevant choices. 
1. Supranational vs. National Enforcement.  Some critics of 
universal jurisdiction have argued that prosecution of grave and 
universally condemned crimes under international law should be 
reserved to international courts.475 The high-profile work of the ICC, 
as well as the ICTR and ICTY, tends to obscure the overall rarity of 
supranational human-rights enforcement.476 These sorts of tribunals 
must often overcome political pushback and typically suffer from 
limited resources.477 Experience in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia suggest that supranational tribunals may be an effective 
response to particularly egregious and high-profile human-rights 
atrocities, particularly when the perpetrating governments are 
politically isolated or defunct.478 More generally, Karen Alter has 
 
 475. See, e.g., Kissinger, supra note 53, at 92–95. 
 476. See generally DONNELLY, supra note 472, at 161 (emphasizing that “international 
human rights law creates a system of national implementation of international human rights”) 
(emphasis added).  
 477. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 40, at 671–73, 676–77; Payam Akhavan, Whither 
National Courts? The Rome Statute’s Missing Half, 8 J. INT. CRIM. JUSTICE 1245, 1247 (2010) 
(“[B]ecause of the costly and time-consuming nature of international criminal justice, where 
national courts have failed to act, the ICC can only investigate or prosecute a small fraction of 
the perpetrators.”). 
 478. See, e.g., Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 40, at 647–48 (noting that supranational 
criminal courts have developed a model of justice and procedure narrowly focused on 
atrocities); Langer, supra note 32, at 9 (noting that Rwandans and former Yugoslavs were 
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documented a remarkable expansion in the number and efficacy of 
international courts over the last half-century.479 But no one thinks 
that the international judiciary has developed the capacity to act as 
the primary enforcer of human rights.480 Assertions of universal 
jurisdiction by domestic courts developed largely in response to the 
weakness of supranational criminal enforcement,481 and that weakness 
seems likely to persist for the foreseeable future. 
Domestic courts have advantages beyond their superior 
resources. They enjoy established procedures for litigation, as well as 
established powers to develop evidence and enforce judgments. 
Advantages also arise from the generalist nature of domestic courts’ 
responsibilities. As much as they may strive for impartiality, a court 
whose raison d’etre is to prosecute particular defendants or crimes is 
likely to adopt a different perspective from one that sees human-
rights cases as just another subject on its general docket.482 Likewise, 
 
“defendants about whom the international community has broadly agreed that they may be 
prosecuted and punished, and whose state of nationality has not defended them”). The ICC, 
which has a more general mandate, is off to a rockier start. See, e.g., Rebecca Hamilton, Guest 
Post: When Should the ICC Call It Quits?, OPINIO JURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2015/01/10/guest-
post-icc-call-quits (Jan. 10, 2015, 10:14 AM) (describing the ICC’s suspension of investigative 
activities in Darfur after its inability to enforce its arrest warrants); Turner, Accountability, 
supra note 471, at 1–2 (noting general concerns about the ICC’s accountability). That tribunal 
may be most likely to succeed when it works in conjunction with national courts. See generally 
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005) 
[hereinafter Turner, Nationalizing]. 
 479. See ALTER, supra note 327, at 335. 
 480. See, e.g., Karen Alter, Remarks at Duke Law School (Apr. 15, 2014) (acknowledging 
this point); International Criminal Court, Understanding the International Criminal Court, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (“The 
International Criminal Court is not a substitute for national courts.”); CTR. FOR JUSTICE & 
ACCOUNTABILITY, The Alien Tort Statute: A Means of Redress for Survivors of Human Rights 
Abuses, available at http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=435 (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) (agreeing 
that “human rights law—if it is to be effective—must be implemented on a national level, 
through domestic courts”); Akhavan, supra note 477, at 1251 (observing that “the entire 
complementarity scheme [of the ICC] rests on the fundamental assumption that national 
prosecutions are essential to the viability of the international criminal justice system”); Turner, 
Nationalizing, supra note 478, at 1–2 (“A less hierarchical international criminal justice system 
that relies significantly on national governments is likely to be better informed by diverse 
perspectives, more acceptable to local populations, and more effective in accomplishing its 
ultimate goals.”); MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND 
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 237 (2001) (“[T]he fact is that 
international institutions can never provide first-line protection for victims of rights violations. 
When protection at the national level is absent or breaks down, there are severe limitations to 
what international enforcement mechanisms can accomplish.”).  
 481. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.  
 482. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–32 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the domestic independent counsel mechanism on similar grounds). 
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the frustrating abstraction of international human-rights discourse 
may be tempered by the likely cross-fertilization arising from 
deciding international cases alongside garden-variety domestic torts, 
crimes, and discrimination claims. 
The key point, however, is that courts function most effectively 
when they are embedded within a larger legal system.483 This 
embeddedness broadens the court’s legitimacy, enhances its access to 
resources, provides executive aid to enforce its decisions, and permits 
legislative adjustment of the governing law in reaction to the court’s 
activity.484 Proponents of international adjudication typically worry 
about domestic courts’ dependence on national governments, but that 
dependence will often run both ways. Critically, national governments 
and private entities depend on their domestic courts for a wide range 
of functions—especially the prosecution of domestic crimes, the 
resolution of private disputes, and the accommodation of local 
practices to national law. Barry Friedman and Erin Delaney have 
demonstrated, for example, that the U.S. Supreme Court developed a 
strong role of reviewing the constitutionality of national legislation 
and enforcing individual rights in part because the national 
government depended on that court to bring state governments in 
line with national law.485 The broader point is that because national 
courts depend on domestic courts as instruments of state power, they 
generally cannot afford to undermine those courts by defying their 
rulings on human-rights questions.486 The costs of defying freestanding 
human-rights tribunals at the international level are considerably less. 
The U.S. government has been known to defy the ICJ, for example;487 
 
 483. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 164. 
 484. Consider, for example, Congress’s expansion of statutory rights and enforcement 
mechanisms to combat systematic racial discrimination in the United States, in reaction to the 
course of the Supreme Court’s case law on that subject. 
 485. See Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of 
Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2011); see also Erin F. Delaney, Judiciary 
Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 543 (2014) (arguing 
that the British judiciary is likely to become more powerful generally vis-à-vis the government 
based on its acquisition of responsibility to enforce the rules of devolved power in the U.K.).  
 486. Cf. JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at 
414–15 (1996) (describing how President Eisenhower had to support the Supreme Court in the 
Little Rock desegregation crisis in order to squelch Southern defiance of federal law). 
 487. See U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, 1986 DEP’T STATE 
BULL. 67, 68 (noting that “[o]ur experience in the case instituted against the United States by 
Nicaragua in April, 1984 provided the chief motivation for the Administration’s review of our 
acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction”); Andreas L. Pauls, From Neglect to 
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it is much harder to imagine U.S. government officials defying an 
order from a domestic federal court.488 
The two European courts demonstrate the same point. By far the 
most successful supranational courts are the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).489 
And yet these courts are both embedded within communities of 
European states bound together by a much thicker set of rules and 
institutions than international society at large. The ECJ is a 
coordinate branch of a full-fledged government for the European 
Union (EU).490 Its human-rights jurisprudence has evolved, at least in 
part, as a means of furthering the supremacy and integrative function 
of European law.491 Much as in the United States, EU officials can 
defy the ECJ’s human-rights rulings only at the risk of undermining 
the Court’s power to check the Member States.492 
The ECtHR, on the other hand, is formally autonomous and 
covers considerably more states than the EU. But the ECtHR’s 
overlap with and connection to the EU legal order probably explains 
much of its influence. The ECtHR is now formally integrated into EU 
law in a number of characteristically convoluted ways,493 and the ECJ 
 
Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 783, 788 (2004) 
(discussing the United States’ refusal to accept the ICJ’s judgment in the Nicaragua case). 
 488. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (successfully ordering the President to 
hand over evidence of criminal wrongdoing by the President and his staff). 
 489. See ALTER, supra note 327, at 103 (showing that “the extent of activity and influence of 
[the ECJ and the ECtHR] can make all other [international courts] pale in comparison”); 
Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: An Appraisal, 31 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1104, 1112 (2008) (observing that it “is undisputed . . . that the ECJ has 
played a central role in shaping the human rights discourse and the treaties that now 
incorporate human rights protection”). But see POSNER, supra note 40, at 158–59 (questioning 
assertions of broad compliance with ECtHR rulings). 
 490. See POSNER, supra note 40, at 161 (suggesting that “the reason for its success is that the 
ECJ is not truly an ‘international court’ for purposes of comparison with the ICJ, arbitral 
tribunals, and other courts”). 
 491. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role 
of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Rights Within the Legal Order 
of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1118–19 (1986). 
 492. Cf. Friedman & Delaney, supra note 485, at 1152–59. 
 493. See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of 
Lisbon, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 645, 650–51, 655 (2011) (explaining that the Lisbon Treaty, which 
came into force in 2009, gave binding legal force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which in turn provides for parity of interpretation of those rights overlapping with the ECtHR; 
the treaty also initiated the process of EU accession to the ECtHR itself); Tommaso Pavone, 
The Past and Future Relationship of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights: A Functional Analysis 3 (May 28, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) 
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has for many years looked to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the ECtHR’s decisions interpreting it.494 And as one might 
expect, the comparative autonomy of the ECtHR comes at a cost in 
efficacy. That court has more limited remedial authority than the 
ECJ, and its jurisprudence incorporates a great deal of substantive 
deference to national governments.495 The two most successful 
international courts thus demonstrate the importance of 
embeddedness in a domestic legal regime. 
Domestic experience with public-law litigation likewise 
illustrates the importance of situating judicial review within a full-
blown domestic legal system. Brown v. Board of Education496 is the 
American paradigm of public-law litigation, yet the post-Brown 
history of desegregation efforts demonstrates that courts are most 
successful in combating entrenched and extensive human-rights 
violations when they act in conjunction with executive and legislative 
institutions.497 Much of Brown’s impact on the history of civil rights, 
moreover, stems from the symbolic force of the Supreme Court’s 
declaration that segregation violated the supreme law of the land.498 
That impact may well be less when the pronouncement comes from 
outside the national legal system.  
As with much public-law litigation, moreover, the critical 
remedial element for desegregation was not damages but injunctive 
relief; desegregation of public schools required extensive judicial 
 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042867) (“[T]hrough the 2009 Lisbon Treaty the EU member states 
took action to unify the [EU and ECtHR human rights] regimes.”). 
 494. See Defeis, supra note 489, at 1113–14 (“In recent years, the ECJ has effectively 
incorporated not only the provisions of the ECHR, but also the decisions of the [ECtHR] into 
its human rights jurisprudence.”); Weiler, supra note 491, at 1135 (“The [ECJ] has indicated its 
intention to look to the ECHR whenever an issue of human rights comes before it.”). 
 495. See Andreas Follesdal, The Legitimacy of International Human Rights Review: The 
Case of the European Court of Human Rights, 40 J. SOC. PHIL. 595, 595 (2009) (observing that 
the ECtHR exercises a “weak” form of judicial review in that “the ECtHR can find a law or its 
application to be incompatible with the ECHR, but this does not directly affect the validity of 
that law in the domestic legal system”); Pavone, supra note 493, at 10–11 (noting that the 
ECtHR may only impose fines on a violating state, and that its doctrine incorporates both a 
“margin of appreciation” protecting the discretion of national governments and a measure of 
deference to majoritarian state practices).  
 496. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 497. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1993) (demonstrating that judicial action is most effective when 
combined with action by the political branches). 
 498. See, e.g., David Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. 
Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 152–53 (1994) (presenting evidence that Brown 
inspired the efforts of civil-rights protesters involved in the Montgomery bus boycott). 
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supervision of public institutions, often lasting for many decades.499 
No foreign or supranational court can hope to provide this sort of 
relief, and ATS claimants have generally sought damages alone. 
Finally, much of the judicial impact in support of the African-
American civil-rights movement came not in the form of decisions 
mandating particular reforms, but rather through judicial holdings 
that shielded various forms of political protest and limited the 
oppressive power of the state criminal-justice system.500 Courts 
outside the domestic legal system are poorly situated to perform this 
role. 
The considerations just discussed provide reasons not only to 
favor national courts per se, but also to employ them in particular 
roles. Brown and similar cases involve national courts engaged in 
review of actions by their own governments (or subnational 
governments). There are, of course, drawbacks to this degree of 
embeddedness. Even in countries with well-developed norms of 
judicial independence, courts called upon to enforce international law 
against their own governments “often defer to governments because 
the executive branch enjoys foreign affairs power, because 
governments have more insight into what an international agreement 
was supposed to mean, and because diplomats often have a better 
sense of how different legal interpretations might impact foreign 
relations.”501 That sort of deference may often be salutary—a means 
of mitigating the countermajoritarian difficulty that courts otherwise 
face.502 But of course the primary drawback to relying on national 
courts to review acts by or associated with their own governments is 
that judicial review will often be unavailable or corrupt in the country 
in which the rights violations occurred.503 
 
 499. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) 
(affirming the courts’ “broad power to fashion [an equitable] remedy that will assure a unitary 
school system”); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1991) (ruling on a request to withdraw district 
court supervision of a desegregation plan for a Georgia school district first imposed in 1969). 
 500. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (relying on the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment to prevent use of libel litigation to deter coverage of the civil-
rights movement by news organizations); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (overturning 
convictions of civil-rights protesters involved in lunch-counter sit-ins on due-process grounds); 
see also Ernest A. Young, Constitutionalism Outside the Courts, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON 
THE CONSTITUTION (Mark Graber, Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2551025. 
 501. ALTER, supra note 327, at 9. 
 502. See BICKEL, supra note 463, at 16–23. 
 503. See, e.g., Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing 
International Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 539, 540 (2007). 
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By contrast, transnational public-law cases typically ask national 
courts to entertain challenges to practices by foreign governments 
and officials or private entities acting in concert with them. Universal 
jurisdiction is the pure type, but courts exercising jurisdiction over 
actions and parties with little nexus to the forum state will have few of 
the advantages that national courts ordinarily derive from 
embeddedness within a robust domestic legal system. Consider a 
hypothetical effort by a Belgian court in the late 1950s to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over Orval Faubus, the segregationist governor 
of Arkansas who sought to block desegregation of the Little Rock 
schools.504 Such a suit would surely have aroused considerable 
resentment in the United States; it might even have brought 
Governor Faubus sympathy as the target of “outside agitators.” 
Equally important, the Belgian court’s remedial toolkit would 
have been extremely limited. The most promising option would have 
been a damage award against some multinational company implicated 
in Arkansas’ segregated regime—an American manufacturer of Little 
Rock’s school buses possessing European assets, perhaps—but no 
foreign court would have been able to undertake the sort of 
continuing oversight that desegregation litigation turned out to 
require. Most important, the domestic political branches would have 
been extremely unlikely to make their own efforts to support the 
Belgian court’s orders politically, supervise compliance with its 
rulings, or enact complementary legislation. Proponents of ATS 
litigation in foreign-cubed cases have rightly touted the symbolic 
benefits of judicial rulings vindicating plaintiffs’ human-rights claims, 
but few would argue that such cases can force meaningful reform. 
The second wave of Filártiga suits may be an intermediate case, 
to the extent they are directed at American corporations and 
behavior with a significant nexus to the United States. That nexus 
enhances the legitimacy of national court intervention; it also brings 
the defendants’ conduct within reach of a broader range of remedial 
tools. One could imagine, for example, consent decrees that would 
require a corporate defendant to institute controls over cooperation 
with foreign security forces; such a decree might well involve 
continuing judicial supervision over compliance. Likewise, it is far 
more realistic to expect complementary legislation and executive 
action bearing on action by American defendants or conducted within 
 
 504. For an account, see Tony A. Freyer, Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis, 1954-
1957, 66 ARK. HIST. Q. 145 (2007). 
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the United States. It remains to be seen, of course, whether the basic 
model of second-wave Filártiga cases can truly work; even if courts 
impose large damages awards on corporate defendants implicated in 
human-rights abuses abroad, those defendants may turn out to have 
insufficient leverage to effect real change in foreign countries.505 
Given such uncertainties, we should temper expectations for 
transnational public-law litigation in the Filártiga mold. 
Notwithstanding the impressive accomplishments of public-law 
litigation within the domestic sphere, American judicial power will be 
hard to exercise to similar effect across international borders. Even if 
our courts can exercise only limited leverage over the behavior of 
foreign human-rights abusers, however, ATS litigation in domestic 
courts may serve three more modest purposes. First, successful suits 
against corporate aiders and abettors may compensate victims even if 
they do not force reform in the victims’ home countries. A second 
purpose dovetails with the First Congress’s likely intent that 
American courts provide a remedy for violations of the law of nations 
perpetrated within the United States or by Americans abroad.506 That 
is not quite the “badge of honor” that Anne-Marie Slaughter had in 
mind for the ATS, but it is nonetheless part of good international 
citizenship. 
The third purpose ought to appeal to both proponents and 
traditional critics of ATS litigation. Human-rights cases in national 
courts offer those courts an opportunity to help shape and articulate 
norms of international law, rather than leaving those norms to 
supranational and foreign courts. Generally speaking, the American 
debate has seen internationalists pressing for the recognition of 
international human-rights claims in domestic courts, while 
 
 505. Other problems may arise from the possibility that multiple jurisdictions may assert 
authority to adjudicate any given rights claim. One can imagine, for example, an international 
version of the infamous “Delaware settlement” in federal securities law, under which litigation 
occurs in a friendly jurisdiction and results in a lenient settlement, which is then asserted to 
preclude litigation in other more rigorous jurisdictions. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 388–99 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting this problem). Russia might purport to try Syrian war criminals, imposing light penalties 
and then asserting that its judgment bars prosecution in any other jurisdiction. But there is no 
reason the international law of conflicts and judgments cannot develop rules to address such 
problems. Moreover, overlapping jurisdictions are a feature as well as a bug, because they 
provide a check on any one nation’s unwillingness to prosecute a given claim. 
 506. See Bellia & Clark, Law of Nations, supra note 115, at 448–49; Lee, Safe Conduct, supra 
note 117, at 836–38. 
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nationalists have resisted that effort.507 But nationalists ought to 
rethink that position. International human-rights law is unlikely to go 
away, and it is more likely to develop in ways that are insensitive or 
inimical to American interests if our own courts do not participate in 
that development.508 Conversely, American jurists deciding human-
rights cases are likely to exert considerable influence, given the 
prestige of the American judiciary, its robust practice of reason-
giving, and the ready accessibility of its opinions. The best way to 
make international human-rights law more compatible with 
American foreign and security policy is to make our courts active 
participants in that law’s formation. 
2. Public vs. Private Enforcement.  I have already discussed some 
of the concerns about private enforcement—in particular, that it 
places the decision to initiate human-rights litigation in the hands of 
persons with no particular mandate (and insufficient information) to 
reconcile that litigation with their nation’s broader foreign policy. 
Analogous concerns exist at the domestic level. American law allows 
extremely broad scope for private litigation that coexists, often 
uneasily, with public regulatory schemes. Sometimes both public and 
private enforcement exist for the same statutory standards. The 
federal employment-discrimination laws, for example, are enforced 
through both public actions by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and private suits by victims of discrimination;509 likewise, 
federal statutes restricting securities fraud have been construed to 
permit both public actions by the SEC and private suits by 
shareholders.510 In other areas, private litigation under state common 
law occurs alongside public administration and enforcement. The 
federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves the sale of 
prescription drugs, for example, but private plaintiffs injured by a 
defective drug may bring a state tort suit against the manufacturer.511 
Not surprisingly, a vigorous domestic debate addresses the 
desirability of private enforcement.512 Critics of private tort litigation 
 
 507. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 6, at 710–11. 
 508. See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 231, at 1221–29 (developing this 
argument). 
 509. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2012). 
 510. See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text. 
 511. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 580–81 (2009). 
 512. See, e.g., FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard 
A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) [hereinafter EPSTEIN & GREVE]; THOMAS O. 
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over defective drugs, for example, argue that such litigation 
undermines the FDA’s role as regulator and chills the development 
and marketing of new medicines.513 In many areas, such as medical 
devices and generic drugs, Congress has protected the primacy of 
public enforcement by preempting private litigation;514 in others, both 
Congress and the courts have recognized that private enforcement 
plays a valuable supplementary role.515 The Supreme Court has thus 
steered a middle course dictated largely by the details of particular 
statutory regimes rather than broad preferences for or against private 
enforcement.516 
The ATS debate in many ways fits comfortably within this frame. 
Critics of the Filártiga line would rely on Congress and the Executive 
to set standards for human-rights violations and to determine when, if 
ever, enforcement actions under those standards should be brought in 
American courts.517 Advocates, on the other hand, would likely 
respond that Congress suffers from political gridlock and a crowded 
agenda, and in any event it cannot draft legislation with sufficient 
flexibility to accommodate the evolving imperatives of international 
human rights.518 Likewise, the national Executive has traditionally 
monitored and reported on human-rights violations abroad but has 
shown little inclination to pursue foreign rights violators in American 
courts.519 
 
MCGARITY, JR., THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL 
JURIES (2008). 
 513. See, e.g., Daniel E. Troy, The Case for FDA Preemption, in EPSTEIN & GREVE, supra 
note 512, at 81, 100–05. 
 514. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2581 (2011); Riegel v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321–30 (2008). 
 515. See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581 (rejecting preemptive effect for FDA approval of a 
brand-name drug’s label).  
 516. See generally Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption 
Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 302–06 (2012) (surveying the 
Court’s preemption cases). 
 517. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 167, at 356. 
 518. See, e.g., Koh, State Law, supra note 165, at 1843–45, 1854 (observing that the 
legislative process is “notoriously dominated by committees, strongwilled individuals, collective 
action problems, and private rent-seeking” and suggesting that Congress should more 
appropriately play a reactive role by incorporating norms of CIL in federal statutes after they 
have evolved through judicial recognition); see also Jonathan Serrie, Gridlock in Congress Stalls 
Human-Trafficking Bill, FOX NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2012/10/02/gridlock-in-congress-over-human-trafficking (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).  
 519. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper (last visited Feb. 4, 
2015). 
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It ought to help simply to recognize the similarity between the 
debates in foreign-relations law and domestic regulatory policy. As 
exotic as cases like Filártiga or Kiobel may seem, the issues they raise 
are hardly sui generis. The advantages of public and private 
enforcement are familiar from the domestic debate: Public 
enforcement is good for setting uniform standards and for integrating 
those standards with other aspects of legislative and executive policy. 
Public enforcement is likewise subject to majoritarian political checks 
on both over- and underenforcement of public norms. Private 
enforcement, on the other hand, leverages private resources to make 
up for constraints on public-enforcement funding. It may provide 
better back-end monitoring of harms (as opposed to front-end 
standard setting). And it frequently provides compensation for 
victims that is lacking in public-enforcement schemes. 
Few areas of domestic law rely exclusively on public 
enforcement, and a reliance on private enforcement is an integral part 
of American litigation culture.520 If we take seriously an international-
law obligation to address human-rights violations, at least when those 
violations have some connection to the United States, then we should 
think twice before either gutting the ATS or adopting an 
untrammeled regime of private enforcement. Moreover, the case for 
exclusive public enforcement in the domestic context typically relies 
on Congress’s delegation of authority to an expert agency that sets 
standards and, to at least some extent, monitors compliance.521 There 
is no such federal agency charged in this way with enforcement of 
human rights. The State Department monitors human-rights abuses, 
but its primary role is to conduct diplomacy. It might well undermine 
the Department’s diplomatic role to expect it to take a position on 
every alleged human-rights abuse; for this reason, some degree of 
institutional separation between human-rights enforcement and 
diplomacy may actually further the Executive’s ability to conduct 
foreign policy.522  
 
 520. See supra notes 416–20 and accompanying text. 
 521. See, e.g., Troy, supra note 513, at 103–104 (emphasizing the role of the FDA). 
 522. In the mid–twentieth century, federal courts deciding cases involving foreign sovereign 
immunity routinely deferred to the State Department’s position as to whether a nation should 
be accorded immunity in the circumstances of that case. Both Congress and the Executive 
ultimately considered this so-called “Tate Letter” regime detrimental to American foreign 
policy, because it pressured the State Department to take a position on immunity whenever a 
foreign nation requested it to do so—even when the Department preferred to remain silent. 
Congress enacted the FSIA in part to allow courts to decide foreign immunity issues 
independently of the Executive. See generally BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 395, at 74–
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Notwithstanding the ubiquity of private attorneys general, our 
domestic law typically subjects private enforcement to important 
limits. Courts have not hesitated to find preemption where private 
tort suits interfere with federal regulatory policy, and the Supreme 
Court has been increasingly cautious about inferring private rights to 
sue where Congress has not made its intent clear. And ever since 
President Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation in 1793,523 American 
law has asserted a particular concern with maintaining public control 
over foreign policy. Kiobel’s presumption against extraterritoriality 
seems likely to weed out the cases most likely to threaten that 
control. Where ATS claims do have a significant nexus to the United 
States, the benefits of leveraging private litigation resources and 
providing compensation for victims suggest a continuing role for 
private enforcement. 
* * * 
At the end of the day, these judgments about the role of national 
courts and private enforcement are ones that Congress ought to 
make. Scholars writing about the ATS have worked hard to milk 
every ounce of meaning out of a terse statutory text and a sparse 
historical record. But at some point, we should recognize that the 
drafters of the ATS neither anticipated nor provided answers to the 
questions posed by contemporary human-rights litigation. As Anne-
Marie Slaughter has acknowledged, the drafters of the first Judiciary 
Act “could not have anticipated a case like Filártiga.”524 It would be 
surprising, then, to discover in the historical materials answers to 
questions about aiding-and-abetting liability or an exhaustion 
requirement. It would be even more surprising if those answers suited 
the international situation of the contemporary United States. As 
Tom Lee has emphasized, the foreign-policy and security imperatives 
of a small, weak, and geographically isolated nation were rather 
 
75. This episode suggests there are advantages to letting the Executive deny responsibility for 
judicial determinations.  
 523. See id. at 12–26 (discussing this episode). Likewise, the Logan Act makes it a federal 
crime for private citizens to conduct foreign diplomacy. See Logan Act, 1 Stat. 613 (1799) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2012)). But see Confrontation in the Gulf; Jesse 
Jackson Meets Hussein on Gulf Crisis, Iraq Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1990, http://www
.nytimes.com/1990/08/31/world/confrontation-gulf-jesse-jackson-meets-hussein-gulf-crisis-iraq-
reports.html. 
 524. Burley, supra note 7, at 488; accord HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 55. 
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different from those of today’s continental superpower with three 
hundred million people and vital interests all over the globe.525 
If Congress declines to act, however, the courts will need to fill in 
the interstices of the ATS through federal common lawmaking.526 
Sosa recognized that ATS cases rely on a federal cause of action 
implied as a matter of federal common law,527 and courts have been 
willing to construct federal-common-law doctrine as needed to fill in 
the procedural and remedial details for other implied rights of action 
under the federal securities laws and other statutes.528 Both the 
Court’s ATS decisions in Sosa and Kiobel and its implied-rights cases 
generally suggest that the Court will fill gaps conservatively—that is, 
that it will continue to view the appropriate scope of ATS litigation 
more narrowly than some lower courts and the human-rights bar 
might like, but also that it will preserve the Founders’ basic notion of 
a private federal remedy for violations of the law of nations. However 
one might hope for a more original insight at the end of a long article, 
that approach strikes this author as fundamentally sound. 
CONCLUSION 
As Ingrid Wuerth rightly observes, the “real difficulty” with the 
debate about the ATS is that “[b]oth sides of the debate capture 
important and deeply-held values”—on the one hand, “redress for 
horrific violations of the most fundamental human rights”; but on the 
other, “the basic sense that many of these cases have very little to do 
with the United States, may impose foreign policy costs, and may not 
enhance net social welfare for those most harmed.”529 Often these 
values are presented through high-stakes rhetoric: Beth Stephens 
hails the ATS as “a means to hold the most egregious perpetrators 
accountable for the most egregious violations of international law,”530 
and a pre-Kiobel statement by EarthRights International predicted 
 
 525. See generally Thomas H. Lee, Theorizing the Foreign Affairs Constitution (Fordham 
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1996734, Jan. 31, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1996734. 
 526. See generally D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 467–73 (1942) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (discussing the need for courts to fill statutory gaps with federal common law). 
 527. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
 528. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 297–98 
(1993) (fashioning a federal-common-law right of contribution in suits under § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5). 
 529. Wuerth, supra note 4, at 620. 
 530. Stephens, Sosa, supra note 204, at 535. 
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that “human rights law [would] be set back decades” if the defendants 
prevailed in that case.531 Similarly, a prominent study criticizing the 
ATS posed a “nightmare scenario” in which “100,000 class action 
Chinese plaintiffs, organized by New York trial lawyers,” file suit 
against major multinational corporations like General Motors, 
Toyota, and Siemens in federal court “for abetting China’s denial of 
political rights, for observing China’s restrictions on trade unions, and 
for impairing the Chinese environment. These plaintiffs might claim 
actual damages of $6 billion and punitive damages of $20 billion.”532 
Such a suit, and the settlement pressures it would engender, might 
massively “chill . . . trade and investment” and place the United 
States “at loggerheads with traditional allies, trading partners, and 
developing countries.”533 
As a legal academic, one always hates to argue that the law is less 
exciting than people think. But one implication of my exploration of 
ATS litigation is that the stakes may not be as high as they sometimes 
seem. The “most egregious perpetrators” of human-rights abuses are 
unlikely to find themselves in the ATS dock, and—as Professor 
Stephens acknowledges—the ATS is unlikely to “plac[e] the federal 
courts at the cutting edge of the progressive development of 
international human rights norms.”534 Nor is the business community’s 
“nightmare scenario” likely to come to pass: no large damages awards 
have been rendered against corporate defendants; settlements have 
been relatively modest; and massive class actions remain largely on 
the horizon. Likewise, the federal courts’ efforts to narrow the ATS, 
including the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel, are unlikely to 
usher in a new era of expanded impunity. The courts’ limits have 
limits, and other avenues—including the TVPA and state litigation—
remain. It is, perhaps, time to step back and take a breath. 
 
 531. The U.S. Supreme Court Must Preserve the Alien Tort Statute for International 
Corporate Human Rights Cases, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L (June 13, 2012), http://www.earth
rights.org/legal/us-supreme-court-must-preserve-alien-tort-statute-international-corporate-
human-rights-cases; see also Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in 
Conflict Zones: How Kiobel Undermines the Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights, 52 
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 119, 132 (2010), available at http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/HILJ-Online_52_Giannini_Farbstein.pdf (suggesting that the Second 
Circuit’s exclusion of corporate liability in Kiobel “would have permitted the German state to 
privatize the gas chambers with the result that a company like I.G. Farben would then have 
been able to exterminate millions of people for profit with impunity”). 
 532. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 10, at 1. 
 533. Id. at 1–2. 
 534. Stephens, Sosa, supra note 204, at 535. 
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In this Article, I have argued that the tension between the 
competing values implicated by ATS litigation should not be resolved 
based on sui generis doctrines of foreign-relations law, but rather in 
two more traditional ways. The first is to fit the problems arising 
under the ATS into traditional federal-courts doctrines governing 
implied rights of action. The second is to apply those doctrines using 
data to be gleaned from foreign experiences with the actual exercise 
of universal jurisdiction. These approaches, however, can only take us 
so far. Where they run out, we should not assume that judicial 
lawmaking can answer every question. It may be that only Congress 
can construct an appropriately nuanced and workable regime for 
private human-rights litigation. 
Any decisionmakers addressing the ATS after Kiobel should 
consider its unresolved issues in light of broader debates about the 
structure of human-rights enforcement in international law. Human-
rights enforcement should not be left to supranational institutions, 
both because they lack the resources and legitimacy to do an 
adequate job and because the development of international human-
rights law would benefit from the participation of American courts. In 
assessing the way domestic institutions enforce human rights, 
moreover, we should consider another broader debate—that 
involving the proper balance between public and private enforcement 
at the domestic level. Domestic experience suggests that a mix of 
public and private enforcement is best, and one may hope that the 
Supreme Court remains committed to this sort of balance. 
International human-rights law has largely succeeded in 
establishing a core of widely accepted prohibitions on torture, 
genocide, and similar acts. The challenge now is designing institutions 
to vindicate those principles. Because sovereign states continue to 
dominate the international scene, these institutions will have to be 
built primarily at the domestic level. And they are more likely to 
endure if they accommodate both the moral imperatives of human-
rights law and individual nations’ needs to maintain security and 
pursue other national interests. The complexities and compromises 
that this will entail are, after all, part of what it means to treat 
international law as law. 
 
